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ABSTRACT 
 
 
ELITE RECRUITMENT AND POLITICAL CAREER PATTERNS:  
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN TURKEY 
 
 
 
GÜLNUR KOCAPINAR YILDIRIM 
 
Ph.D. Dissertation, December 2018 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu 
 
 
Keywords: political elites, political career, Turkish politics, political parties 
 
This dissertation aims to explain the determinants of political elite recruitment and 
political career patterns in Turkey, with specific reference to deputies (MPs) of the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM), candidates running in general elections and 
local party elites. It provides answers to the questions of “what are the determinants of 
career patterns of political elite in Turkey?”, “why and how do some individuals become 
first-ranked candidates even though they have never run in general elections prior to their 
candidacy?” and “why do some individuals become candidates in general elections even 
though their electability chances are low?”. Questions are answered by the help of two 
unique datasets (MPs dataset and MP candidates dataset) consisting of data between 2002 
and 2015, and in-depth interviews conducted with local party elites of four political 
parties in Turkey. Data were compiled from the official websites of the TBMM, Supreme 
Election Council of Turkey and political parties. MPs dataset includes socio-economic 
backgrounds, legislative, party, local politics and civil society experiences of the MPs, 
while MP candidates dataset contains information on candidates who ran in general 
elections, and election results (2002-2015). Results show that the composition of the MPs 
in the TBMM has changed through time; ideological stances of political parties affect the 
composition of their MPs; political parties strategically revise their party lists and 
specifically change first-ranked candidates in districts where they are electorally 
vulnerable; and ambitious politicians accept unwinnable candidacy ranks with the 
expectation of pushing their ranks to electable positions in future elections.
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ÖZET 
 
 
SİYASİ SEÇKİNLERİN PARTİLER TARAFINDAN SEÇİLMESİ VE SİYASİ 
KARİYER MODELLERİ: TÜRKİYE’DEKİ SİYASİ PARTİLERİN 
KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ANALİZİ 
 
 
GÜLNUR KOCAPINAR YILDIRIM 
 
Doktora Tezi, Aralık 2018 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: siyasi seçkinler, siyasi kariyer, Türkiye siyaseti, siyasi partiler 
 
Bu tez, Türkiye’deki siyasi seçkinlerin partiler tarafından seçilmesinin ve bu seçkinlerin 
izledikleri siyasi kariyer yollarının belirleyici unsurlarının neler olduğuna Türkiye Büyük 
Millet Meclisi (TBMM)’ne seçilmiş olan milletvekilleri, genel seçim adayları ve yerel 
siyasi parti örgütlerinde görev alan parti seçkinleri özelinde açıklama getirmeyi 
amaçlamaktadır. Tez, “Türkiye’deki siyasi seçkinlerin kariyer modellerinin belirleyici 
unsurları nelerdir?”, “kimi adaylar daha önce genel seçimlerde aday olmamalarına 
rağmen neden ve nasıl birinci sıra adayı olmaktadır?” ve “seçilme şansı düşük olan kişiler 
genel seçimlerde neden aday olmaktadır?” sorularına, 2002 ve 2015 yıllarını kapsayan 
milletvekilleri veriseti ve milletvekili adayları veriseti ile dört siyasi partinin yerel 
örgütlerinde görev alan parti seçkinleri ile yapılmış derinlemesine görüşmeler yardımıyla 
cevaplar sunmaktadır. Verisetlerinde bulunan veriler, TBMM, Yüksek Seçim Kurulu ve 
siyasi partilerin resmi websitelerinden alınmıştır. Milletvekilleri veriseti, 
milletvekillerinin sosyoekonomik özellikleri ile yasama, parti, yerel siyaset ve sivil 
toplum örgütü tecrübelerini kapsarken, milletvekili adayları veriseti genel seçim adayları 
ve beş genel seçim (2002-2015) sonucu hakkında bilgi içermektedir. Bulgular, 
TBMM’nin milletvekili bileşiminin yıllar içinde değiştiğini, siyasi partilerin ideolojik 
pozisyonlarının bu partilerin milletvekili kompozisyonunu etkilediğini, siyasi partilerin 
düşük oy aldıkları seçim bölgelerinde aday listelerini yeniden yapılandırdığı ve özellikle 
birinci sıra adaylarını değiştirdiğini ve siyasi motivasyona sahip kişilerin gelecekteki 
seçimlerde aday listelerinin daha üst sıralarından aday gösterilebilecekleri beklentileri ile 
seçilme şansları düşük olan sıralardan aday olmayı kabul ettiklerini göstermektedir.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Purpose of the Dissertation 
 
In one of his books on Turkish political history, Altan Öymen mentioned a couple living 
next door to his family’s house in Ankara:  
“They moved to our apartment after we started to live there. From time to 
time we might run across and greet each other on the stairs. After a while, I 
learned that the man was an engineer and serving as a public servant… But, I 
did not know his name, and learnt it afterwards. Indeed, in the future there 
would be no one who does not know their names in the country: Süleyman 
Demirel and Nazmiye Demirel. Of course, we could not know that one day 
our engineer neighbor will occupy the position of then Prime Minister (PM) 
Adnan Menderes. Neither could we know that he will be the president of the 
country after serving long years as PM. I have heard that he was quite 
successful in his job as public servant, and many people thought that his future 
was bright. Yet, obviously, those people were talking about his occupational 
career. Indeed, he was promoted to the highest level of his job through time. 
However, no one could imagine that he will occupy the highest political 
position in the future as the president.”1 (Öymen, 2009: 20).  
Similar stories are available for other political actors as well. For example, Bülent Ecevit, 
who has been one of the major figures of Turkish politics just as Demirel, and who served 
as PM for long years, mentioned that entering politics was not his nor his wife Rahşan 
Ecevit’s (who also played important roles in Turkish politics) primary goal in life. 
Actually, being very interested in literature, poetry and painting, they once said that they 
were planning to live in a small cabin in the meadows and spend their life creating art 
(Dündar and Akar, 2006). Nevertheless, they ended up with political careers not unlike 
                                                          
1 The book is written in Turkish, and translation belongs to the author of this dissertation. 
2 
 
Demirels. Back in the time, Öymen and Ecevit were working at Ulus daily, and they were 
close friends. Öymen was suggesting that the Ecevits become members of the Republican 
People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi - CHP), but their life plans did not yet include a 
political career. However, Ulus was closed by the decision of Democrat Party (Demokrat 
Parti – DP) government, and this incident, which Ecevits defined as quite an unfair 
decision, influenced them deeply and led them to register with the CHP as party members. 
Hence, with the impact of triggering factors, they started their engagement with politics 
(Dündar and Akar, 2006). Inferring from such stories, one may understand that some 
individuals who do not have any intention for entering politics may change their decisions 
and become politicians through time, as these individuals became politically ambitious 
with the emergence of specific motives and interests. Some individuals, conversely, may 
always have held interest in politics -sometimes starting from early childhood- and they 
desire to embark on political careers. However, not everyone with strong political interest 
and motivation can become a politician. Then, what determines who becomes a politician 
and why? 
With regard to occupying political office, questions of who governs and who possesses 
power to rule have been examined in many different political systems. As a related 
question, who becomes a politician is also worth explaining, since politicians consist of 
one of the major components of political systems. More specifically, political systems are 
identified with three major elements: authorities, regimes, and community which consists 
of the people (Easton, 1953). Among these, authorities consist of various levels of elites, 
especially the political elite. The political career patterns of these elites help us to 
understand relationships within political systems, and to predict activities in a given 
legislature (Scarrow, 1997: 254). 
Throughout time, from kings to elected presidents, many different types of rulers have 
possessed authority to govern states. As authority depends upon the legitimate right to 
rule politically, it has attracted the attention of social scientists who pondered and 
examined what exactly produces political legitimacy of the ruling authorities. Among 
those, Max Weber (1958), categorized legitimate authority into three broad types by 
analyzing the sources of legitimacy: traditional authority, charismatic authority, and 
legal-rational authority. Comparing these three types of authority, one may argue that it 
was easier to predict who would be the next ruler -and political elite in general- under 
traditional and charismatic authority. The most important reason for this argument is that 
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the pool of possible and eligible rulers was not broad under such circumstances. That is 
to say, the number of people who could be legitimate or eligible to occupy the office of a 
political authority is quite small. However, this has changed over time with the emergence 
of representative democracy, which brought about what Weber defined as “legal-rational 
authority”.  
More specifically, traditional authority pursues its legitimacy from long lived traditions. 
The rulers having this authority are believed to possess the right to rule, as those traditions 
provided a political legitimacy to their claim to authority. Kings, queens and sultans were 
categorized as constituting this type of political authority. Families of those rulers who 
possessed the right to legitimately govern and control the respective empires or kingdoms. 
Who could become the ruler, under these circumstances, was determined by kinship, and 
traditional authority was transferred from one family member to another, generally from 
father to son. Consequently, the number of eligible individuals who could be politicians 
was restricted to certain members of a family (dynasty). Although alternative political 
offices were available, which did not require a blood relationship to the dynasty, those 
offices were often occupied by a small number of people sharing similar backgrounds.  
The second type, charismatic authority, takes its legitimacy from the charisma of the ruler 
or leader. This charisma can be defined in many ways, such as being a war hero or 
possessing extraordinary powers, even though they may not be real. Most crucially, if the 
people over who the ruler in question is assumed to have authority believed that the leader 
has that charisma. So, the ruler is believed to be ultra-powerful or victorious, and 
consequently possesses the legitimate right to control and rule the state. This authority 
cannot be easily transferred to another person, and would be hard to routinize as Weber 
(1958) called it. Usually totalitarian leaders such as Hitler and Mussolini were categorized 
as being this type. Under such circumstances, again, the characteristics of the eligible 
political actors would be quite similar to each other, as they would be recruited by the 
charismatic leader.  
The third type, legal-rational authority, can however be differentiated from the others 
with regard to the eligibility of individuals to become politicians. The first two types were 
usually identified with non-democratic rules, but legal-rational authority can be 
observable generally in regimes with rule of law. This type gets its legitimacy from the 
citizens by elections. Hence, the likelihood of competition among possible politicians 
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before coming to political office is much higher, and the ones who win this competition 
get their legitimate power to rule for a certain period of time, i.e. until the next elections. 
Consequently, there emerges a broader group of eligible individuals -depending on the 
legal regulations-, the composition of the political elite may be more heterogeneous and 
alternation in political offices becomes more likely. That is to say, the number of people 
who can be politicians has increased tremendously over time, as many previously 
excluded groups such as non-aristocrats, women, and minorities gained the right to run 
for political office. Eventually, the number of politically ambitious individuals has 
increased as their opportunities expanded. However, not all of the eligible individuals 
have fulfilled their goals as the political positions to fill are scarce. This situation has 
created a more competitive environment for the individuals who would like to enter 
politics and actively work as politicians. Moreover, the motivations of individuals and 
their attitudes towards politics became more diverse over time:  
“Politics, just as economic pursuits, may be a man’s avocation or his vocation. 
One may engage in politics, and hence seek to influence the distribution of 
power within and between political structures, as an ‘occasional’ politician. 
… The alternative is to make politics one’s vocation: either one lives ‘for’ 
politics or one lives ‘off’ politics.” (Weber, 1946: 83-84).  
Today, in an age of political parties, many politicians engage with these organizations in 
order to be actively working in a political system. Political parties need to recruit 
personnel and politicians to function decently, and the individuals who would like to 
become politicians -usually- need to be selected and recruited by political parties. 
Although individuals who enter politics without a party ticket and continue as 
independent politicians are also present. (Ashiagbor, 2008), a sizable portion of 
individuals seek to be members of political parties for their political careers (see e.g., 
Turan, 2013). Hence, becoming a politician is not a unilateral decision taken only by these 
individuals. In other words, not everyone who desires to be a politician eventually fulfills 
that goal, as they need to be presented with certain opportunities, one of the most crucial 
of which is being recruited by political parties. The mechanism behind who becomes a 
politician and why, is usually composed of two general parts: supply side and demand 
side. The explanation of supply and demand side in the process of political elite 
recruitment and candidate selection is given its most importance by Norris and 
Lovenduski (1993). In terms of explaining political careers, this dissertation adopts this 
approach. According to this explanation, there are two sides of recruitment, in Norris and 
Lovenduski (1993)’s own words: 
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“On the demand side selectors choose candidates depending upon their 
perceptions of the applicants' abilities, qualifications and experience. Since 
candidates are rarely well known to most selectors, these perceptions may be 
coloured by direct and indirect prejudice about certain types of applicant. The 
term 'prejudice' is used here in a neutral sense. Prejudice can be for or against 
certain groups, whether lawyers, farmers, trade unionists, southerners, 
women or Asians.” (Norris and Lovenduski, 1993: 377). 
So, demand side explanation is about the decisions of the party selectorate. This 
selectorate can be inclusive, consisting of a large group including local levels of party 
delegates, party members and national level leaders; or exclusive, which only includes a 
small group of people, usually the party leaders (Hazan and Rahat, 2006). Nevertheless, 
the demand side is not the only part of recruitment and individuals’ political careers. 
Regarding supply-side explanation, the following paragraph is quite helpful: 
“Supply side explanations suggest the outcome reflects the supply of 
applicants wishing to pursue a political career. Constraints on resources (such 
as time, money and experience) and motivational factors (such as drive, 
ambition and interest) determine who aspires to Westminster. Most citizens, 
other than lunatics, traitors and peers, and a few other categories, are legally 
qualified to stand. Few do so. The narrow path leading to a political career is 
usually risky, gruelling and unglamorous. Nursing a hopeless seat for a couple 
of years -slogging up to the constituency every weekend, banging on 
unfriendly doors to drum up support, going to poorly attended party 
committees in draughty halls, helping to raise funds with whist drives, raffles 
and jumble sales, juggling work, party committees and constituency 
demands-requires stamina, optimism and dedication.” (Norris and 
Lovenduski, 1993: 380). 
Following their explanation, it is possible the argue that both the desires of the individuals 
to become politicians and the decisions of political parties to select among those 
individuals play major roles on political career patterns. The balance, or the lack of it, 
between these two sides of decisions is quite significant regarding political recruitment 
and eventual political careers. Knowing which side has the leverage shapes the strategies 
of these two actors, namely the party selectorate and the individuals pursuing political 
career. For example, if supply of possible politicians (e.g. the applicants for candidacy in 
elections) is in high levels in a certain district, the party which selects among them would 
have an upper hand as it has chance to find many possible candidates. However, if a 
political party faces problem of finding appropriate individuals desiring to become 
politicians to fill their candidate lists, then that party would need to select from only the 
possible ones, even if those individuals are not qualified enough. Of course, any party 
would choose not to select anyone to nominate as their candidate or to appoint as their 
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party elite, if there emerge no selectable candidates for these positions. But, parties, with 
vote maximizing goals, may also prefer to nominate at least several candidates rather than 
having no candidates in order to compete in as much electoral districts as possible.  
It seems that, in many of the countries, the powerful part in the supply and demand side 
equation are the political parties. However, particular characteristics of individuals who 
would like to be recruited, or parties’ power in certain constituencies matter a lot, and 
these will determine the characteristics of the political elite. About these, Norris and 
Lovenduski (1993) propose the following hypotheses: “(i) If demand-side factors are 
important, we would expect a significant difference in the characteristics of applicants 
and candidates; (ii) If supply-side factors are important, we would expect a significant 
difference in the characteristics of party members and applicants.” (Norris and 
Lovenduski, 1993: 381). Hence, taking these points into consideration is helpful while 
examining the composition of political elite and political career patterns. 
Figure 1.1 shows two major sides of becoming a politician, in other words, pursuing a 
political career regarding various explanations in the recruitment, nomination and 
political ambition literature. The first one is supply side as mentioned above. This side is 
basically related to the individuals’ political ambition, opportunities and interests. 
Political ambition matters, because it is a vital driving factor that makes individuals to 
decide to enter politics and stay or leave the political arena. Opportunities matter, because, 
as Fox and Lawless (2005, 2011) underline, becoming a politician is a type of political 
participation, and it is actually the top level of that participation, rather than only voting 
in elections or becoming members of civil society organization. Deriving from this 
argument, it is vital to have certain opportunities which are also required for political 
participation. Additionally, an individual’s interests’ matter, because along with political 
ambition, these interests shape the decision of individuals to become politicians and stay 
in politics. Even if those individuals cannot be elected as representatives, or cannot 
become active politicians, their interests would be fulfilled depending on what they want. 
These interests may rely on economic gains, public offices or maybe forming networks. 
Regardless of their form, individual interests are also noteworthy for political careers. 
Moreover, resources such as flexible time and financial support also play important roles 
on the supply side explanation. These factors are not mutually exclusive, for example, 
interests and demands of individuals can also trigger or shape their political ambition. Or, 
political participation opportunities can shape the types of interests and ambition. Thus, 
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while explaining the supply side of political recruitment process, it is important to take 
those factors into consideration all together.  
Figure 1.1: Determinants of becoming a politician 
 
 
The second one is the demand side. This is about the political parties and their decisions 
on recruitment and candidate selection processes. Elite recruitment and candidate 
selection are quite closely related to each other. Nevertheless, the first one can be defined 
as a wider area, as it may include recruiting party elite in various levels of the party 
organization. Candidate selection for elections is usually defined as a more specific 
process: “The processes political parties use to select their candidates for public office 
constitute a crucial element of political recruitment in representative democracies…” 
(Cross and Gauja, 2014: 22). Hence, examining these processes provides a good 
opportunity to reveal political career patterns in a given country. 
Political party organizations are composed of multiple levels, and party elites take roles 
in various offices. The roles of these party elites are not usually static, and political career 
mobility among different levels of the party is possible for them. Here, by political career 
mobility, one may refer to party elite’s transfers amongst various positions, after they are 
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recruited in parties. These positions can be chairs of women or youth branches, local party 
branches, positions in party headquarters, party leadership, mayoral positions and 
legislative offices. A politician’s movement alongside such positions show his or her 
career mobility, and it may show upward or downward movement, depending on the 
initial position and newly occupied position that the political actor gains. More 
specifically, if an individual starts with being a youth branch chairperson and then moves 
to local branch chair position, it means that this person experiences an upward political 
career mobility. Yet, not all party elites experience similar political career patterns, and 
more specifically, there is no one single political career pattern applicable to everyone. 
Similarly, candidates running in local and national elections may also have complex 
political careers. The reason for this is that political career mobility is not dependent on 
standard practices, and different parties may show different patterns with regard to this 
phenomenon. Then, what affects the political career patterns of political elites? Before 
answering such a question, it is important to remember that among the different levels of 
parties, recruitment of party elites –for both the higher levels and lower levels- and 
candidate selection in elections, are two of the most important parts of this decision 
making. These decisions affect a huge number of people within the parties, and those 
selected individuals will occupy pivotal positions.  
This dissertation aims to unearth the practices behind the political elite recruitment and 
political career patterns within the Turkish political parties between 2002 and 2015, with 
specific reference to deputies (Milletvekili - MPs) of Turkish Grand National Assembly 
(Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi – TBMM), candidates running in general elections, and 
local party elites. Several studies regarding recruitment patterns and career paths of 
political elites focus on party activists on the lower levels of the party organizations 
(Seligman 1961, 1964; Bowman and Boynton 1966; Eldersveld, 1989) while some 
analyze legislative and ministerial recruitment (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; De 
Almeida et al., 2003). In Turkey, socioeconomic backgrounds of the party elites, their 
interactions with the central party offices, and their motivations have been analyzed in a 
similar fashion (Frey, 1965, Tachau, 1973; Güneş-Ayata, 1994; Çarkoğlu et al., 2000; 
Uysal and Topak, 2010); and similar studies have also been done regarding legislative 
elites and ministerial recruitment patterns (Kışlalı, 1976; Kalaycıoğlu, 1995; Sayarı and 
Hasanov, 2008; Sayarı and Dikici-Bilgin, 2011).  
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Being closely related to recruitment studies, candidate selection literature also provides 
information about political elites. As indicated above, such studies have been conducted 
both in national and local levels. These studies analyze “who selects” with regard to 
exclusiveness or inclusiveness of the selectorate and internal party democracy (Hazan and 
Rahat, 2006; Rahat, 2007; Indriðason and Kristinsson, 2015); “who gets selected” with 
regard to socioeconomic characteristics, political experience, incumbency and political 
motivation of the candidates (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Ballington, 2004; Rallings et 
al., 2008, 2010) and “what effects” those processes, such as political regime, party system, 
size of party, regional differences and party ideology (Lundell, 2004; Shomer, 2014; 
Kernell, 2015). Additionally, political ambition literature (Schlesinger, 1966; Prewitt and 
Nowlin, 1969; Black, 1972; Soskice et al., 1992; Fox and Lawless, 2005, 2010, 2011; 
Vanlangenakker, 2010; Kerevel, 2013) reflects significant clues about political careers. 
 
Keeping the previous studies in mind, this dissertation seeks answers to the following 
questions: The main research question of the dissertation is “What are the determinants 
of political career patterns of political elite in Turkey?” While answering this question, 
two important factors will be analyzed: political recruitment and political ambition. 
Moreover, there emerges two sub research questions from the main question. The first 
one is related to political recruitment: “Why and how do some individuals become first-
ranked candidates in general elections even though they have never run in elections prior 
to their candidacy?” The second one is related to political ambition: “Why do some 
individuals become candidates in general elections even though their electability chances 
are low?”. Even though these two sub questions are introduced as being related to political 
recruitment and political ambition separately, they are not completely disconnected from 
one another. Hence, the interaction between political recruitment and political ambition 
is also worth taking into consideration while answering these questions. Detailed 
explanation and reasoning of research questions and hypotheses are available in Chapter 
6; however, the following pages provide a summary of those. 
Determinants of political career patterns may change over time. For example, a legislature 
may be dominated by legislators whose backgrounds are more homogeneous, but the 
composition of that legislature may alter by sociological changes in the society, 
emergence of new relevant parties or closures of existing parties. Moreover, the 
composition within party groups may show differences through time. Related to this, with 
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regard to general research question, the following hypotheses were tested in this 
dissertation: 
Hypothesis 1a: Ideological differences of parties have impact on the socioeconomic 
composition of their MPs. 
Hypothesis 1b: Acquiring party experience has a positive effect on re-nomination of the 
MPs in the next elections. 
Legislative experience is important for being chosen by political parties to be nominated 
in general elections. A number of MPs serve for multiple terms in legislatures. One may 
expect that parties reward such MPs by nominating them from electable districts and 
ranks. Nevertheless, newcomers who do not have any prior legislative experience are also 
nominated by political parties. It is not surprising to observe new candidates nominated 
in party lists, even though they did not become MPs before. What is surprising it to see 
that such newcomers are ranked first on the party lists. Then, why and how do some 
individuals become first ranked candidates in general elections, even though they have 
never run in elections prior to their candidacy? One would expect that first-time, first-
ranked candidates either have public appeal, or party experience in a given district. 
Nevertheless, being nominated as a first rank candidate on a party list does not always 
result in being rewarded. Depending on the party’s electoral base and success in a given 
district, individuals who are ranked first would have even less electability chance 
compared to the ones who are nominated in districts with larger voter support, even 
though they are not first-ranked candidates. Under those circumstances, investing in 
politics is still not a rewarding act. Hence, in reference to the first sub research question, 
the following hypothesis is tested in this dissertation: 
Hypothesis 2: Inadequate electoral support (i.e. insufficient vote share to win seats in a 
particular district) for political parties increases the number of first-time first-ranked 
candidates on party lists in general elections. 
There may be two important reasons to see first-time first-ranked candidates in electorally 
flawed districts for parties: Individual politicians may not want to invest in that position 
anymore, or the parties may want to change those candidates, as they cannot increase their 
vote support.  
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Generally, many candidate nominees compete with each other to be selected by the parties 
and nominated on their lists. Not all candidate nominees can achieve this goal. Those who 
are selected by the parties as candidates become closer to legislative careers. 
Nevertheless, not all candidates among the selected ones enjoy the same chances of 
electability on the party lists either. Some are nominated on the higher ranks, which show 
higher likelihood of becoming an MP, while others need to compromise to be nominated 
as lower rank candidates. Then, why do some individuals become candidates even though 
their electability chance is low? With regard to this second sub research question, the 
following hypotheses are tested in this dissertation: 
Hypothesis 3a: Party leadership change decreases the continuity of candidates on party 
lists in the elections following this change. 
Hypothesis 3b: Candidates who accept to be ranked in non-electable positions expect to 
push their ranks to electable positions over time or be rewarded by other positions in the 
party. 
These hypotheses are tested in Chapter 6 of this dissertation, “Elite Recruitment and 
Political Ambition by Empirics: The Turkish Case”.  
 
1.2. Relevance of the Dissertation 
 
Eldersveld (1989: x) defined political elites in a broad term by including not only “those 
at the apex of the system who obviously have power” but also “those at the lower levels 
of the system who hold important positions, who have influential roles, and who exercise 
important functions in the polity”. Thus, according to this definition, various actors, from 
party leaders on the top to party activists on the ground are identified as political elites. 
Similarly, the definition of party elites in this dissertation covers ones in all levels of the 
party organization, from top to bottom, including the ones in the parliamentary party 
groups in the TBMM.2 Yet, within this broad term, it is important to remember that each 
position gives different roles and power to the person who occupies that position. Even 
the same levels within different districts may provide different powers to political actors. 
For example, being a local party chairperson in İstanbul, which is socioeconomically the 
                                                          
2 Please see Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 of the dissertation for more details on the analyzed groups of political elites. 
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most developed city of the country, may enable one having more power within the party 
than being a local party chairperson in a less developed one.3 Or, a provincial party 
chairperson may possess more power than an MP to affect decision making within the 
party if he or she occupies a position in particular districts which are given the most 
importance by political parties. Thus, although all the party actors are included in this 
definition of party elites, there is a certain differentiation among them. This also applies 
to relevant significance of different offices. Analyzing these differentiations has 
importance in order to explain political career patterns of these elites. Examination of 
these topics are provided in Chapter 7 of this dissertation. 
Researching the recruitment and candidate selection (both in national and local elections) 
literatures provides a good overview, in order to examine the recruitment and career 
mobility patterns of party elites. The studies on both recruitment patterns and candidate 
selection procedures usually employ the analysis of socioeconomic backgrounds of the 
political elites. Recruitment of political elite studies have mainly two strands which focus 
on national level recruitment and local level recruitment patterns. More specifically, a 
number of scholars focus on party activists on the lower levels of the party organizations 
(Seligman, 1961, 1964; Bowman and Boynton, 1966; Eldersveld, 1989) while some 
analyze legislative and ministerial recruitment (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; De 
Almeida et al., 2003). As mentioned previously, various scholars also focus on candidate 
selection strategies and methods of parties (see e.g., Hazan and Rahat, 2006; Rahat, 2007; 
Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Ballington, 2004; Lundell, 2004; Shomer, 2014; Kernell, 
2015). Although quite a number of recruitment studies are available for various countries, 
literature covering political career patterns in Turkey still needs to be developed. Thus, a 
recent and further research would contribute to the literature, and this further research can 
be carried out through analyzing political career patterns, including the political ambition 
characteristics of these elites, as in this dissertation.   
What is the relevance of the Turkish case? The Turkish case provides a good opportunity 
to analyze political career patterns under a pre-dominant party system4 (Gumuscu, 2013; 
                                                          
3 For further information about the socioeconomic development of the provinces of Turkey, please see TÜİK’s data 
such as urban-rural proportions of the provinces, energy consumption by provinces, GDP per capita by provinces, 
employment by provinces; and the report of Kalkınma Bakanlığı (2013) titled “İllerin ve Bölgelerin Sosyo-Ekonomik 
Gelişmişlik Sıralaması Araştırması (SEGE-2011). 
  
4 Party system in Turkey has been also defined as hegemonic party system due to deficiencies in democracy and 
fairness of elections in the country (see e.g., Ayan Musil, 2015; Cinar, 2016). 
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Ayan Musil, 2015; Sayarı, 2016) in which one political party, Justice and Development 
Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP), have electoral hegemony and political 
dominance (Esen and Gumuscu, 2018), and other political parties having seats in the 
TBMM could not gain enough votes to form government by themselves since the 2002 
General Elections. Although five political parties won seats in the TBMM after each 
election during 1990s (Turan, 2016: 113), only two political parties had chance to occupy 
seats. This was mostly due to the 10 percent electoral threshold which led to the 
elimination of political parties which were electorally more successful prior to these 
elections such as True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi - DYP) and Nationalist Action Party 
(Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi - MHP); and the emergence of the AKP, which led to a change 
in voter behavior. After 2002 elections, in 2007 and 2011 there were three to four5 
political parties in the TBMM, and both June 2015 and November 2015 General Elections 
created a 4-party legislature. And, except in the June 2015 elections, the AKP won enough 
votes to form a party government by itself. Hence, opposition parties, the CHP, the MHP 
and People’s Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi – HDP) could not develop 
significant electoral competitiveness against the AKP. Moreover, these three parties’ 
competition against each other was not significantly high as their ideological stances and 
vote bases are quite different from each other.6 However, intra-party competition for 
particular offices seems to be utterly significant, especially in the incumbent party. For 
example, the number of candidate nominees (aday adayları), who are the applicants for 
candidacy positions in general elections, is quite high compared to the number of total 
candidates nominated in elections. To illustrate this, within the time frame of the analysis 
of this dissertation (2002-2015), each electoral district had different magnitude, and the 
number of candidates was determined accordingly varying between one (Bayburt in 2011 
General Elections) and 31 (İstanbul District 1 and İstanbul District 3 in June 2015 General 
Elections). The number of seats in the TBMM was 550 in that time frame, and each party 
could have fielded 550 candidates in total. But, for example, the AKP received over 
                                                          
5 Please see the following pages for a detailed explanation of the parties in the TBMM. 
 
6 Even though some CHP supporters seem to vote for the HDP in June 2015 and November 2015 General Elections, 
this does not create a real competition between these parties, but rather seem to a strategic voting for pushing the 
HDP to exceed the 10% threshold in the country. Moreover, from time to time there may be shifts of voters from the 
CHP to MHP or vice versa, but the portions are not significant to create an utter competition between these parties. 
Lastly, the vote shares of these three parties do not dramatically change from one election to another which implies 
that these parties more or less consolidated their voter basis. This, again, lowers the competition of those parties over 
particular groups of voters.  
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6,2237 applications from candidate nominees for the June 2015 General Elections during 
this time frame, showing that a large group of people compete for a smaller number of 
seats. These numbers may imply that the highest level of competition is within the 
incumbent party; however, other parties do also have significant competition within 
themselves for candidate positions in general elections. For example, over 2,822 
individuals applied to the CHP as candidate nominees for June 2015 General Elections.8  
Moreover, the parties in the Parliament from 2002 to November 2015 position themselves 
on different points of the ideological spectrum. The AKP defines itself as a conservative 
democratic party and has significant religious sentiments, the CHP represents the secular 
democratic strand, the MHP has strong Turkish ethnic nationalist sentiments, and the 
HDP mainly represents Kurdish ethnic nationalist strand. Hence, selected four parties 
represent four main ideological stances in Turkey. This difference among them enables 
us to understand how various ideological attributes affect recruitment strategies of these 
parties, while controlling the structural characteristics.  
Still, the significance of the Turkish case is not limited to the party system, party 
competition and ideologies. Regardless of their ideologies or electoral success, political 
party organizations are structurally quite similar to each other, due to legal regulations. 
Consequently, it provides a chance to compare the parliamentary parties in Turkey with 
regard to organizational structures.  
Another reason to select Turkey as a case, is that the country implements a Proportional 
Representation (PR) electoral system with a 10% electoral threshold, which is one of the 
highest in the world, and the highest one among Council of Europe member countries. 
Although some of the other countries, such as Russia (7%), Germany (5%), Poland (5%), 
Austria (4%), Italy (4%), and Denmark (2%) implement electoral thresholds, Turkey 
presents a distinct case with 10% threshold.9 The reason for that is that a high threshold 
                                                          
7 Please see the following link for more details: http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/akpye-kac-kisi-aday-adayligi-icin-
basvurdu-1428941/. 
 
8 Please see the following link for more details: 
http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/siyaset/224941/CHP_den_aday_adayligi_icin_2_bin_822_kisi_basvurdu.html. 
 
9 For a detailed information on thresholds in Council of Europe member states, see the 2010 report of Venice 
Commission “Report on Thresholds and Other Features of Electoral Systems which Bar Parties from Access to 
Parliament (II)” adopted by the the Council for Democratic Elections at its 32nd meeting (Venice, 11 March 2010) and 
by the Venice Commission at its 82nd plenary session (Venice, 12-13 March 2010), from the link: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2010)007-e. 
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clearly changes the nature of competition among political parties, and consequently the 
likelihood of parties to win seats in legislature. According to official numbers, 84 political 
parties in total function actively in Turkey, as of July 2018.10 Among those, only a small 
number of them can compete in elections, as the laws regulate that a party shall have local 
offices at least in half of the electoral districts in order to be able to run in elections. Not 
all political parties fulfil this requirement, hence, they are not eligible for of electoral 
competition. Nevertheless, the number of parties participating to general elections is still 
considerable. For example, 15 political parties competed in the November 2015 General 
Elections, even though all except the four main political parties would not expect to 
exceed 10% threshold and win any seats in the parliament. As a result of this election, 
only four (AKP, CHP, MHP, HDP) of those 15 parties gained enough votes to win seats 
in the TBMM. Similarly, the number of parties in the parliament was two in 2002 (AKP, 
CHP), three in 2007 (AKP, CHP, MHP), three11 (AKP, CHP, MHP) in 2011 and four 
(AKP, CHP, MHP, HDP) in the 2015 June elections (Turan, 2016: 113). Under these 
circumstances, it is observable that real competition revolves around mainly three to four 
parties since 2007. This case provides a good opportunity to analyze continuities and 
changes in those parties’ candidate selection strategies.   
 
1.3. Data and Methodology of the Dissertation 
 
In Politics, Aristotle (384-322 BC) argued that:  
 
“As in other departments of science, so in politics, the compound should 
always be resolved into the simple elements or at least parts of the whole. We 
must therefore look at the elements of which the state is composed, in order 
that we may see in what the different kinds of rule differ from one another, 
and whether any scientific result can be attained about each one of them.”12  
 
                                                          
10 Please see the following link for more details: https://www.yargitaycb.gov.tr/sayfa/faaliyette-olan-siyasi-
partiler/documents/Spartiler19072018.pdf. 
 
11 This number shows the immediate election results. There were also independent elected candidates which were 
affiliated with Peace and Democracy Party (Barış and Demokrasi Partisi - BDP), and they form a party group in the 
TBMM after they got their seats. According to legal regulations in Turkey, at least 20 deputies can form a party group 
in the TBMM. Additionally, there was one deputy from Participatory Democracy Party (Katılımcı Demokrasi Partisi – 
KDP) along with 6 other independents. For more details, please see the following source: TBMM. 2012. 24. Dönem 
TBMM Albümü. Ankara: TBMM Basın, Yayın ve Halkla İlişkiler Başkanlığı Yayınları, p: xvii. Retrieved from: 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/TBMM_Album/donem24/24_Donem_Album_20032013.pdf. 
 
12 Aristotle. 1996. “Politics”. In Aristotle: The Politics and The Constitution of Athens, Stephen Everson (eds.), 
translated by B. Jowett, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp: 9-208. 
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If we apply this to political parties, Sartori (1976)’s explanation comes to fore: “By 
studying political parties, we imply that the party is a meaningful unit of analysis. Yet we 
go above the party as a unit, for we also study the party system. By the same token we 
can go below the party as a unit and study, thereby, the party subunits.” (Sartori, 1976: 
71). These two significant arguments infer that studying individual politicians functioning 
in political parties yield helpful clues about those parties in general, and eventually about 
a country’s politics on an upper level. Thus, it is noteworthy to analyze who becomes a 
politician and what the career paths are of these individuals.  
 
This dissertation aims to explain political career patterns, hence, both elite recruitment 
and political ambition theories need to be included. For elite recruitment and candidate 
selection studies, Hazan and Rahat (2006: 110) suggest that the unit of analysis is a single 
party in a particular country at a specific time. From a similar perspective, the unit of 
analysis of political ambition studies can be identified as the individual politicians, more 
specifically, an individual politician in a particular country at a specific time. Moreover, 
“The study of political ambition is the study of motivations of politicians, and hence 
requires data on individuals.” (Black, 1972: 145). Data on individuals both include 
biographical data such as date and place of birth, father’s occupation, level and type of 
education, place of education, occupation, gender and political experience, and data 
compiled through interviews with these political actors. For example, some scholars 
employ variables such as “age, ideology, share of the vote in the previous election, district 
size and hierarchical position in committees, in an effort to explain the career decisions...” 
since “Institutional variables (such as type of electoral system, party system and 
nomination procedure) […] cannot explain all the variation in political career choices.” 
(Leoni et al., 2004: 111). 
 
Following the above-mentioned information, the unit of analysis of the dissertation is 
individual politicians, and analyses rely on two original datasets, and in-depth interviews 
with local party elites. More specifically, biographical data of political elites analyzed in 
this dissertation contain general elections candidates’ data (9,350 of them) and members 
of the TBMM data (2,750 of them) for the AKP, CHP, MHP and HDP for five general 
elections (2002-2015).13 The variables coded under biographical information are: age, 
                                                          
13 These numbers show the total number of candidates and elected members for the mentioned elections. Although 
there are continuities across the elections both candidate-wise and MP-wise, each candidate and each elected MP at 
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birth place, gender, education, foreign language knowledge and occupational 
backgrounds of these individuals. Political experience contains number of served terms 
in the parliament, commission membership, bill initiation, other political office 
experience such as mayoral or municipal council membership experience, and party work 
experience of individuals. Demographical data consists of population, migration, 
education levels. In order to code biographical information of candidates and elected 
members, official candidate lists, and election results announced by Supreme Election 
Council of Turkey (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu - YSK) and Official Gazette (Resmi Gazete) 
were used. However, these sources do not provide all the necessary information for the 
analysis in this dissertation. Thus, biographies of the MPs provided on the official website 
of the TBMM, Albums of the TBMM (TBMM Albümleri), on the official party websites 
and MPs’ personal websites were also used while compiling the data. National 
newspapers were also searched for additional information. Reasons for employing some 
of the above-mentioned variables are as follows, yet more comprehensive analyses of 
those variables are provided in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 of this dissertation. 
 
1.3.1. Socioeconomic Backgrounds of the Political Elites 
 
Age of the political elites. An analysis of the ages of party elites provide us with clues 
about the questions, such as ‘At what age do they usually start their political career? Do 
younger ones have more prospective plans to experience an upward career mobility? Do 
older ones have necessarily more political experience? And, what are the differences 
among political parties with regard to the composition of their politicians?’ 
Gender of the political elites. Political parties in Turkey have different views on gender. 
Although there is no legally binding rule for gender quotas for national or local candidates 
in elections in Turkey, the CHP and HDP implement gender quota as stated in the party 
by-laws, whereas the AKP does not support it, arguing that it is an insult to the women, 
that they should start from the bottom and get higher positions by their own work. Yet, 
some AKP members are against this idea, and they argue that it is the local politics, not 
the parliament, who put certain barriers in front of the women, because it is significantly 
                                                          
an election stands for a unique observation. Details of the datasets are available in Chapter 6 on data analysis and 
findings. 
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more difficult for women to climb the ladders from bottom to top, and only an application 
of a gender quota would ease it (Tür and Çıtak, 2010: 619-620). Thus, analysis of this 
variable will enable us to answer questions such as, “Do we observe different patterns 
between different genders?” “Do women face more difficulties in recruitment and 
political career mobility?” 
Birth place and localism characteristics of political elites. As Frey (1975) underlines, 
comparison of the birth and work places of political elites is a defining factor for localism. 
If the political elites (deputies in Frey’s case) were born in the provinces which they 
represent, it is defined as localism. And if localism emerges, personal and proximate ties 
with the constituents can exist, which may provide us with important clues about their 
relationships with the electorate.  Additionally, existing studies also focus on the fathers’ 
birth places to understand whether their children (who are the political elites in these 
studies) have a connection with the same place, or whether these people have a rooted 
localism in that specific place.  
Educational background of the political elites. Educational attainment is one of the most 
standardized measures that enable us to compare party elites. Although different countries 
have different understandings of educational attainment in terms of years to complete and 
quality of education, we can assume that a huge portion of the political elites have similar 
educational system background. Among these educational institutions, it is important to 
analyze whether those people attended religious schools, e.g. İmam Hatip Schools, which 
can be an indicator of conservatism and Islamic sentiments. Several studies unearthed 
that larger proportion of party elites have religious education in a conservative party 
(Sayarı and Hasanov, 2008), and similarly, a positive correlation between conservatism 
and religious education has been unearthed in other studies (Kalaycıoğlu, 2007). Thus, 
by analyzing their educational attainment, it is possible to observe which parties recruit 
party elites with what level of educational backgrounds, and whether religious school 
graduates tend to be recruited by conservative parties, and whether parties recruit party 
elites who have different overall educational backgrounds in different districts.   
Occupational backgrounds of the political elites. Many studies reveal that occupational 
backgrounds which enable the elites with a certain amount of wealth (to spend to cover 
their party expenses and election campaigns) and flexible working hours are quite 
important factors to be successful and sustainable in politics (Norris and Lovenduski, 
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1993; Güneş-Ayata, 1994; Uysal and Topak, 2010). By analyzing the occupational 
backgrounds of the party elites, answers can be found for the questions like “What type 
of occupations do we observe in different parties”, “Are there any clear patterns for 
political parties to select one occupational group over the others?”, and “Do party elites 
believe that certain jobs ease the upward career mobility of party elite and candidates? 
 
1.3.2. Political Experience and Motivation of Political Elites 
 
Lawson (1976) unearthed why people become party members and what their interests are 
to do so. Some other scholars specify these questions by focusing on political elites (not 
only the members but also those who occupy particular positions) as the local party 
bosses, councilors, legislative elites and ministers (e.g. Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; 
Rallings et al., 2008, 2010). One may infer that political experience and incumbency can 
ease upward career mobility, and motivation of the party elites can also be a triggering 
factor for this. With regard to motivation of the party elites, previous studies analyzed the 
influence of those party elites’ families, especially their fathers, (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000; 
Uysal and Topak, 2010) in order to understand how those politicians were influenced by 
their families to participate in politics. To illustrate, Uysal and Topak (2010: 59-78) 
conducted in-depth interviews with various local party actors, and unearthed that families, 
friends, residency and experiences do play a significant role on their party membership, 
and political road map in general. Yet, some party elites also indicate that they were asked 
by party leadership to run in elections or occupy particular offices (e.g. Rallings et al., 
2009, Ayan, 2009), therefore invitation by parties also plays a major role for starting a 
political career. Thus, there can be different influential factors in terms of motivation of 
the party elites. One can observe by looking at the candidate lists in the National 
Elections, and some local party organizations’ webpages, a number of those party elites 
that have been candidates for several times in general elections. Some have been 
occupying the same positions in local branches for years without climbing to a higher 
position. What can be their motivation behind this? Do they want to stay in their current 
position, or climb the ladder? Do they think that they themselves can gain another 
(preferably higher) position, or can the party’s higher authorities enable them to do so? 
This dissertation also intends to find answers to such questions via conducted interviews.  
20 
 
Legislative experience, party experience and other elected office experience are added to 
dataset for the measurement of political experience in general. More specifically, three 
variables are used for legislative experience which are number of served term in the 
TBMM, committee membership and bill initiation. Along with these, previously occupied 
party seats and other elected offices such as mayoral positions are included. 
Political experience is also closely related to being experienced with the constituents. In 
other words, the ones who have been interacting with the constituents and learning their 
interests or demands can have higher chances to remain in positions of influence in 
politics. In the Turkish case, the relationship between the political elite and the voters 
usually rely on clientelistic practices (Güneş-Ayata, 1994; Sayarı, 2011). Many 
legislative elites have been creating proximate relations with the voters and dealing with 
those voters’ demands, such as finding jobs and providing health care. For example, 
Kalaycıoğlu (1995) analyzed the Turkish parliamentarians’ “attitudes towards their 
parties and opponents,” “political beliefs and values” and “social backgrounds” in 1984 
and in 1988, and unearthed the relationship between the deputies and the constituents 
regarding clientelistic linkages. This finds that constituency demands from the deputies 
have been mostly personal ones. Concomitantly, a significant number of the deputies 
(more than a half) have been spending their time –as a regular activity- on “finding jobs 
and providing other services or benefits for constituents” (Kalaycıoğlu, 1995: 47, 49). 
Moreover, the constituents seem to be aware of the advantages of competitive political 
arena which provides them a chance to swap the “patrons” who will bring services 
(Kalaycıoğlu, 2001: 62-63). Both lower level party elites and legislative elites face quite 
a number of demands coming from the constituents, and if they cannot, or do not satisfy 
those demands, it can affect their political career negatively. So, it can be important to be 
aware of the practices in politics to gain a higher chance of upward mobility in the party. 
The information on these connections and networks was gathered by drawing upon a 
series of in-depth political elite interviews in this dissertation. 
 
1.3.3. Party Ideology and Organization 
 
One can argue that party ideologies and organizational structure may create a variance 
among parties with regard to elite recruitment and political career mobility patterns. Yet, 
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the organizational schema of Turkish political parties does not show major differences 
from each other. In other words, the organizational structures of the Turkish political 
parties are very similar to each other due to the regulations of the SPK (Bektaş, 1993: 39; 
Erdem, 2001: 85). The reason for this is that both the Constitution of the Republic of 
Turkey and the SPK regulate political party structures in a strict and standardized way. 
Then, if not the organizational structures, what can constitute the difference between the 
parties with regard to relationship between different levels which may influence the 
recruitment and career mobility patterns? Does party ideology affect the way that the 
party elites occupy and change positions? Do the leftist or the rightist parties have 
differing composition of their elite? Such questions are also important to explain in order 
to understand political career patterns. 
 
1.3.4. Electoral Results and Regional Characteristics 
 
Political culture of regions can and do show differences in Turkey. A possible way to 
measure those differences is to look at the vote shares of the four political parties included 
in this research. As indicated above, these four parties represent four main ideological 
stances of the country, namely conservatism along with religiosity, secularism, Turkish 
nationalism and Kurdish nationalism. The number of votes and elected number of 
members are included for each party per each district between 2002 and 2015 to the MPs 
Dataset. Districts with the highest and the lowest vote shares for each party may reveal 
helpful clues with regard to party competition and its effect on career patterns.14  
As explained, those two datasets were prepared to examine the research questions and 
test the hypotheses. However, the datasets are not the sole data to rely on in the 
dissertation. 
According to Duverger (1964), those who are most knowledgeable about the power 
structure and organizational dynamics of parties are the experienced party members and 
activists. Therefore, in order to grasp the political ambition prospects of political actors, 
I conducted a series of in-depth interviews with 23 local party actors from four political 
                                                          
14 The HDP constitues a special case in this analysis, as it run for elections as a party only in the last two general 
elections in 2015 within the time frame which analyzed in the dissertation. Nevertheless, depending on the precessors 
of this party which were closed down previously, we can find the districts where the HDP has its most and least 
power. 
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parties in Turkey, in İstanbul, Antalya, Adana, Kayseri and Denizli. These interviews 
provide complementary information about political ambitions and recruitment patterns of 
parties to explain career patterns. While preparing interview questions, previous research 
(see e.g., Kalaycıoğlu, 1995; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Çarkoğlu et al., 2000; Ayan, 
2009; Rallings et al., 2010; Uysal and Topak, 2010) provided important points to take 
into consideration. In order to compare the results in this dissertation with those previous 
studies conducted on parliamentary elites and recruitment patterns, several similar 
questions are included in the interview question list.  
Ambition is identified as a “psychological predisposition” which makes a systematic 
analysis of it to be difficult and problematic (Hibbing, 1989: 28). Moreover, it is 
underlined that “It is easier to assert that career ambitions shape legislative behavior than 
it is to diagnose what those ambitions are. One way to do this is to study members' career 
routes to and from the assembly...” (Scarrow, 1997: 255). Nevertheless, it is still possible 
to categorize various political actors depending on their political ambition types. For 
example, Schlesinger (1966) opened the way of political ambition theories by classifying 
three main types of ambition: progressive, static and discrete.  This assumed that an 
individual who seeks a higher office has progressive ambition, while one who seeks the 
same office (re-election) shows static ambition, and the one who seeks retirement after a 
certain period of time in a political office shows discrete ambition. Similarly, some 
assumptions show that “…everyone who seeks a higher office has progressive ambition, 
that members seeking leadership posts harbor intrainstitutional ambition, while those who 
remain in the house without moving on to another post have static ambition.” (Herrick 
and Moore, 1993: 765). Details of these theories are available in Chapter 3 of this 
dissertation. Depending on these explanations, a categorization of political elites in 
Turkey is present in Chapter 7. 
As in other studies (see e.g., Dal Bo et al., 2017: 1878-79), this dissertation contains some 
data limitation due to difficulties in arranging interviews with party elite in different 
districts. Hence, although data on MPs and candidates are available to a large extent, 
interviews do not include members from all parties in a given district. Additionally, it is 
possible to find official data on candidates; however, data on applicants or candidate 
nominees are unfortunately not available to a large extent. Newspapers give information 
about the number of these candidates for nomination, but the political parties do not 
provide detailed lists of those individuals. Acquiring information about the pool of all 
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available candidates for nomination is crucial for a better analysis of who are selected 
among them and nominated as candidates by parties; however, unavailability of such data 
hinders doing so. Moreover, conducting in-depth interviews has not been easy, as many 
of the elite mention that they are not available for such an interview with their busy 
schedules. Although such limitations are present, the data compiled for this dissertation 
still provides considerable insight about political recruitment, ambition and career 
patterns in Turkey. 
 
1.4. Plan of the Dissertation 
 
As indicated in the previous pages, the aim of this dissertation is to explain political career 
patterns in Turkish political parties. This is achieved by analyzing the practices behind 
the political elite recruitment strategies of parties, and analyzing the political ambition of 
individuals engaging with these parties. To fulfil this goal, it is necessary to review first 
the recruitment and candidate selection, and the political ambition literature to understand 
the practices and theories. A detailed explanation of party politics in Turkey follows these 
chapters, and examination of respective literatures on Turkey is provided to better 
understand the peculiarities of this case. Specifics of data analysis and discussion on 
results comes after these chapters. The following paragraphs show how the dissertation 
is organized structurally more in detail.  
 
Chapter 2 explains party recruitment and its importance on political careers. More 
specifically, details of party recruitment and candidate selection strategies of political 
parties are explained, with the aid of a review of respective literature. Additionally, 
various types of party recruitment and candidate selection, such as inclusive and exclusive 
methods are discussed. After an extensive analysis of these topics, candidate selection 
strategies under different settings (such as under different electoral systems or party 
systems) are studied and compared.  
 
Chapter 3 explains political ambition and its significance on political careers. Various 
types of political ambition theories are explained with a broad literature review, and their 
reflections on political career patterns are examined in this chapter. Additionally, factors 
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influencing political ambition and eventual politicians’ decisions to remain in or out of 
politics are discussed.   
 
Chapter 4 provides information about party politics in Turkey. Before going through the 
specifics of party recruitment and political ambition in the country, this chapter explains 
the political culture, electoral system(s), party organization, legal regulations on political 
parties, party system(s) and party competition in the country. Additionally, two 
significant characteristics of Turkish political parties and their relations with the voters 
are explained under two different sub-sections, namely centralist structures of political 
parties and clientelism. 
 
Chapter 5 explains elite recruitment patterns and political ambition in Turkey. More 
specifically, it identifies major characteristics of party strategies in recruitment and 
candidate selection. Reviewing the previously conducted studies, this chapter aims to 
explain past practices and their possible reflections to today. It also provides practices of 
previously active and electorally successful political parties in the country. Additionally, 
this chapter provides information on previous research on party elite and parliamentary 
elite, and their possible career choices with regard to political ambition in the country. 
 
Chapter 6 presents a detailed explanation of proposed hypotheses, data analysis and 
findings with regard to determinants of career patters of political elite, first-time first-
ranked candidates, and candidates with low chance of electability in Turkey. It provides 
a comparison of political parties in terms of the composition of their MPs, alternation in 
that composition over time and strategies about candidate selection. 
 
Chapter 7 provides personal insights gathered via in-depth interviews with local party 
actors in the country regarding political ambition and career choices. More specifically, 
it explains individual politicians’ interests, motivations and entrance to politics. This 
chapter also represents discussions on varying categories of political ambition in Turkey. 
 
Chapter 8 presents the concluding remarks and prospects for future studies. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
ELITE RECRUITMENT BY PARTIES AND POLITICAL CAREER 
 
 
2.1. What is Elite Recruitment by Political Parties? 
 
Political parties are identified as organizations which reflect various ideas, interests, and 
can form governments with meaningful and coherent programs (Bale, 2005). Political 
parties also provide opportunities for political participation, representation of citizens and 
ideologies. Other organizations such as civil society organizations also provide channels 
for representation and political participation, yet Key (1942) argued that the interest 
groups try to influence the government, but these groups do not run for elections for 
forming a government. Political parties, on the other hand, nominate candidates and run 
in elections in order to control or become a part of the government, or at least to occupy 
some seats in legislatures. Consequently, “Parties are powerful policy makers, especially 
in parliamentary systems.” (Detterbeck, 2011: 245), and they function as policy makers 
with the help of their recruited political actors.  
Political parties are relatively recent organizations in the world’s political history. 
Politicians, however, have been in politics much longer than political parties. Over time, 
the politicians started to need specific organizations in order to ease the coordination, 
policy making and candidate selection through elections times:  
“The very scale of the contemporary polities and the electoral and 
parliamentary dynamics of representative democracies have in turn prompted 
politicians to create or join electoral and legislative ‘terms’ of parties, that is, 
stable organizations through which politicians coordinate their political 
activity across electoral districts, in parliamentary assemblies, and in 
executive or governmental committees.” (Boix: 2007: 499).  
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In fact, with the exception of a small number of countries, many countries contain 
political parties in the contemporary world, and all modern democracies contain “some 
type of political party” (Moser, 1999: 147). Moreover, “…there are a few small, 
traditional societies, especially in the Persian Gulf, that are still ruled by the families who 
were dominant … Then there are those regimes in which parties and party activities have 
been banned; these regimes are run either by the military or by authoritarian rulers who 
have the support of the military.” (Ware, 1996: 1). Except such examples, many countries 
-democratic or not- have political parties. Hence, “…it is scarcely imaginable how 
democratic governance could function in nation-states with millions of inhabitants 
without political parties to frame electoral options, aggregate and articulate social 
demands, and translate them into public policy.” (Moser, 1999: 147). Although they may 
show differences with regard to their organizational structures and functions, with the 
emergence of popular sovereignty and mass politics as the fount of political legitimacy 
for political systems, political parties have become central actors of both national and 
local politics.  
Definitions of political parties reflect their organizational characteristics and their 
interface with the mass public. One of the oldest explanations is what Burke (1770: 372) 
once wrote: “Party is a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the 
national interest upon some particular on which they are all agreed.” From a rather similar 
perspective, but with a clear addition of competitive race, Schumpeter (1942: 283) 
described a political party as “a group whose members propose to act in concert in the 
competitive struggle for political power”, while Aldrich (1995: 283-84) explained the 
political parties as “coalitions of elites to capture and use political office.” Aldrich (1995: 
283-84) also added that the party organizations are more than those coalitions, as “…a 
major political party is an institutionalized coalition, one that has adopted rules, norms, 
and procedures.” Definitions of political parties varied over time. Even though there is no 
one single definition of political parties, a common, extended and accepted explanation 
is that “A political party is an autonomous group of citizens having the purpose of making 
nominations and contesting elections in the hope of gaining control over governmental 
power through the capture of public offices and the organization of the government.” 
(Huckshorn, 1984: 10). Inferring from this definition, it is clear that political parties are 
organizations which are in need of human resources and financial resources in order to 
realize their goals. Among those necessities, human resources are perhaps the most 
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crucial one. For this reason, it is not a coincidence that “…Political parties are central 
participants in the recruitment of political personnel, both for the elective and appointive 
office...” (Katz, 2014: 204). More specifically, “…One classic function of political parties 
concerns their gatekeeping role in nominating candidates for office at all levels of 
government…” (Norris, 2006: 89).  
But, how do those parties find their personnel to work and candidates to run in elections? 
From the individuals’ perspective, why do people want to work for political parties and/or 
run in elections with their tickets? Such questions are vital while understanding party 
politics in general. Specifically, on party recruitment studies it is highlighted that “…The 
study of recruitment is of substantial interest to the political scientist who seek to 
understand and explain why an individual chooses to run for office rather than merely 
vote, contribute to a campaign or actively work to see a candidate other than himself 
elected” (Levine and Hyde, 1977: 959-960). 
This explanation is not only about parties’ decisions of who to recruit, but also about who 
-as individuals- would like to be recruited. As explained in the Introduction of this 
Dissertation, these processes are two major sides of political careers: supply side and 
demand side which together provide explanations about political recruitment and 
ambition. Thus, party recruitment is closely related to political ambition in that regard. 
However, before explaining political ambition, it is necessary that political recruitment 
be examined and explained. This chapter is dedicated to exploring this by building on the 
existing comparative politics literature on party recruitment and candidate selection. 
Why does the analyzing of elite recruitment by parties matter? As being political 
organizations, political parties are composed of individual members, and knowing the 
characteristics of these people ease the understanding of the internal features of those 
organizations. Political elites have been analyzed by several scholars with regard to their 
positions that they occupy, their significance in decision making processes and their 
power relations (Michels, 1915; Mills, 1956; Pareto, 1968). Bendix (1953) once argued 
that “…a study of politics should be concerned with the social composition of the 
members and leaders of different political organizations…” According to Quandt (1969: 
4), the rationale behind this argument is that such information will yield clues about the 
“political goals” of those politicians. For example, parties’ prominent or established elites 
may have decisions to implement alternation in the organizational structures of parties 
28 
 
for their own interests (see e.g., Panebianco, 1988) which may imply the importance of 
their influence on decision making process. Thus, as we analyze elite recruitment 
patterns, we understand more about the composition of political parties. And as we 
understand that composition in bits and pieces by looking at individual politicians, we 
interpret more and more information about the political parties as a whole. Moreover, 
following Crotty’s (1968) arguments, Cross (2008: 600) takes attention to the “relative 
significance of candidate nomination” by proposing that the process of candidate 
selection is crucial, as it has an effect on the group of politicians who will take place in 
decision-making, and indirectly influence the policy making decisions. Hence, studying 
elite recruitment and candidate selection also yields knowledge about who occupies 
pivotal offices with regard to decision-making processes. This is actually one of the most 
discussed issues in political history. Who rules and how, for whom, and who are the ruled 
questions raised by many philosophers, including Aristotle, and they are closely related 
to the recruitment process. Indeed, studies on political elites occupy a large room in the 
literature. The reason is that politicians have crucial roles in policy making and decision-
making processes, and consequently, directly or indirectly affect the citizens’ lives. “The 
power elite is composed of men whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary 
environments of ordinary men and women; they are in positions to make decisions having 
major consequences. Whether they do or do not make such decisions is less important 
than the fact that they do occupy such pivotal positions...” (Mills, 1956: 3-4).  
 
In addition, “The identity of politicians influences which policies get selected, how well 
they are implemented, and who benefits from them.” (Dal Bo et al., 2017: 1877-1878), 
and according to these scholars, it is applicable both in authoritarian and representative 
regimes. If the politicians are autocrats, they are not really bound by checks and balances, 
thus, they may use their arbitrary power. Consequently, those politicians’ personal 
characteristics determine the policy making and enacting processes to a large extent. 
Nevertheless, even if there are more constraints on political elite in democracies, the 
identities of the politicians under such regimes are also determinative in decision making. 
 
Above-mentioned questions are also related to power relations and having opportunity 
for controlling the party -and if elected, state- resources. For this, not only party offices, 
but other offices would also be offered to the recruited politicians. The following 
quotation clearly explains how different types of appointments can be made: 
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“Political recruitment is not just a matter of nominating elected 
representatives at local, regional, national, and subnational levels, the 
core focus of this chapter, but also of filling a wide range of patronage 
appointments to public office. This is exemplified by party nominations 
to the proliferation of non-governmental organizations in Britain, the 
thousands of positions in various government branches and federal 
agencies allocated by the patronage of the incoming American 
president, and the depth of patron–client relations in Brazil. The process 
of recruitment to elected and appointed office is widely regarded as one 
of the most important residual functions for parties, with potential 
consequences for the degree of intra-party conflict, the composition of 
parliaments and governments, and the accountability of elected 
members.” (Norris, 2006: 89). 
Thus, the process and consequence of recruitment are significant. But, how does the 
recruitment process work? It is obvious that party recruitment has a large number of 
different steps. For example, according to Norris (2006: 89), there are several factors 
influencing the candidate recruitment process:  
“Certification stage which involves electoral laws, party rules and informal 
social norms defines the eligibility of the candidates; nomination stage 
involves supply of eligibles seeking office and the demand from selectors 
when deciding who is nominated; and election stage as the final step 
determining which nominees win legislative office.” In other words, a group 
of candidates are selected from a large pool of eligible individuals by the party 
selectorate, and then the electorate elects from that relatively narrowed pool 
of candidates in both local and national elections. A very clear way to explain 
this process is that “…many are eligible, few are nominated, and even fewer 
succeed.” (Norris, 2006: 89).  
Party recruitment does not operate in a similar way in each political setting. It is 
underlined that “There is substantial variance in the degree of democratization of 
candidate selection processes used by parties…” (Cross, 2008: 598). Moreover, as a 
significant factor, candidate selection processes may create power struggles among the 
party leaders within political parties (Michels, 1915). Two of the most well received 
categorizations of party recruitment depends on “Who recruits?” and “Who nominates?” 
questions. Basically, the size of the group of people (i.e. the selectorate) in the party which 
decide who to recruit is important. Hazan and Rahat (2001, 2007) use this categorization 
to differentiate between inclusive and exclusive party nomination, and candidate selection 
methods. Many scholars underline the significance of centralization with regard to 
inclusiveness and exclusiveness of candidate selection (see e.g., Epstein, 1980; Gallagher, 
1988; Katz, 2001; Rahat and Hazan, 2001, 2007; Lundell, 2004). Across these studies, 
“…there is an implicit assumption that selection made at the local level is more 
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democratic, as the decision is decentralized to those who will be represented by the 
candidate, and that the more persons eligible to participate in the selection process the 
better, as this enfranchises more voters...” (Cross, 2008: 598). Thus, including the party 
members, delegates, and grassroots to the recruitment and nomination processes provide 
a good environment for an inclusive and more democratized candidate selection. 
Regarding this, some political parties implement primaries in order to expand their 
selectorate. However, primaries are not compulsory in every country, and parties may 
choose to implement an exclusive types of candidate selection method. Under those 
circumstances, what Hazan and Rahat (2001) explain about the inclusivity or exclusivity 
of selectorate in the process of party recruitment and candidate selection plays an 
important role. The reason behind this is that “…in some systems, the party selection part 
is most significant, as general election voters have little or no opportunity to influence the 
relative ranking of a party’s candidates, while in others general election voters have 
essentially unfettered choice in selecting which candidates, from a large pool, are 
elected...” (Cross, 2008: 601). 
Elite recruitment and candidate nomination are affected by numerous factors. Among 
those factors, legal requirements or restrictions would play an important role in terms of 
eligibility of the candidates. A variety of regulations on this issue, such as age limit, 
citizenship, or residency requirements can be applicable in various countries (Massicotte 
et al., 2004). More specifically, “The main legal regulations include those relating to age, 
citizenship, residence, incompatibilities, monetary deposits, and the need to gather 
supporting signatures.” (Norris, 2006). Additionally, there emerges a second form of 
restrictions on candidacy: “…it may declare membership of parliament / legislature or the 
presidency incompatible with various offices, which caveat obliges candidates, once 
elected, to relinquish the other offices.” (Massicotte et al., 2004: 40).    
Among the candidacy requirements in various countries, one of the most referenced 
examples is what once Obler (1974) presented and was then mentioned by several other 
scholars (Hazan and Rahat, 2006:111; Norris, 2006: 91) about the Belgian Socialist Party:  
“While the exact requirements vary from one constituency to 
another, they generally stipulate that to be placed on the primary 
ballot aspirants must (1) have been a member of the Socialist party, 
trade union, co-operative and insurance association for at least five 
years prior to the primary; (2) have made annual minimum purchases 
from the Socialist co-op; (3) have been a regular subscriber to the 
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party’s newspaper; (4) have sent his children to state rather than 
Catholic schools; and (5) have his wife and children enrolled in the 
appropriate women’s and youth organizations. These conditions, in 
effect, require that a candidate serve as a member of an activist 
subculture before he becomes eligible to run for Parliament. They 
involve a form of enforced socialization during which it is assumed 
(or hoped) that the aspirant will absorb the appropriate values and 
attitudes as well as a keen commitment to the party.” (Obler, 1974: 
180). 
Along with legal restrictions, the method of candidate selection, especially the 
composition of party selectorate, is also significant for the filtering of recruited personnel 
and nominated candidates. Previous paragraphs provide the definition of party 
recruitment in general. Eligibility of the candidates is identified as the first step of party 
recruitment process. As explained in the previous section, many legal regulations would 
occur which affect the candidacy process. Nevertheless, the second step -identified as 
nomination stage by Norris (2006)- has been one of the most significant processes about 
recruitment. Thus, focusing on nomination strategies of political parties is noteworthy 
while explaining career patterns.  
 
Elite recruitment and candidate selection patterns differ from one country to another. For 
example, Samuels (2008) argued that political party leaders have a certain amount of 
control over candidate selection in national elections, allocation of campaign resources, 
patronage and politicians’ career advancement after legislative office holding. In Turkey, 
many party leaders exert high degrees of such control power over above mentioned issues 
(Hale, 2002; Ayan, 2014). However, Brazilian party leaders do not possess a control over 
those issues with regard to legislative careers of politicians (Samuels, 2008). 
Nevertheless, methods and strategies of elite recruitment and candidate selection do not 
differ only from one country to another, but they also vary among parties functioning in 
the same country. Several reasons may contribute to this difference. Along with the 
above-mentioned legal regulations, the electoral system, party system and candidate 
selection methods with regard to inclusiveness and exclusiveness are major determinants 
of recruitment. The following sections are organized to explain and understand these 
differing types of party recruitment.  
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2.2. Elite Recruitment, Candidate Selection and Re-nomination 
 
Many studies have been conducted on the recruitment and nomination of political elite, 
more specifically legislative, local and party elites. Among those, deputies/MPs and 
cabinet ministers are defined as legislative elites. In democratic regimes, these politicians 
present themselves as possible candidates, run in elections, and are popularly elected. 
Legislative elites occupy significant offices in politics. For this reason, they are identified 
as “the core group of decision makers” (De Almeida and Pinto, 2005: 4). Since these 
politicians are identified as pinnacle in the decision-making and law-making process, 
there have been many studies which examine their characteristics, strategies and 
behavior. The recruitment patterns of these politicians and socioeconomic composition 
of legislative branch were frequently analyzed in order to explain politics in a given 
country from non-democracies to democracies. To illustrate, political elite’s acts in Iran’s 
patrimonial system (Bill, 1975), legislative elite’s socioeconomic and biographical 
backgrounds in Iraq (Marr, 1975), the influence of social transformation on legislative 
elite recruitment and circulation patterns in Lebanon (Khalaf, 1980); and effects of 
political and social alternation on legislative elite turnout in Israel (Gutmann, 1980) are 
some of the studies conducted in rather non-democratic regimes. Studies also examined 
how regime change or various regime types affect the social backgrounds of ministerial 
elites in Spain (Linz et al., 2005); how “substantial control exercised by provincial-party 
bosses over the candidate recruitment and selection process in Argentina endows these 
bosses with considerable influence over national politics” (Jones, 2008: 73); how party 
leaders’ choices for appointing “parachuting” candidates affects the composition of 
candidates and legislative behavior of the elected in Canada where parties usually have 
decentralized candidate selection methods (Koop and Bittner, 2011); what are the 
recruitment patterns of the political elite in the UK (Norris and Lovenduski, 1993), and 
how “generational, occupational and institutional” backgrounds of legislative elite have 
altered through time to create a new type of elite in Soviet Russia (Lane and Ross, 1994), 
and how socioeconomic composition of ministerial elites changed over time in Turkey 
(Sayarı and Dikici-Bilgin, 2011). Along with the legislative elite, political party elite in 
general takes the attention of many scholars in various countries. From top to lower ranks, 
party elites in various levels have been studied. Especially party leadership (Martz, 1992), 
relationship between party headquarters and local offices (Biezen, 2000), significance 
and role of party grassroots and recruitment of local party officials (Bowman and 
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Boynton, 1966), party activists (Hirschfield et al., 1962), and professional staff of parties 
(Webb and Kolodny, 2006) have been examined under different settings. 
Regarding the previous recruitment studies, it can be said that, parties do not only recruit 
their local and national office chairpersons and professional workers, but they also 
nominate their candidates in elections. Candidate nomination may be defined as one of 
the subsets of the recruitment process in that regard. Nevertheless, not all parties follow 
the same or similar manner for candidate nomination, and their strategies are shaped by 
various factors. First of all, parties’ primary goals are important. Although in theory all 
parties pursue the goal of winning seats in legislative assemblies, and forming the 
government, or at least be a coalition member, these goals are not, in practice, always 
fulfilled. In fact, political parties with little chance of forming the government or being a 
part of it may be aware of their possible share of votes. Such parties may be seeking only 
votes rather than government office so that they can at least occupy seats in legislature. 
Regarding this issue, rational choice scholars suggest three types of party behavior: “(1) 
vote-seeking, (2) office-seeking, and (3) policy-seeking models…” (Strom, 1990: 566). 
Especially during elections, vote-seeking and office-seeking behaviors may influence 
each other and make parties nominate individuals who can attract the electorate and 
maximize the parties’ votes, so that eventually they can occupy seats in legislative branch 
(Hobolt and Høyland, 2011; Pemstein et al., 2015).  
However, parties cannot always find experienced and distinguishable candidates (Norris, 
1997), and “…A party with visible, loyal, experienced, and knowledgeable candidates is 
likely to be successful at the polls and in government. However, not all available 
candidates have these desirable qualities. Parties must therefore manage their candidates 
as scarce resources during elections...” (Pemstein et al., 2015: 1422).  
Thus, depending on their goals, parties may adopt different strategies in candidate 
nomination. They may even prefer not to nominate any candidates if the likelihood of 
being elected is low, or if they decide to support another party’s candidate(s). For 
example, recently, the MHP leader Bahçeli signaled that his party will not nominate any 
candidates for İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality in the upcoming local elections which 
will be held in 31 March 2019. Bahçeli explained the rationale behind this decision is that 
the success of the parties which support the new government system (Cumhurbaşkanlığı 
Hükümet Sistemi) in the country established after the 16 April 2017 Referendum, in the 
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2019 Local Elections is crucial, especially in the largest three provinces of the country, 
(İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir), to further strengthen the system. Thus, such parties like the 
AKP and MHP may prefer to form an alliance in some electoral districts in local 
elections.15 Similar decisions may emerge in general elections of presidential elections 
while nominating the candidates. Several parties may form electoral alliances in 
accordance with legal regulations or may nominate the same candidate together. Such 
strategies may be shaped by electoral success and the available resources of political 
parties.  
Both candidate selection and re-nomination literature reveal significant information about 
party recruitment processes. Such studies have been conducted both at national and local 
levels. These studies analyze “who selects” with regard to exclusiveness or inclusiveness 
of the selectorate and internal party democracy (Hazan and Rahat, 2006; Rahat, 2007; 
Indriðason and Kristinsson, 2015); “who gets selected” with regard to socioeconomic 
characteristics, political experience, incumbency and political motivation of the 
candidates (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Ballington, 2004; Rallings et al., 2008, 2010) 
and “what affects” those processes, such as political regime, party system, size of party, 
regional differences and party ideology (Lundell, 2004; Shomer, 2014; Kernell, 2015). 
Additionally, political ambition literature (Schlesinger, 1966; Prewitt and Nowlin, 1969; 
Black, 1972; Soskice et al., 1992; Fox and Lawless, 2005, 2010, 2011; Vanlangenakker, 
2010; Kerevel, 2013) reflects significant clues about political careers. 
 
Candidate selection has been identified as the “key stage” of recruitment by some scholars 
(Gallagher, 1988: 2; Hazan and Rahat, 2006). In a similar vein, some underlined that the 
significance of candidate selection is much higher, as this process is defined as the most 
crucial step in party and its recruitment process (Schattschneider, 1942; Czudnowski, 
1975). Kirchheimer (1998: 198) revealed this importance even further, by arguing that 
“the nomination of candidates for popular legitimation as office holders thus emerges as 
the most important function of present day catch-all party.” Similarly, it was proposed 
that, in the process of recruiting party candidates, selectorates shape the groups of 
decision makers, consequently, it will affect the party decisions in an indirect way, hence, 
                                                          
15 For more details, please see the following link: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/son-dakika-bahceliden-yerel-
secimler-icin-onemli-mesajlar-40962394.  
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“Candidate recruitment then represents one of the key linkages between the electorate 
and the policy-making process.” (Crotty, 1968: 260). 
  
Thus, candidate selection studies are significant for analyzing the recruitment patterns of 
political parties, and eventually, their internal relations. For example, Schattschneider 
(1942: 64) clearly underlined that “The nature of the nominating process determines the 
nature of the party; he who can make the nominations is the owner of the party. This is 
therefore one of the best points at which to observe the distribution of power within the 
party.” Thus, it is expected that “…the most vital and hotly contested factional disputes 
in any party are the struggles that take place over the choice of its candidates…” (Ranney, 
1981: 103). Cross (2008: 597) underlined that “…Candidate selection is examined within 
the context of better understanding both the dynamics of party organization and the 
changing distribution of power within a party in the cadre, mass catch-all, professional 
cartel and franchise party models...” This is also related to the opportunities of the 
members of the parties with regard to participating in the decision-making process. Which 
members can have what type of influence is quite crucial. Gallagher (1988: 3) highlights 
this concern that “…ordinary members cannot realistically expect to play a role in laying 
down party policy or formulating election manifestos […] Consequently, the contest over 
candidate selection is generally even more intense than the struggle for control over party 
manifestos.” 
As the improvements in the candidate selection studies and research relying on empirical 
findings, it is now clearer that candidate selection processes influence parties, their 
members, party leaders and democracy (Hazan and Rahat, 2006). It is further argued that 
party politics can be understand by candidate selection process,  
“First, candidate selection reflects and defines the character of a party and its 
internal power struggle. Second, it is relatively easy for parties to alter their 
candidate selection methods. Third, a change in candidate selection methods 
will affect party politics…” (Hazan and Rahat, 2006: 110).  
 
Additionally, in another study, Rahat and Hazan (2001: 297) argue that “If we claim that 
the behaviour of parties is affected by the nature of electoral system, then the behaviour 
of individual politicians must be affected by the nature of the selection method.” Thus, 
candidate selection processes and procedures are also quite influential on political 
ambition of individual politicians. Together, candidate selection and political ambition 
shape and explain political career patterns of elites. Details of the political ambition 
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theories and approaches are revealed and discussed in Chapter 3, titled “Political 
Ambition and Political Career” of this dissertation. 
 
2.3. Elite Recruitment in Different Settings 
 
Elite recruitment by political parties does not follow a single or common path in all 
settings. Parties develop varying strategies, depending on electoral systems, party 
systems, or nature of party competition. The following sections explain the variation 
amongst different settings on elite recruitment and candidate selection processes by 
political parties, and their consequences. 
 
 
2.3.1. Electoral Systems, Elite Recruitment and Candidate Selection 
 
Electoral systems matter for candidate selection strategies, the pool of possible candidates 
and consequently, representation. More specifically, when an open party list is used in a 
PR system, the voters are provided with the chance to use preference votes and re-rank 
the candidates, while closed party lists restrict the voters from doing this alternation by 
providing only a pre-ranked list of the candidates. Nevertheless, even if the lists are open, 
the voters may get the signal from the parties about the relative significance and value of 
the nominees by looking at the ranking of the candidates (Carey and Shugart, 1995). Thus, 
list construction presents parties with an opportunity to behave strategically, balancing 
vote, office, and policy-seeking incentives (Strom, 1990). Regarding these issues, the 
following sections explain the specifics of electoral systems, their impact on candidate 
selection, and consequently the political careers of individuals. 
Elections are one of the conventional political participation ways (O’Neil, 2010), along 
with others, such as political party membership, civil society organizations and 
membership to them as conventional forms; protests and demonstrations as 
unconventional forms of participation. Elections have both symbolic and practical roles 
(Gallagher et al., 2011). Symbolic roles are that elections are legitimizing the system for 
the citizens, and enable these citizens to have the feeling that they are participating in 
politics with little cost and effort. Practical roles of the elections are to define the political 
elite, to identify who will form the government, and to govern the country. Thus, the main 
role of elections is to select the representatives, but the elections may have various 
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attributes as well. For example, elections may enable voters to reward or punish the 
existing representatives. If an incumbent government is doing well, the voters who 
support it may reward it by voting for them in the next elections, or in the contrary, if a 
government is not working properly or not satisfying the demands of the voters, they can 
punish it by not supporting it in the next election (this can be defined as retrospective 
voting as the voters decide how to vote by looking at the past success of the party or any 
candidate, and alternatively, people can also vote prospectively by looking at the future 
promises of parties and candidates). Thus, elections give voters the chance to reflect their 
ideas and demands with regard to selection of representatives. In some countries, such as 
Turkey, elections can give more opportunity to influence political decision making, if 
other participation channels are less influential, such as low levels of civil society 
organization membership (see e.g., Kalaycıoğlu, 2016). Conversely, in some countries, 
such as Switzerland, other methods of political participation to affect political decision 
making may be as significant as elections. Design of electoral systems is important in 
party recruitment. Electoral rules would shape the strategies of political parties while 
preparing their electoral lists.  
In general, two types of electoral systems are mainly identified: (1) Single Member 
District Plurality Systems, (2) Proportional Representation (PR) Systems (O’Neil, 2010). 
Under plurality systems, the candidate who gains more votes than other candidates wins 
the elections, or as a specific case of it, under majority systems the candidate who gains 
more than half of the total available votes wins (Bale, 2005: 134). Plurality systems, thus, 
are identified as first-past-the-post. Electoral districts are shaped as single member 
districts under these systems, hence, only one seat is available to fill in each district. 
Under these circumstances, only one candidate enjoys being elected, and others cannot 
gain any seats, which is defined as winner-takes-all system. As an alternative to these 
settings, PR is an electoral system which distributes the seats to the parties proportionally, 
regarding their vote shares. Under PR systems, multi-member districts are usually 
employed, and the number of seats in a given district would vary. So, PR allows more 
than one candidate to be elected from a constituency. The rationale behind these two 
designs of electoral systems differ from one another. 
Plurality systems are designed to create a simple electoral rule, make the government 
formation become easier, and increase the government accountability once it is formed. 
This system is simple, because it does not require the allocation of seats proportionally, 
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but rather it makes the candidate with more votes than the other candidates be the winner. 
For example, in the United Kingdom (UK) employing plurality system, the first-past-the-
post rule is used and it enables the candidates who get the most votes to be elected. Due 
to single-member district in the UK case, there is only one seat to fill in each constituency, 
and there is only one candidate who will win that election in that specific electoral district. 
Differentiating from the majority/plurality rule, the main motivation behind the PR 
system is to increase proportionality between the votes and seats. So, eventually the 
number of parties in the parliament, inclusivity, representativeness, and fairness will 
increase, and the number of wasted votes will be decreased compared to plurality systems. 
In majority systems, votes given to the candidates other than the winner are usually 
defined as wasted votes since there is always only one winner (Heywood, 2007).  
Electoral systems may affect the strategies of political parties while selecting their 
candidates. As plurality with single member district systems are usually identified as the 
systems in which winner-takes-all, or first past the post, the parties seem to be more 
cautious about their candidate selection. The rationale behind this argument is that such 
systems are defined as candidate-centered systems as the constituents are voting for the 
candidates rather than the political parties or party lists as a whole. The significance of 
the candidates is generally seen to be more significant compared to other electoral 
systems. PR systems with multi member district, on the other hand, seem to give more 
chances to the selectorate of the parties. However, with regard to party centrality, this 
system is usually defined as party centered, and the voters need to select among the parties 
rather than showing their choices about particular candidates (see e.g., Shugart, 2001). 
More specifically, “…Closed list proportional and SMP systems offer general election 
voters no say over which of their preferred party’s candidates are elected … Voters’ role 
in these systems is reduced to determining how many deputies are allocated to each party. 
The parties have full determination over who these deputies are…” (Cross, 2008: 604). 
In addition, “…When lists are open, voters can use preference votes to alter candidate 
ranks, but the list provides a default ordering and sends the electorate signals about the 
relative value that the party selectorate places on candidates...” (Carey and Shugart, 1995)  
This ranking does not send signals about their values given to a specific candidate only 
to voters, but also clearly to the candidate himself or herself. Consequently, some 
candidates who find their ranking on the list as dissatisfying, may take this as a sign to 
expend more effort so that his or her candidacy order will be better, or, one may think 
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that the party does not remunerate this individual, and may break up from the party. In 
the latter cases, some politicians prefer to switch parties to find better opportunities in 
terms of candidacy. Hence, party-central or candidate-central systems also create 
differentiating strategies for political parties with regard to candidate selection. Not only 
the strategies of political party selectorate but also the behaviors of politicians are 
influenced by such factors. For example, “Electoral rules, candidate selection 
mechanisms and patronage also constrain where federal deputies seek future office.” 
(Kerevel, 2013: 2). 
Electoral threshold, district magnitude, formula used to distribute seats in PR systems are 
the factors affecting the party competition and voter behavior, and eventually the outcome 
of the elections results. Some countries do not implement any electoral threshold, 
however, parties and voters in Germany need to keep 5% threshold in mind, while it is 
10% threshold for Turkish voters and parties. Party and voter strategies may vary 
dramatically under such different cases. Voters may tend to vote for their second or third 
preferences, if they think or realize that first preference (the party) may not have enough 
votes to exceed the threshold. Eventually, this strategic voting will negatively affect that 
party, and it may lose its relevance in the system, and even disappear or die. Thus, such 
kind of a threshold affects the number of parties in the system, hence, the party system. 
When electoral threshold is abolished, the people may gradually start to give votes to their 
first preferences which will enable more party to have seats in the parliament. As another 
factor related to electoral rule, district magnitude can affect the party system: If district 
magnitude is small and if only one candidate wins, then the smaller parties will have little 
chance (although regional parties might have chance in such a set up even if they are 
relatively small). But if the district magnitude is large, proportional representation is used, 
and more than one candidate will win, then the chance of small parties to win seats is 
expected to increase. Additionally, the formula to distribute seats may affect the number 
of parties in the legislature. If these formulas favor larger parties, this can create a problem 
of disproportionality, and having smaller number of parties in the legislature. Lastly, 
election periods and time have an influence on party competition and eventually 
recruitment and candidate selection. For example, if the election date is set by the 
government, it can choose a date by calculating the effects of policy outcomes, and try to 
choose the best time to maximize its votes. If there is a set date for election, the parties 
arrange their campaigns and rallies accordingly, but if there is chance to call early 
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elections, some government parties may use this opportunity. For example, if the 
conditions are not going well for a government, and if it is expecting an economic crisis, 
it may call for an early election or a “snap election” in order to secure its position or 
minimize its losses. This would be more beneficial for that government party, rather than 
having elections after the crisis hit. Thus, such rules regarding the election time can affect 
the strategies of parties about candidate selection. 
Keeping all these factors in mind, we can argue that party competition will eventually be 
affected by the electoral rules and election timing, which affect the party system. When 
the party competition is affected, the strategies of the parties with regard to candidate 
selection will also be influenced. Hence, one may argue that, electoral system and 
candidate selection processes are closely related to each other and parties may use 
different strategies under different electoral systems. Not only electoral systems, but also 
electoral rules in the parliaments may affect candidate selection: If parliamentary votes 
are cast openly, parties may have chance to observe their MPs’ voting behavior. Thus, 
everyone may know who each deputy votes for. This visibility enables the parties to see 
whether their members are in line with the party policies. Thus, the electoral rules in the 
form of voting rules in the parliament will affect party discipline, which eventually 
influences party recruitment, as parties may punish some candidates if they break party 
discipline. 
 
2.3.2. Party Systems, Party Competition and Candidate Selection 
 
Party systems exert influence on elite recruitment, and more specifically, candidate 
selection strategies. One significant reason for this is that party systems shape inter-party 
competition. Before explaining possible repercussions of party systems on recruitment 
and candidate selection, providing brief details of party systems would be useful. Scholars 
have been identifying various criteria to define and classify party systems.  Consequently, 
definitions of party systems vary in a broad range, yet, as a simplified explanation, one 
may argue that party systems are not only about the competition of various political 
parties, but also the cooperation among them (Caramani, 2014: 217). Discussions revolve 
around whether counting only the number of parties in the system is enough, or should 
we have other criteria to count parties in the party systems? This question is related to the 
decision of which parties should be included or excluded while defining the party 
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systems. The number of parties and competitiveness of the opposition parties (Dahl, 
1966), the number of parties along with the relative sizes of parties (Blondel, 1968), and 
the number of parties along with the ideological stance of parties (Sartori, 1976) have 
been employed to classify party systems. One of the most accepted arguments about this 
topic is what Sartori (1976) proposed as counting the effective number of parties in a 
system. According to Sartori (1976)’s explanation, any party with a coalition potential or 
blackmail potential should be counted within the effective number of parties, and the 
party systems should be defined accordingly. Moreover, analyzing “mode of the 
alternation of government”, “stability of governing alternatives”, and looking at “who can 
and does govern” are also useful factors to identify and compare party systems (Mair, 
2002). Ware (1996: 149) summarizes the generally accepted criteria for classifying the 
party systems as follows: “1) the extent to which parties penetrate to society, 2) the 
ideologies of parties, 3) the stance of the parties towards the legitimacy of the regime, and 
4) the number of parties in the system…” Combining all these approaches and definitions, 
it is possible to explain party systems as follows: “…Party systems are sets of parties that 
compete and cooperate with the aim of increasing their power in controlling government 
… Interactions are determined by (1) which parties exist, (2) how many parties compose 
a system and how large they are, (3) the way in which they maximize their votes...” 
(Caramani, 2014: 2017). 
Regarding these propositions, various types of party systems have been categorized both 
under non-democratic and democratic regimes. Under non-democratic regimes, only two 
types of party systems are defined: First, single party systems which consist of only one 
legal political party, and do not provide any space to any opposition. These systems are 
available both in authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. Some examples are National 
Socialist Party in Germany, Communist Party in the Soviet Union in the past and Baathist 
Party in Iraq until 1993 (Caramani, 2014: 222). The second type is hegemonic party 
systems, under which one hegemonic party dominates the party politics both electorally 
and politically, and, although there are other parties which are defined as legal, these are 
identified as “satellites” as they are strictly controlled by the hegemonic party (Sartori, 
1976). Some examples of this party system have been Mexico’s party system with the 
hegemony of PRI, and some communist regimes in Eastern Europe in the 1980s.  
Other than those party systems under non-democratic regimes, there are mainly four other 
types in democracies. The first one is the pre-dominant party systems, in which one large 
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political party dominates the politics “with a majority above the absolute majority of 50 
per cent of seats for protected periods of time (several decades)” (Caramani, 2014: 223). 
Sartori (1976) explains pre-dominant party system by saying that if the elections are free 
and fair, and if a political party wins three consecutive elections (such as in Japan’s 
Liberal Democratic Party – LDP, and Sweden’s Sweden Democrats - SD cases) the 
system becomes pre-dominant. Other political parties can freely operate and compete 
under this system, but usually they cannot gain enough votes to obtain the majority of the 
seats in the legislative assembly alone or in coalition with other parties. Therefore, they 
do not have much opportunity to form the government, or to be a coalition partner as the 
dominant party gets enough votes to form the party government by itself. Moreover, 
government alternation in such party systems is not frequent. The second is the multi-
party system, in which one observes two or more political parties in the legislature after 
almost each election, and usually none of these parties can win 50% of the seats in the 
legislature. Consequently, the emergence of a coalition government is more likely under 
this party system which, can push parties to cooperate with one another during 
government formation. Depending on the vote shares of parties in this system, 
government alternation can occur from one election to another. Three to five parties 
would be the case generally identified as moderate pluralism, as in the German case; or 
six to ten parties would gain seats in the legislature, which is defined as extreme pluralism.  
Further still, 11 and more parties would occupy seats in legislature, which creates an 
atomistic system. Under 6-10 multi-party systems, parties usually show a large 
ideological distance, and some extremist parties may gain seats in the legislature. Thus, 
party competition would show differences from the first type. The third category of party 
systems under democracies is the two-party system, which is best depicted by the systems 
in the UK, US and Australia. In this system, two large parties usually get the highest 
amount of the votes (approaching jointly up to and sometimes above 80% of the total vote 
between themselves), and party government is the most likely outcome. The chance of 
forming the government usually changes hands between these two parties. Although there 
are other parties which compete in elections and would get some seats in the parliament, 
the largest two parties dominate the legislature. Lastly, the fourth is the bipolar party 
system, which consists of “two large coalitions composed of several parties sharing 
together around 80% of the votes and seats.” (Caramani, 2014: 223). Under these systems, 
those coalitions are usually in similar sizes and they run in elections in a form of electoral 
43 
 
alliances. This system usually creates coalition governments, and it could be assumed that 
parties are more likely to cooperate at least within their own alliances.  
Reasons for the emergence of those party systems vary. Historical background, social 
cleavage structure and legal framework are some of the factors shaping political party 
system. Specifically on party competition, various scholars propose differentiating ideas: 
Duverger (1964) explained party competition with reference to institutional effects (i.e. 
the impact of electoral rules), Lipset and Rokkan (1967) unearthed the influence of 
various social cleavages in the society, Ware (1996)  brings attention to the influence of 
ideologies as earlier suggested by von Beyme, and Sartori (1976) underlined the 
characteristics of party systems and their effects, while explaining party competition. It 
is possible to categorize the analysis of effecting factors on party systems into two main 
segments: institutional approach and sociological approach. Institutional approach 
explains the impact of electoral system design on party systems while sociological 
approach mainly focuses on social cleavages and their reflections on politics and 
specifically parties and party systems. 
Institutional approach explains the emergence of various party systems with the influence 
of electoral systems. One of the most prominent explanations of the causal relationship 
between electoral systems and party systems comes from Duverger (1964), and his 
exposition of this relationship is called as Duverger’s Law in the literature. According to 
Duverger (1964), plurality electoral system with a single member district tends to favor a 
two-party system; and PR system with multi-member district usually favors or is more 
likely to create a multi-party system, in which many independent parties can exist. In 
addition to these, double ballot majority system is more likely to create a multi-party 
system in which the parties tend to form alliances (Gallagher et al., 2011: 390). To 
illustrate this argument, the UK implementing plurality rule with single member district 
and the Netherlands using PR system can be compared: Plurality electoral system created 
a two-party system in the UK, while PR system with multi-member districts in The 
Netherlands led to a multi-party system (Gallagher et al., 2011: 208). Although, more 
recently, the party system of the UK seems to change towards having more than two 
effective parties, a two-party system has been a characteristic of this country for a long 
period of time. From the perspective of Duverger’s Law (1964), two main factors cause 
this: (1) mechanical effect which emerges from the electoral formula that translates the 
votes into seats in legislature, (2) psychological effect which influence voter and party 
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behavior. According to psychological effect explanation, voters decide to select between 
strategic voting and sincere voting, and parties try to find the best strategy among merging 
or forming alliances and running by their own in elections depending on the electoral 
design. This, at the end, affects the strategies of parties on candidate selection processes 
as well.  
With regard to institutional approach, Duverger’s Law proposes that majoritarian 
electoral rules tend to create two-party systems, as there will be one winner who gains the 
majority of the votes from each district, and this rule usually favors the powerful parties 
rather than the smaller ones, and eventually (and usually) two powerful parties become 
the relevant parties in the system. PR systems, on the other hand, tend to favor smaller 
parties along with the bigger ones, and thus usually create multiparty systems.  
With regard to sociological approach, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) focus on sociological 
factors and propose that various cleavages emerge in societies, and their reflections are 
translated to political party systems which influence political competition. Specifically, 
with regard to competitiveness of party systems, these scholars argued that mainly four 
thresholds (legitimation, incorporation, representation and majority power)16 are defining 
factors with regard to the characteristics of a party system. In other words, different 
combination of the levels of these four thresholds results in different party systems. For 
instance, if legitimation and incorporation show low levels whereas representation and 
majority power show high levels, the resulting party system will be a “competitive party 
system under universal and equal manhood suffrage but with high payoff for alliances 
and with a clear separation of legislative and executive powers.” (Lipset and Rokkan, 
1967: 26-29).  
In addition to Lipset and Rokkan (1967)’s explanation, Sartori focused on centripetal and 
centrifugal competition while explaining how competitive a party system is:  
“If a political system obtains anti-system and bilateral oppositions, and if the 
system discourages centripetal competition by the fact that the center is 
                                                          
16 “Legitimation: Are all protests rejected as conspiratorial, or is there some recognition for right of petition, criticism 
and opposition?  
Incorporation: Are all or the most of the supporters of the movement denied status as participants in the choice of 
representatives, or are they given political citizenship rights on a par with their oppenents? 
Representation: Must the new movement join to larger and older movements to ensure access to representative organs 
or can it gain representation on its own? 
Majority power: Are these built-in checks and counterforces against numerical majority rule in the system, or will a 
victory at the polls give a party or an alliance power to bring about major structural changes in the national system?” 
(Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 27). 
 
45 
 
physically occupied, then we can have a polarized system. In such a system, 
the lateral poles are quite away from each other, and in fact, the distance 
between them covers a maximum spread of opinions. Thus, we can say that 
the ideologies seem to be significant, and the cleavages seem to be very deep 
in such a system. Here, the system is center-based as it is polarized –the center 
parties can be rewarded, thus there can be a centripetal behavior. In certain 
conditions, centrifugal drives can overcome the centripetal ones. The 
characteristic trend it such a system is the enfeeblement of the center, and a 
persistent loss of votes to one or two of the extreme ends on the political 
spectrum. In other words, we observe a trend of votes from center to extreme 
ends.” (Sartori, 1976: 120). 
Regarding this explanation, it is possible to argue that political party strategies with regard 
to candidate selection and election competition differs from one system to another. In 
other words, depending on the level of competitiveness and locus of competition, parties’ 
choices may be shaped in different ways. 
Lastly, Ware (1996) underlines the impact of ideologies with regard to party competition. 
As he mentions, the literature reveals mainly two types of approaches to understand and 
explain adaptation of a particular ideology, and the persistence or modification of that 
ideology: (1) a competitive approach and (2) an institutional approach. Competitive 
Approach can also be called as the adaptation approach, and parties are seen as actors 
who can adapt their ideologies to the opinions and values of their likely supporters in the 
electorate. Different from this approach, according to Institutional Approach, the history 
of the parties shapes their (ideology) adaptation process, usually the parties have their 
ideologies when they are founded, and this ideology does not change, but rather persists, 
even if the conditions change. Although the parties have an adaptation capacity, they do 
not change so quickly. Such differences may also shape party strategies in electoral 
competition. If a political party chooses to adapt a new ideology or new policies, elite 
recruitment and candidate selection strategies may change in this party, which eventually 
alter the composition of elite within this party.  
Party systems and eventually party competition may change over time. Some political 
parties would have salience and occupy an important place in a country’s politics for a 
certain period of time, but then those parties would lose their significance or vanish 
completely. Such chances also affect party competition. Examples of these arguments are 
explained in Chapter 4, which explains party politics in Turkey. However, before going 
through the peculiarities of the Turkish case, the next chapter explains political ambition 
and provide various approaches to it. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
POLITICAL AMBITION AND POLITICAL CAREER 
 
 
3.1. What Determines Decisions to Embark on a Political Career? 
 
Who becomes a politician? This question cannot be answered only by the party 
recruitment approach explained in the previous chapter. One need to understand “Who 
decides to become party elite?” and “Why do people decide to become politicians?” This 
is related to the second part, which determines becoming a politician: the supply side 
explanation. In general, quite different motivations, from ideological motives to 
economic or personal interests, from dissent to triggering individual experiences, may 
drive individuals to participate politics. Political participation has various ways such as 
voting in elections, working in electoral campaigns, membership to political parties or 
civil society organizations and petitioning (which are conventional forms) or protests, 
rallies and strikes (which are unconventional forms). Deciding to be a politician is also a 
specific form of political participation, and this form of participation requires much more 
effort, motivation and investment. Indeed, becoming one is defined as one of the highest 
levels of political participation (Fox and Lawless, 2005; 2010). More specifically, 
“Considering a candidacy for public office involves pondering the courageous step of 
going before an electorate and facing potential examination, scrutiny, and rejection.” (Fox 
and Lawless, 2011: 443). Not everyone desires to be a politician even if they are 
politically mobilized. Some individuals choose only to vote during elections, some 
become members of civil society organizations, some would also prefer to be affiliated 
with political parties - but not become active politicians -, and some also want to be 
actively working politicians.  
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“Democratic legitimacy is a central justification for exploring all types of political 
participation” (Verba et al., 1995); and running for political office simply represents the 
ultimate act...” of political participation (Fox and Lawless, 2005: 643). Hence, one may 
argue that, if becoming a politician is the ultimate act of political participation, then one 
need to first understand what is needed for political participation. Political participation 
in general is usually analyzed with regard to behavior of the electorate, and it requires 
mainly three elements (Kalaycıoğlu, 2016: 194): The first one is the motives which are 
formed by knowledge and interest, attitudes, values, beliefs and perceptions of an 
individual about and towards politics. The second one is resources which are necessary 
for emergence of the motives and to make individuals to act with those motives. Political 
resources are the necessary social, economic and cultural ability of an individual to have 
specific knowledge, interest or skills. By the help of these, an individual can capture, 
understand and evaluate political phenomena, and can decide his or her acts for making 
a certain influence. The third one is opportunities which provide political chances to affect 
decision-making processes. An individual with certain political motives would use his or 
her resources by using the opportunities to have an influence on the decision-making 
process (Kalaycıoğlu, 2016: 194). This explanation of political participation is usually 
employed to analyze participation of ordinary citizens; however, regarding the argument 
of Fox and Lawless (2005, 2011), it seems possible to apply motives, resources and 
opportunities explanation to the ones who desire to be politicians. 
Figure 3.1: Determinants of political participation 
 
 
Figure 3.1 summarizes three major determinants of political participation which is 
explained in the previous paragraph. When we use this template for the individuals who 
prefer to be a political actor as a political participation form, it is important to explain 
Political 
Participation
Motives
Resources
Opportunities
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what the factors affecting those three elements are. For example, “The resources and 
motivation applicants bring to the role will vary according to their social background. 
Younger teachers from the Midlands, well-established middle-aged lawyers, self-
employed company directors, experienced Scottish trade unionists and London women 
social workers will bring different skills, qualifications and assets to political life” (Norris 
and Lovenduski, 1993: 380). 
Entering to political arena, requires an important examination of both personal attributes 
and current political situation in a given country. Nevertheless, entering into the political 
arena is not the end point for the individuals who would like to embark on a political 
career: 
“…although many people have resources, only a few choose a political 
career. The combination of resources plus motivation produces the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for candidacies. Motivational factors are defined as 
psychological predispositions to become involved in politics. Previous 
research has commonly explained activism by higher levels of political 
ambition, interest and confidence.” (Norris and Lovenduski, 1993: 402).  
Thus, career decisions of politicians would differ from one individual to another. The 
following paragraphs explain what drives political ambition, and eventually the decision 
of embarking on a political career.   
Political parties are identified as a component of political opportunity structures provided 
for political career (Norris, 1997). Additionally,  
“Party organizations’ leaders, elected officials, and activists serve as 
gatekeepers who groom eligible candidates to run for office. For many 
individuals, recruitment from political leaders serves as the key ingredient in 
fomenting their thoughts of running. Not only is political viability often 
conveyed by the suggestion to run from a party official, but party support also 
tends to bring the promise of an organization that will work on behalf of a 
candidate.” (Fox and Lawless, 2011: 446). 
 
Regarding this explanation, it is not a surprise that individual politicians who receive 
encouragement from the party gatekeepers reveal higher levels of ambition about being a 
candidate, compared to other who do not have such kind of a support coming from parties 
or leaders (Fox and Lawless, 2010; 2011), and such party encouragement may change the 
composition of candidates. Moreover, according to Broockman (2014: 109), “…having 
been asked to run [is] the modal explanation for candidacy or the factor most positively 
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associated with interest in running.” One may associate this idea of being asked to run 
with a significant signal coming from one’s party for the prospective politician. With such 
invitations, these individuals feel more supported, and to some extent more secure with 
regard to their candidacy process. Nevertheless, with regard to running for higher office, 
“signaling behaviour by the prospective candidate increases the likelihood of them 
entering the selection process for higher office, but does not affect the likelihood of them 
being successful in this endeavour…” (Allen and Cutts, 2017: 2). 
Some scholars argue that individual politicians’ calculation of cost and risks determines 
the political career choices rather than the nature of political ambition, and “…an 
incumbent’s career choice is decisively influenced by the strategies they adopt to 
effectively use their resources.” so, the expected utilities matter a lot in terms of this 
choice (Leoni et al., 2004: 109). For example, length of legislative terms influences the 
MPs behavior and decisions about running in elections (Carey, 2002). 
   “…the strategic decision federal deputies make concerning the office for 
which he/she will run in the next election is mostly determined by a self-
evaluation of performance in office and the estimated chance of re-election. 
In other words, federal deputies’ choices of career are guided not only by the 
incentives of the position pursued, such as a higher stipend or a bigger staff, 
but also by the electoral viability of that choice. That is, the higher utility of 
being elected to these offices is weighed against the risks and costs one must 
incur. Three main factors that influence the probability of re-election and the 
potential costs are institutional position and performance in office, personal 
characteristics and electoral vulnerability.” (Leoni et al., 2004: 111). 
 
Depending on many issues, such as satisfaction with the current office, future goals and 
opportunities provided by certain offices may drive politicians to stay in their current 
offices, or may not. For example, “…the level of competition inside districts does affect 
incumbents’ choice of which office to run for.” (Leoni et al., 2004: 129). Figure 3.2 in 
the following page shows the simplified decision tree model of the politicians with regard 
to their career choices. This figure was prepared by the explanations of above-mentioned 
studies. 
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Figure 3.2: Decision tree of political career choices. 
 
Note: This figure is adopted from Leoni et al. (2004: 118), with some additions and changes. 
 
Another vital issue which determines the career choices is the relative significance of 
offices. Meaning that, not all offices would attract all politicians in the same way. For 
example, a municipal office would be considered as more important than a legislative 
office by some politicians. So, some may not necessarily define linear or vertically 
hierarchical understanding of upward mobility in politics. Similarly, political ambition 
would not be only for occupying elective offices. Some individuals with political 
ambition would be satisfied with other opportunities even if they cannot run for elective 
office. For example, occupying a particular party office, a promotion in their own job, or 
engaging with possible networks would be more important than occupying a political 
office for such individuals. Hence, regarding the above-mentioned factors, a large number 
of scholars explained the political career choices of individuals from rational choice 
paradigm (see e.g., Schlesinger, 1966; Black, 1972; Rohde, 1979; Stone and Maisel 
2003).  
Still, some politicians are far more appealing to the public both in national politics and 
local politics. Even if individuals are driven by rational choice, individuals’ political 
career decisions are not only dependent upon their own discretion but also the decisions 
of parties and other politicians. Hence, the influence of parties cannot be denied; however, 
the effects of parties vary (Detterbeck, 2011). While some parties provide better 
opportunities for individuals from different socioeconomic backgrounds, some choose to 
exclude particular groups from their candidate lists or party elite. 
Politician's Career 
Choices
Run for any office
Run for a higher 
office
Run for the same 
office
Retire or
exit politics
Run for a lower 
office
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Which politicians try to converge with their political parties more deeply? How does the 
party and the politician benefits from the given decisions with regard to recruitment and 
candidate selection, and how do these benefits interact with each other? Which side will 
have the leverage in terms of shaping an individual’s political career: parties or 
politicians? The following parts in this chapter are on explaining political ambition in 
greater detail and review the literature on different types of ambition. These varying types 
of political ambition are progressive ambition, hyper progressive ambition, static 
ambition, discrete ambition, intra-institutional ambition, dynamic ambition, and 
regressive ambition. Although the literature contains sub-forms of these political 
ambition types, mainly the above-mentioned ones will be examined, and employed in 
data analysis chapter. 
 
 
3.2. What is Political Ambition? 
 
If there were a tombstone of political ambition theory, the following sentence would be 
written on it: “Ambition lies at the heart of politics.” (Schlesinger, 1966: 1). Obviously, 
this sentence lies at the heart of political ambition literature, as many scholars reference 
it in their research, and underline the importance of it. The following paragraphs explain 
the significance of this argument by referring to respective studies and examine the impact 
of various types of political ambition on political career decisions.  
First of all, continuing with Schlesinger’s theory, it can be underlined that “A politician’s 
behaviour is a response to his office goals.” (Schlesinger, 1966: 6). He argues that “the 
politician as office-seeker engages in political acts and makes decisions appropriate to 
gaining office.” (1966: 6). Relatedly, “It makes little difference to the theory of ambition 
whether men adopt the ambitions suitable to the office or attain the office because of their 
ambitions. It is sufficient to conclude that governors of New York will behave as though 
they were Presidential candidates while governors of Mississippi or South Dakota will 
not.” (Schlesinger, 1966: 9). This argument is not peculiar to New York and its governors. 
Similarities can be found in other cities or districts in other countries. For example, being 
a mayor of London may not be similar with being a mayor of Southampton in the UK as 
the political salience and population of, along with economic activities within these two 
cities differ. Similarly, a mayor’s position in İstanbul is usually not comparable to other 
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mayors serving elsewhere in Turkey. Consequently, occupying a political office may 
provide different opportunities in different cities. 
Thus, “Schlesinger finds considerable consistency in the career patterns that politicians 
follow from state to state. He finds that some offices are substantially more likely to 
promote political advancement than other offices, and he characterizes these differences 
as the ‘opportunity structure’ of the political system.” (Black, 1972: 144). Black (1972: 
144) then argues that “Although one cannot prove it with these data, I suspect that the 
ambitions of individuals are strongly shaped by the availability of opportunities, and that 
this effect is manifested in the probability estimates that politicians assign to various 
alternatives.” Black’s criticism on Schlesinger’s (1966) argumentation is that “while 
Schlesinger can chart recruitment patterns, his data do not permit an examination of 
ambition directly. The study of political ambition is the study of motivations of 
politicians, and hence requires data on individuals…” (Black, 1972: 145). 
Although political ambition studies need data on individuals, one needs to explain what 
kind of differences in those politicians’ behavior can be measurable depending on the 
political context of a specific country. Laws, party bylaws or regulations and other criteria 
would affect the behaviors of the politicians. For example, if there are any limitations to 
candidates mentioned in the party bylaws -such as term limits-, it is not easy for those 
politicians who would like to seek reelection. Consequently, politicians’ motivations with 
regard to staying in office or seeking for other offices may be affected. For example, it is 
underlined that “…term limits reduce the benefits of seeking reelection, even for state 
legislators who are eligible to run, and reduce the opportunity cost of running for other 
offices.” (Lazarus, 2006: 357). Hence, such regulations are also noteworthy to take into 
consideration in political ambition studies. 
Political ambition shows diversity within itself. Not all individuals or politicians show 
the same kind of political ambition. Then, what are diverse types of political ambition? 
How does political ambition differ from one political context to another? What are the 
reasons for these? Such questions are answered in the following sections of this chapter. 
To illustrate some differences among various countries, it is indicated that: 
“A majority of members of the six nations harbor ambitions beyond their 
current office. In the Third World parliaments more than one-half show 
progressive ambition […] The ambitions of the European parliamentary elites 
run even higher: those with progressive ambition are 83 percent in Belgium, 
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62 percent in Italy, and 82 percent in Switzerland. It is clear that the European 
elites generally have a better idea as to how far and to which office they could 
go from parliament and possess a well worked out plan to attain their career 
goals. In comparison, the Third World elites appear uncertain as to where 
their legislative service will ultimately lead them. During the interviews we 
found many hesitant to give us a decisive response because they were 
themselves unclear about their ultimate career goals. This uncertainty seems 
to stem from two sources. The first is a relatively low institutionalization of 
the political career structures in these nations; that is, the interconnections of 
various career paths are not sharply enough defined to be predictable. The 
second source is the risk and uncertainty associated with a political career due 
to the chronic instability of the political system in these nations.” (Kim and 
Patterson, 1988: 389). 
Deriving from these findings, it is arguable that political career paths do not show 
regularities within each political system. Hence, politicians may develop differing 
strategies in different contexts depending on the past experiences and common practices 
in various countries. 
Political ambition literature’s early stages contain progressive ambition, static ambition 
and discrete ambition theories in general. Throughout time, scholars researching political 
ambition added new types of political ambition to the respective literature. Those newly 
described types include hyper-progressive ambition (McCoy, 2014), dynamic ambition 
(Fox and Lawless, 2011) and intrainstitutional ambition (Herrick and Moore, 1993) and 
regressive ambition (Leoni et al., 2004).  
Political ambition may affect career decisions in different ways under differing settings, 
such as different electoral and administrative systems and regimes. In the previous 
chapter, the relationship between electoral systems and party recruitment was examined.  
Besides those, political opportunity structure matters a lot in political career decisions. 
Maestas et al. (2006) include with the previous argument that along with political 
opportunities structure, legislators will also take various personal and institutional factors 
into consideration. In other words, along with the political opportunities structure, there 
are other issues that the individuals consider while deciding to compete in elections 
(Rohde, 1979). Following the ideas of Schlesinger (1966), who underlined that political 
ambition affects the legislator’s behavior, in a more specific way it was argued that 
political aims of the politicians affect their behavior:  
“For MEPs who aim to move to the state level, attendance and participation 
in legislative activities is substantively lower among legislators from 
candidate-centered systems. Importantly, the effect of career ambitions on 
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legislative participation is stronger in candidate-centered systems than in 
party-centered systems. These findings suggest that the responsiveness 
associated with candidate-centered systems comes at the expense of 
legislative activity” (Hoyland et al., 2017: 1). 
Similarly, types of electoral system seem to have influence on political ambition and 
consequently behavior of politicians. For example, we can discuss a hypothetical MP 
having static ambition, who wants to be re-nominated and re-elected in the next elections. 
If this MP operates in a candidate centered electoral environment in which his or her goal 
can be achieved mostly by satisfying the needs of and providing the necessary services to 
the respective constituency, his or her chances to occupy the current office does not only 
be determined by the party but mostly by the MP’s own hard work. However, if the same 
MP with same degree of ambition operates in a party-centered system with PR electoral 
laws with a closed party list on which voters cannot make any changes, he may face a 
problem of not being elected, if not nominated by the party or placed higher up on the 
list. Under these circumstances, party discretion may override the individual politician’s 
ambition and goals. It is not surprising, thus, that parties pursue a good opportunity to 
determine their candidate types in list-based PR systems (Gallagher, 1988). Nevertheless, 
politicians usually take such issues into consideration, and determine their acts and 
behavior appropriately. Various scholars analyze, for example, the relationship between 
legislative behavior, parliamentary performance and re-nomination of MPs in different 
countries, and find that parliamentary performance does affect re-nomination chances of 
MPs (Proksch and Slapin, 2010; Louwerse and Otjes, 2016; Fernandes et al., 2017; 
Yıldırım et al. 2017). One significant finding is that MPs signal their political ambition 
and career goals to the decision makers (e.g. party leaders) (Allen and Cutts, 2017). 
Therefore, the decisions and behaviors of politicians would change from one electoral 
system to another. For example, candidate-centered or party-centered electoral systems 
activate different types of behavior:  
 “In a ‘candidate-centered’ electoral system, such as open-list proportional 
representation, legislators who want to be re-elected need to devote greater 
attention to their constituency regardless of which office they are seeking. 
Once a high profile has been established locally, this lowers the cost of 
transferring from one political arena to another. In contrast, in a ‘party-
centered’ electoral system, such as closed-list proportional representation, 
legislators primarily need to be on good terms with their party leaders, who 
control candidate selection. The effect of career ambition on legislative 
participation thus varies across electoral systems.” (Hoyland et al, 2017).  
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Deciding whether the constituency or the party holds the most importance for their career 
paths is a crucial task for the politicians. If a politician cannot calculate the appropriate 
strategy, his or her nomination or re-nomination chance would decrease. Thus, the 
politicians and their ambition are shaped by the electoral systems to some extent. 
Electoral systems also provide important clues in order to understand political ambition’s 
impact on politicians’ behavior in legislature as electoral rules shape the campaigning 
strategies of ambitious individuals and “how they behave once elected, such as how 
responsive they are to legislative party leaders or which legislative committees they 
choose to join.” (Hoyland et al., 2017: 4). Moreover, how parties select their candidates 
is also highly influential on legislators’ behavior, which shows political career prospects 
of those individuals (see, e.g. Jun and Hix, 2010) Similarly, it was argued that: 
“Political career patterns also may provide clues about the nature of informal 
ties in the political system. Here the main question is whether legislators have 
good reason to hope for advancement moving to other political levels. Those 
who see their current positions as stepping-stones to higher office have 
particularly strong reasons cultivate ties with politicians elsewhere in the 
system (Schlesinger 1966, 1991). Conversely, those who pursue careers in a 
single politic level have fewer career-related incentives to cooperate with 
party colleagues in other tiers.” (Scarrow, 1997: 254). 
Lastly, political ambition and its effects on political career paths are conditioned by the 
regime of a state. In other word, emergence and types of political ambition under 
democratic regimes differ from the cases under non-democracies. In general, political 
ambition theories rely on the cases under democracies, and explain the variance 
depending on different institutional or administrative factors such as electoral rules, 
degree of (de)centralism, and so on. One important reason for this is that it is not easy to 
pursue political career under non-democratic regimes unless one person is not affiliated 
with the ruling party or other effective and powerful organizations which most probably 
have close relations with that party or the rulers. Moreover, opposition parties are usually 
weakened, limited, and even outlawed under non-democratic rules. Hence, the 
opportunities to become a politician may be much less, when compared to a democratic 
regime. Still, political ambition is not peculiar to the individuals living in democratic 
countries.  
Many people are also driven by political ambition under authoritarian regimes.  Elections, 
candidacy and eventually political ambition patterns under authoritarian regimes have 
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been also examined (see e.g., Lust-Okar, 2006), and these research usually focus on -in a 
similar vein with the ones conducted under democracies- who decides to be a candidate, 
what drives these individuals and how they run their electoral campaigns; and from 
another perspective, why some individuals decide to run as an opposition candidate 
although their chances to be elected are utterly low (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009: 409). 
Usually, “…candidates are encouraged to run by friends, family, and acquaintances who 
stand to benefit from having an elected official in their circle.” (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 
2009: 410). For example, a large portion of Jordanian candidates came to a decision to 
become a candidate relying to their families’ or friends’ support rather than parties’ or 
government officials’ suggestions (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009). However, this is 
usually applicable in countries with relatively open nomination processes such as Jordan 
and Egypt, and it is not quite possible to run as a candidate based on personal supporters 
in countries like Mexico and Syria where party discipline is much stronger (Gandhi and 
Lust-Okar, 2009: 410). It seems that some of the major reasons for running as candidates 
and becoming politicians under non-democratic regimes are for gaining proximity to 
government resources and government officials such as ministers (e.g. to be able to get 
necessary permits), benefitting from the mediating and service providing process to their 
constituency, and enjoying legislative immunity (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009: 410).   
After these general remarks on political ambition, the following parts explain various 
categories of it. The first part starts with the original ambition theory of Schlesinger 
(1966) who categorizes political ambition into three areas: progressive, static and 
discrete. Then, other types of political ambition, which are identified and developed over 
time by alternative theories are examined. 
 
3.2.1. Progressive Ambition Theory 
 
Schlesinger (1966) argued that the legislative elites, who are aiming to occupy a higher 
office compared to their current office show different behavior compared to less 
ambitious politicians. For example, Maestas (2003) underlined that politicians who aim 
for higher political office and career take the voters’ ideas more into consideration 
compared to the others who are not seeking to occupy a higher office. One assumption is 
that if there is an opportunity without any cost and risks for a politician to seek for a 
higher office, he or she will seek to run for that (Rohde, 1979). However, one can still 
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observe that some politicians would not run for higher office even given that opportunity. 
The rationale behind this is related to the significance of the particular offices. Meaning 
that, not all offices would give the same utility to all politicians. Or, politicians identify 
some offices as being better than the others, even though those offices are not of high 
rank. For example, an individual politician may believe that a mayoral position which is 
identified as a local office provides more opportunities and utilities to himself or herself. 
So, in this case, running for a mayoral position would be regarded as running for a lower 
level office compared to legislative one; however, that politician would benefit more from 
that office. Thus, Samuels (2000) also asserts that running for a municipal office as a 
mayoral candidate can be a sign of possessing progressive ambition. This shows that the 
significance of the office in the eyes of a politician matters in terms of political ambition 
and behavior. Similarly, it is argued that: 
“Schlesinger's approach should stress position-seeking rather than office-
seeking. By not doing so he misses the fact that the numerous committee and 
party positions in the House make it possible for the entire gamut of position-
seeking behavior to be demonstrated by just those people Schlesinger 
classifies as having static ambition. Progressive behavior can just as easily be 
displayed by running for party whip as by running for Senate (Hibbing, 1989: 
28). 
While mentioning the progressive ambition theory, it is quite crucial to refer its costs and 
risks. Compared to static ambition or discrete ambition (which will be examined in the 
following parts), progressive ambition may be identified as more cost and risk prone. For 
example,  
“…In Brazil, as in the United States, the costs and risks of progressive 
ambition are very high. Brazilian federal deputies, in this regard, are not 
at all different from their US counterparts, since the great majority of 
those who decide to run for an office adopt a risk-avoidance strategy 
and seek reelection. As a consequence, we argue, under the assumption 
that legislators are rational, that static ambition predominates in the 
United States and Brazil because of the high risks and costs entailed in 
the decision to run for higher office. These risks consequently constrain 
the career choices of incumbents, including those with meaningful 
electoral capital. In the Brazilian 1995–1998 legislature, of the 38 
deputies running for higher offices, only seven succeeded. This only 
amounts to an 18.9 per cent success rate, whereas those running for re-
election had a 64.9 per cent success rate. In light of high risks and costs 
an incumbent may face if he or she pursues higher office, many may be 
assumed to be risk-averse and likely to run for re-election, as is the case 
in the United States as well...” (Leoni, et al., 2004: 115). 
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Calculating the electoral success and electability appears to be of serious importance for 
political careers, but this is not the only cost and risk calculation. Other constraints may 
emerge with regard to risks and costs of progressive ambition. Some individuals are 
obliged to resign from their own offices if they want to run in elections. For example, a 
mayor must resign from his or her office to run in general elections in Turkey 
(Parliamentary Elections Act (Law no: 2839), 1983). Some of these individuals may be 
invited by party officials or other gatekeepers to run in elections; however, deals may not 
be necessarily stable in politics. Thus, those individuals need to also consider the 
possibility of not being nominated. Or, even if they are nominated, they may be ranked 
in an “unelectable” position on party list ballots, so, their chance to occupy the higher 
office may be shallow. Regarding these issues, how individuals with progressive ambition 
calculate the risks and costs of running fur a higher office plays a crucial role in their 
political careers. Wrong calculations might negatively affect their career due to 
competitive nature of politics. 
One important issue about progressive ambition and wrong risk calculation, thus, is that 
fulfilling the goal of seeking higher office may not be easy, especially if political parties 
dominate the candidate nomination processes.  
 
3.2.2. Static Ambition Theory 
 
Progressive ambition makes politicians climb the career ladders towards the top by 
aiming for higher offices. However, not every political actor pursues such a desire. For 
some, staying where they are may be much beneficial and appealing. Such an impulse 
induces another form of political ambition: static ambition. Static ambition leads the 
individual politicians to seek to be re-elected for or re-appointed to their current offices 
(Schlesinger, 1966; Strom, 1997; Schwindt-Bayer, 2011). That is to say, the politicians 
with static ambition do not seek for other -especially higher- offices, and they desire to 
make long-run careers out of a particular office. Several factors would determine static 
ambition. For example, if a politician is satisfied with his or her current office’s 
incentives, that person would be seeking to keep that office. Or, one would seek to stay 
in the same office as a last step before retirement, so there is no need to work or aim for 
other offices. Samuels (2002) differentiates between politicians and their ambitions by 
arguing that if a politician feels that he or she is electorally vulnerable, this person seeks 
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re-election rather than running for a higher office; but if an incumbent sees that he or she 
has electoral safety, this person may run for a higher office.  
Similar concerns (which are explained in the previous pages) may emerge with regard to 
re-nomination or re-appointment under this type of political ambition. In many countries, 
parties are identified as gatekeepers for accessing political office. Thus, one of the most 
important relationship between political ambition and re-nomination is the candidacy 
ranking in the party lists in general elections. “Recruitment to parliaments and 
governments is channeled through selection procedures within parties and through public 
elections which are conducted primarily along party lines. Party nomination for a ‘safe 
seat’ is next to equivalent to obtaining the public mandate.” (Detterbeck, 2011: 245).  
Moreover, “At election time, vote and office-seeking incentives reinforce one another. 
Parties focused on these goals should seek to elect candidates who will maximize votes, 
and thus control over seats in parliament.” (Pempstein et al., 2015: 1424). However, if a 
party does not decide to re-nominate a politician for the same office, then the incentives 
of the party and the individual politician will not coincide each other. Hence, even if a 
politician has static ambition, he or she may need to step back if the party does not choose 
to re-nominate that individual. This may eventually force such an individual to seek other 
opportunities and offices, probably the lower ones. 
Sometimes, a politician may prefer to run for the same office even if seeking for other 
offices would provide better opportunities. One explanation for such behavior is that 
politicians regard running for the same office as the safest decision, and likelihood of 
being elected for the same office is higher than being elected for another office (Pereira 
and Rennó, 2013: 73).  
 
3.2.3. Discrete Ambition Theory 
 
Along with progressive and static ambition theories, Schlesinger (1966) proposes one 
more type which he calls discrete ambition. Here, “…Politician wants the particular office 
for its specified term and then choses to withdraw from public office” (Schlesinger, 1966: 
10). In other words, these individuals seek to retire or exit politics. Many factors may 
influence this decision of politicians such as loss of political interest, loss of feeling of 
political efficacy, age, family issues, economic interests and so forth.   
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3.2.4. Intrainstitutional Ambition Theory 
 
Although the main categories of ambition theories have been progressive, static and 
discrete ones, various scholars propose new forms of ambition as the career decisions of 
political actors diversified: “Schlesinger’s typology of political ambition should be 
expanded to include intrainstitutional ambition – the members’ desire for leadership 
positions within their present institution.” (Herrick and Moore, 1993: 765). According to 
these scholars’ findings, this type of ambition differs from what Schlesinger (1966) 
defined progressive and static ambition categories explained in the previous pages. 
Mainly, some individuals may desire to occupy the leadership positions within their 
current institutions such as political parties, and such a desire is distinct from what is 
called progressive ambition to some extent. Herrick and Moore (1993: 766) found 
differentiating impacts of each ambition type on legislative behavior, thus a desire for 
leadership positions should be categorized as “a unique from of ambition”.   
“Members who left the House to run for higher offices at any juncture during 
their career, regardless of the success of their bid, were coded as having 
progressive ambition. These "higher" offices include vice president, senate, 
governor, other state-wide offices, and mayors of major metropolitan areas. 
Determining who runs for leadership positions within the House is more 
difficult. While party leadership positions within the House are formal, efforts 
to run for many posts tend to occur behind closed doors. To help compensate 
for this secrecy we treat individuals who hold a broad range of leadership 
positions as having intrainstitutional ambition.” (Herrick and Moore, 1993: 
766). 
Hence, intrainstitutional ambition refers to a specific type of progressive ambition, and 
examining it as a different form may yield more clues about career choice differences of 
individuals. 
 
3.2.5. Dynamic Ambition Theory 
 
As an extension to previous political ambition theories, Fox and Lawless (2011) propose 
another type which they call as dynamic ambition. According to Fox and Lawless (2011), 
“Existing research on candidate emergence, therefore, does not focus on, operationalize, 
or provide a systematic understanding of, the process by which an individual gains or 
loses political ambition over the course of a lifetime...” (Fox and Lawless, 2011: 443).  
Thus, mostly, these scholars bring attention to the fact that political ambition of an 
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individual would change from time to time depending on various reasons such as changes 
in political efficacy, political recruitment, life cycle, professional status, political 
engagement. Fox and Lawless (2011: 444) define dynamic political ambition as “the 
notion that myriad factors work systematically to encourage and suppress political 
ambition among potential candidates.” Moreover, according to these scholars, political 
ambition “fluctuates widely” and “Changes in patterns of political recruitment, as well as 
in personal and professional circumstances, also contribute to the likelihood that potential 
candidates will gain or lose interest in seeking elective office.”  
In fact, Schlesinger (1966: 10) himself argues that “We can also assume that one type of 
ambition is unlikely to remain constant for any one politician over his lifetime.” To 
illustrate, an MP may have static or progressive ambition for a certain amount of time, 
but then want to leave his or her legislative office and exit politics by developing discrete 
ambition. This person may lose his ambition due to negative experiences in politics, or 
some other factors such as old age or diseases. Nevertheless, Schlesinger (1966) does not 
find it concerning to try to understand or predict the future ambitions of a politicians. 
Rather, he argues that a theory of ambitions should focus on the current ambitions of a 
political actor, because policies of a political actor are not products of his or her future 
ambition, but the current one. Still, he adds that this explanation is not proposing that a 
politicians’ ambition cannot bring together his or her long-term and short-term goals. 
Consequently, he does not provide another type of political ambition.  
 
 
3.2.6. Regressive Ambition  
 
Apparently, not all political actors aim higher offices or seek re-election to their current 
offices in their career paths. If a political actor does not believe that running for a higher 
office is possible, or if that person feels that continuing with the current office seems 
unlikely, but still has political ambition, he or she may prefer to run for a lower office. In 
other words, rather than risking their political career by aiming unlikely offices, they turn 
to lower level offices to stay in politics. For example, Brazilian deputies pursue the 
following strategies: 
“…federal deputies that believe the possibility of being re-elected is unlikely 
(and therefore have even less chance of being elected to a higher office) prefer 
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to run for a lower, and safer, position. They still strive to hold an elected 
office, and are therefore ambitious, but opt for running for an office that they 
are more likely to win.” (Leoni et al., 2004: 123). 
Such a behavior was defined as “…an oxymoronic expression, regressive ambition” and, 
according to this definition this is actually a “survival strategy for those incumbents who 
are electorally vulnerable and who do not hold power positions in the Chamber.” (Leoni 
et al., 2004: 123).  
Nonetheless, running for a lower office does not always translate as an actual regression 
in one’s political career path.  
“For ambitious politicians, climbing down the career ladder with regards to 
elected office may be more attractive based on one’s particular circumstances 
given the higher rate of success. Moreover, many ambitious politicians seek 
non-elected office, and … most are successful at gaining positions in the 
bureaucracy or doing party work.” (Kerevel, 2013: 27). 
Regarding these arguments, it seems that the relative significance of the office matters for 
the politicians. In other words, the benefits provided by the targeted office shape the 
career decision of political actor, and regardless of the office’s status (even if it is a lower 
one), that individual decides to run for it. Moreover, the newly targeted office does not 
necessarily need to be an elected office. For example, some MPs may prefer to seek party 
positions rather than re-election to legislative office. Even though party office is identified 
as a lower level office compared to a legislative one, this office may enable that politician 
a higher level of control and discretion power, or maybe more years to stay in politics.  
 
3.3. Political Ambition and Political Career 
 
According to Fox and Lawless (2011: 443), each and every person who wants to be a 
candidate in elections, would answer a variety of questions regarding their “personal, 
professional and political circumstances” which usually show differences through time 
and “undoubtedly affect the extent to which someone considers entering the electoral 
arena.”  It is not easy to compete in an environment full of other ambitious individuals 
trying to be nominated and re-nominated in elections. Among those individuals, the 
incumbents would have higher chances to be re-nominated compared to the new-comers. 
This is generally true both for the local and national elections. 
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Incumbency advantage is available not only for individual politicians but also political 
parties. Indeed, drawing on more than 500 elections across the world, Cuzan (2015: 416) 
proposes that the law of incumbency is one of the five laws of politics, and “In 
democracies, the governing party or coalition is returned to office more often than not.” 
with an average of 60% incumbent re-election rate from around the world. This law is 
also a crucial point to take into consideration while shaping political career decisions. For 
example, it is evident that incumbency increases the chances of being re-nominated in 
local elections (Yıldırım and Kocapınar, 2018). Although individuals usually engage with 
political parties which they find ideologically closest or closer to their stance, they may 
re-evaluate their career decisions depending on the (electoral) success of the parties. 
Regarding this law mentioned by Cuzan (2015), it is possible to argue that individuals 
with political ambition may choose the incumbent parties to engage with even if it is not 
the closest one with regard to their ideological thinking.   
Yet, the incumbency advantage can also turn into a disadvantage, which lead us to another 
law of politics: “the law of shrinking support” meaning that “all incumbents face growing 
opposition during their tenure.” (Cuzan, 2015: 416). In other words, “It costs votes to 
rule” (Nannestad and Paldam, 1999). This applies for the individual politicians as well. 
Depending on negative evaluations of constituency and party selectorate, political career 
of an individual may be affected negatively. If voter support decreases, a party’s support 
may also decrease, since that politician can no longer gain similar amounts of votes, 
which then has a negative effect on electoral success of the party as a whole. Thus, even 
if that individual was selected as a candidate, and elected as an MP, loss in his or her 
electoral support may decrease the likelihood of being re-nominated in the next set of 
elections. Moreover, depending on electoral rules, clientelist relations and opportunities 
in a particular system, politicians may shape their career choices. For example, “…federal 
deputies act strategically while in office to obtain particular types of future office. 
Deputies who seek future sub-national office engage in more pork-barreling while 
deputies who seek future legislative office sponsor more bills.” (Kerevel, 2013: 2). 
Explanation of varying political ambition categories and political career choices of 
individuals by empirics are available in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 of this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
PARTY POLITICS IN TURKEY: A FRAMEWORK 
 
 
In the following pages, Chapter 5 explains party recruitment and political ambition with 
regard to political careers specifically in Turkey. Right before that chapter, having a 
framework of political environment in Turkey is helpful to fully explain how party 
recruitment works and how political ambition influences political careers in the country. 
This chapter is written to explain the political culture, electoral system, state 
regulations/legal requirements on political parties, party system and party competition in 
Turkey. Along with these, deterministic social and political norms of the country such as 
clientelism and centralist party structures are additionally examined. Together, these 
factors shape politics in the country in general, and eventually have significant effects on 
how parties recruit their politicians, and how political ambition is revealed.  
Sayarı (2016: 239-241) explains the development of party politics in Turkey (starting 
from Ottoman period) mainly in three phases: The first phase is the emergence of political 
parties in Ottoman period in the early 20th century, the second is the era right after the 
foundation of the Turkish Republic and emergence of the Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası 
(which then called as Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – Republican People’s Party), and the third 
phase is the one which started right after the Second World War, with the emergence of 
multi-party period in the country. In order to better understand party politics in the 
country, examining certain characteristics of politics and political parties will be helpful.  
To start with, Turkish political culture and the practice of centralism broadly shaped the 
party politics in the country. Political culture is important for understanding a country’s 
politics. According to Almond (1956), “every political system is embedded in a particular 
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pattern of orientation to political actions...”. Relying on this argument, Pye proposed that 
“A political culture is the product of both the collective history of a political system and 
the life histories of the individuals who currently make up the system…” (Pye, 1965: 8). 
In a broader definition, Almond and Verba (1963) defined political culture as “political 
orientations, attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes 
toward the role of the self in the system.” According to these two scholars’ explanation, 
the system is internalized in cognitions (knowledge of the political system, whether one 
knows the type of system one has at home or the government people), feelings (affective 
orientation, alienation, or pride with the system) and evaluations (your judgements) of the 
population (Almond and Verba, 1963). 
Regarding the political culture definitions, one may infer that those values, orientations 
and norms are transferrable from one generation to another. In other words, the current 
generation is affected by the past as it receives the knowledge, and affects the future 
generation, as the current one accumulates on the one that is received and passes that to 
the next one. Turkey, for example, has a political culture heritage originated from the 
Ottoman Empire. Certain values, norms and beliefs internalized throughout the Ottoman 
period continued to be embraced in Turkey after the foundation of the Republic. The 
Ottoman Empire has been identified with the characteristics of patrimonial absolute 
monarchy system, centralism, state cult, hostility towards political opposition, consisting 
of a rural society and relying on agricultural economy. Specifically, Turkish politics was 
affected by the traditional roots of the Ottoman Empire which had a central and 
patrimonial system, along with the practice of primacy of politics. In Ottoman political 
culture, the ideas of state centralism and patrimonialism have been two major 
characteristics. Moreover, the lack of tolerance to political opposition was another 
important factor in the Empire. Such characteristics continued to be influential even after 
the collapse of the Empire.  
One of the most important historical legacies of Ottoman Empire is a strong state tradition 
(see, e.g. Heper, 1985). Relatedly, the primacy of politics has also been identified as a 
significant feature of Ottoman political culture. Another legacy is about political elites 
who have been seeking monopoly of power, and thus been hostile towards political 
opposition. As Frey (1975) underlined, political elites tend to centralize their power in 
the country, and they categorize others as friends and enemies. This is closely related to 
political culture of the country which involves ‘in-group, out-group’ mentality. In this 
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understanding, political elites prefer to trust to their in-group friends. Consequently, 
tolerance towards opposition is low, and compromise among political elite from opposing 
groups seems to be quite exceptional. For example, The Ottoman Empire experienced the 
bifurcation of elite (Turan, 1984) in a strict way in which the political elite divided as 
Islamist on the one hand, and seculars/Westernists on the other. Indeed, two different 
images of good society defined as the consequence of a culture divide: The first one relied 
on rational values and secularism, the second one adopted religious values and traditions 
(Kalaycıoğlu, 2012). 
In order to analyze the Ottoman Empire's culture, many scholars employed the center 
periphery division as the major political cleavage. As Mardin (1975) argued, the Ottoman 
Empire consisted of two major cleavages which are the center and the periphery, and 
throughout time this division has been the decisive factor in social and political 
environment. According to this explanation, the center was the state which is so powerful, 
homogeneous and culturally compact, and was the main decision maker in politics with 
its elites. On the other hand, the periphery consists of the ruled people which are 
heterogeneous and ineligible for political decisions (Mardin, 1975: 171-173). It is not 
surprising, under these conditions, that there emerged a “rigid dichotomy between the 
ruler and ruled” (Özbudun, 1988: 2). More specifically, physical proximity to the center 
is to have power, and power in central cleavage is important for survival and welfare. In 
other worlds, there is a center with respect to power, legitimacy and authority. 
Influenced from these characteristics, the state elite in the Republican period was 
identified as the center and the people who were outside this center were composing the 
Periphery. During the single party period between 1923 and 1950, and with the 
introduction of multiparty era such a division was still available in the country 
(Kalaycıoğlu, 2002). Both throughout this era, and after the multiparty period started, 
many politicians from the opposition had criticisms relating to this division and centralist 
structure of the politics. There have been various political parties promising that they 
might decrease the degree of centralism and apply more of a decentralized administration 
if they occupy the government office. Their decentralization promises were relying not 
only on administrative but also economic policies.  
Hence, criticizing centralism and its negative effects on representativeness, 
democratization and liberty is an issue highly contested by political parties in Turkish 
67 
 
politics. With the emergence of the multiparty system, several political parties came to 
power by the claim of decentralization in politics. Starting with the Democrat Party 
(Demokrat Parti – DP), and continuing with the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi - AP), 
Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi - ANAP), DYP and the AKP, this practice was 
repeated. In general, these political parties are seen as representing the periphery rather 
than the secularist Center. The triggering idea has been defined as the replacement of the 
central elitism with the people's will and democracy; however, these parties generally 
became even more centralist while arguing to be democratic and decentralized throughout 
their incumbency. Other political parties which were/are opponents of centralism and 
supporting decentralization are the ones which have been placed on the left of the 
ideological spectrum and the Kurdish ethnicity movement, however, these political 
parties could not enter any government for a lengthy tenure.  
Decentralization promises were frequently used for emphasizing democratization and 
providing people with greater involvement in politics and the decision-making process. 
By supporting the interests of Periphery, the above-mentioned political parties argued that 
differently from center-oriented political system, they can create more “people oriented” 
polity, which would be more democratic and representative. For example, the DP 
campaigning had the idea of representing the people's will and the motto of “Yeter, söz 
milletindir!” as opposed to the “oppression” of the single party, the CHP. Nevertheless, 
after coming to the power, the DP created even more centralist type of government 
(Kalaycıoğlu, 2005). Especially due to the economic recession, the DP started to function 
as if it was ruling in one party regime (Kalaycıoğlu, 1997: 182). Also, Sunar (1985) 
mentioned that the DP used patronage system as an important factor for clientelism, 
helped by the economic resources which had earlier been accumulated. However, after 
1954, by the declining of economic life, the DP could not find enough sources for 
continuing this clientelistic system. Since its popular support started to decline, the DP's 
populism became more and more authoritarian over time (Sunar, 1985: 2082) which 
brought higher degrees of centralism.  
After the DP period, the AP -which eventually emerged as the heir of the DP- also adopt 
the idea of lowering the degree of centralism. “In the post-1960 era, the RPP17 still 
continued to play the role of the party of the 'state = center,' and the then banned DP was 
                                                          
17 The abbreviations of political parties are used in English in the cited source. Since this is a direct quotation, they 
are not changed. 
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replaced by the Justice Party (JP) as the party of the periphery.” (Kalaycıoğlu, 1994:406). 
For example, economic development was a major aim of the AP, and it seemed to support 
more of a liberal economy. However, “...when the party (AP) came to power, the share 
of the governmental sector in the Turkish economy did not diminish and the state 
economic enterprises continued to exist.” (Levi, 1991:141). Here, one can argue that in 
terms of decentralization, the AP could not achieve its promised aims about economic 
liberalization and it continued to use state control over market which is actually a more 
centralist idea. In addition to the practices of the DP and the AP, 
“The symbols and values of the periphery continue to emphasize 
religiosity and even religious (Islamic) orthodoxy, conservatism, 
decentralization of government, and a market economy devoid of the 
state control. 'Liberty' (hürriyet) was still a core campaign slogan for 
the TPP and MP in the 1980s, and it connoted opposition to the practice 
of the rule by the 'uncaring, and alien' public bureaucrats, or simply 
etatism. The values of the periphery since the beginning of the republic 
have followed a consistent pattern, and their antietatist core hardly lost 
its eminence.” (Kalaycıoğlu, 1994: 409). 
However, while criticizing the centralist model of the Republic, many of the political 
parties which then had opportunity to form government, generally constructed centralist 
structure similar to the previous eras. So, these political parties' promises for decentralized 
character for Turkish politics and consequences of their polity were not consistent with 
each other. Nevertheless, political parties in Turkey are not only identified as centralist 
within the party itself, but also within the government when they come to power. 
Political parties in Turkey generally had and continue to have strong intra-party 
centralism by conferring a high importance to their party leader and this leader's ideas, 
and almost all political parties in Turkey operate according to this structure. For example, 
all of the political parties that defined themselves as representatives of the periphery 
which are mainly but not exclusively the DP, AP, DYP, ANAP and the AKP have been 
identified with strong leadership positions. Only the ANAP came close to have more 
democratic structure in the party which was “democratic centralism” (Heper, 2002: 145), 
yet, this case does not provide a decentralized party structure either. Moreover, Sayarı 
(2002) emphasized the personalistic style of leadership which makes the party 
organization to be highly stuck to the leader. “Empowered with their ability to control the 
candidate nomination process in the elections and access to sources of political patronage, 
leaders have acted with impunity in personalizing the exercise of power and party 
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leadership.” (Sayarı, 2002: 25). More details on centralized party structure in Turkey are 
examined in Part 4.4 of this Chapter.  
Since center-periphery division affected these parties in terms of constructing their 
ideological stance and specifying their aimed part of the society, the contradiction 
between the representatives of the center and the periphery generally clearly determined 
at the starting point of these parties. However, although these political parties gained their 
votes which helped them to come to power by their approaches to centralization and 
decentralization, they could not maintain these once they come to power. Consequently, 
the ongoing issue of centralism in Turkish political culture can be a deliberative decision 
taken by political parties -which are internally centralized- although a lot of them claim 
to support decentralization. 
The following parts scrutinize the role of the electoral system, regulations on party 
organizations, party system, and party competition in general. In addition, two important 
determinants of party politics in Turkey are examined here: authoritarian party structures 
and clientelism. These characteristics of Turkish politics yield clues about elite 
recruitment and candidate nomination to a large extent. 
 
4.1. Electoral System Design and Election Results in Turkey 
 
Electoral systems play a major role in candidate selection and eventually political career 
patterns of politicians. The reason for that lies in how electoral systems shape party 
competition and strategies in candidate selection processes. Thus, it is noteworthy to 
investigate different electoral designs and consequences of them while examining the 
careers of politicians. Basically, if political parties compete only for one seat in electoral 
districts, such as single member district plurality systems, they need to nominate only one 
candidate, and there would be appeals to relevant criteria to select their candidates. For 
example, if those parties believe that nominating a female or a young -and relatively 
inexperienced- politician would decrease their chance to get votes, they would opt out of 
selecting such individuals. However, if there is more than one seat in an electoral district, 
those parties would strategically nominate those people in order to increase representation 
of different groups in the constituency in question. 
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The main characteristics of various types of electoral systems were explained in Chapter 
2. Regarding those characteristics, Gallagher et al. (2011: 390) highlighted the criteria to 
evaluate electoral systems in terms of their advantages and disadvantages.  When they 
compare majority or plurality systems with PR systems, they conclude that there is a 
trade-off: having more stable and effective government (brought by majority systems) vs. 
proportionality of votes and seats gained (thanks to PR system). Some of the advantages 
of the PR system are identified as follows: as the level of proportionality between votes 
and seats is higher than the plurality system, PR system tends to increase 
representativeness by enabling more parties to have seats in the parliament. To illustrate, 
in the UK under majoritarian electoral system, smaller or extreme parties such as far right 
or left are not really favored, as it is difficult for those parties to gain seats proportionally 
with their votes shares Meanwhile, the opposite is more likely in Austria or Norway, in 
which PR system creates better conditions of competition for such parties (Bale, 2005: 
152). Hence, the chances of small or minor parties to be penalized is lowered under the 
PR system, thus, more parties, ideas and interests can take place/be represented in the 
decision-making processes in legislatures. However, the level of representativeness is not 
that high under majoritarian systems, as the system tends to eliminate the minor parties. 
This will raise the problem of disproportional distribution of seats regarding the votes, 
and can create over and under representation. Still, under PR systems, similar problems 
of disproportionality may occur depending on the level of electoral threshold and district 
magnitude. According to Gallagher et al. (2011: 390), the most proportional results can 
emerge under the PR with no electoral threshold and large district magnitude: If a 
threshold and/or small district magnitude are implemented, disproportional results are 
more likely to exist according to this explanation. For instance, in some countries such as 
Poland, Hungary and Latvia which implement 5% threshold, disproportional results can 
occur. 
Nevertheless, proportionality and representativeness are not identified as the only 
objectives of electoral systems. From the point of effective and stable government, 
plurality systems generally create better results. As indicated above, one of the main 
motivations behind the plurality electoral system is to ease the government formation 
process. Due to the fact that many parties can get a similar number of votes, which is not 
enough for forming a government under PR systems, these parties can attempt to form 
coalition governments, which may take some time, due to discussions of who will be in 
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the coalition. On the contrary, it is more likely that the government will be formed by a 
single party which gets the majority of the votes under majority systems (Gallagher et al., 
2011: 393). So, this can also create a more effective and a stable government formation 
process, and a more coherent government compared to the coalitions which emerge under 
PR systems. The majority system can provide clear results and mostly it is obvious which 
party will form the government (the one who gets majority of the votes). It also renders 
the accountability of government clear cut, for people will know who are responsible for 
the government, and this system generally promotes party government rather than 
coalition government. Thus, a specific party is accountable for the government decisions 
on its own. These tradeoffs between the consequences of different types of electoral 
systems have been discussed widely with regard to “representation of voter preferences 
and accountable governments” (Carey and Hix, 2011: 838).18  
These comparisons of plurality and PR electoral systems have been made in Turkish 
politics since the beginning of the multi-party era. Hence, from one election to another, 
significant changes emerged through time. Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, 
several electoral systems have been employed in Turkish politics in a broad range. From 
majoritarian system to national remainder (milli bakiye), from PR without a threshold to 
PR with a 10% electoral threshold, quite different forms of electoral systems have been 
implemented. In three general elections which took place between 1950 and 1960, a 
majoritarian electoral system was implemented in Turkey, while the PR system started to 
be used in 1961, and since then there have been various methods of PR system 
implemented in the country (Erdem, 2013: 55). The following paragraphs provide 
historical information about the electoral systems and their reflections to politics, parties 
and voter behavior in the country.  
As it can be seen in Table 1, implementing majority system and PR with 10% threshold 
usually created a National Assembly with a small number of political parties, while PR 
with no threshold enabled more parties to gain seats. It seems that, when every other 
factor remains the same, changing only the electoral formula creates an extreme 
difference in the seat distribution in the legislature. This also affects the emergence of 
                                                          
18 For more details on this comparison, please see Carey, J., M. And Hix, S. 2011. “The electoral Sweet Spot: Low 
Magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems.” American Journal of Political Science, 55(2), 383-397. In this study, 
Carey and Hix (2011: 383) find that “Electoral systems that use low-magnitude multimember districts produce 
disproportionality indices almost on par with those of pure PR systems while limiting party system fragmentation and 
producing simpler government coalitions.” 
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disproportionality in the National Assembly. Proportionality means that vote shares and 
seat shares of a party go hand in hand. In other words, if a political part gets 30% of the 
available votes, it will occupy approximately 30% of the seats in parliament. However, 
some electoral systems do not enable this, creating disproportionality. For example, if a 
party occupies 70% of the seats in a parliament even if it gets 50% of the all available 
votes, there emerge an over-representation problem. Such problems would occur both in 
majority systems or PR with a high threshold. As explained previously, under 
majoritarian systems only one party/candidate will win in each electoral district. If that 
party’s vote share is slightly higher than the others, it will get the seat, but the others will 
get no seats even though they gain similar amounts of votes. If this case is applied to 
many electoral districts, the party with slightly more votes win seats in each of them, 
resulting in a huge percent of seats in parliament. However, once total available votes and 
their distribution to the parties are calculated, there may not emerge a huge difference 
between some parties. To illustrate, Turkey employed a majoritarian electoral system in 
1950 General Elections, and there were three political parties which compete in these 
elections: DP, CHP and MP. Among these parties, the DP won 52.7% of the available 
votes, the CHP won 39.4%, and the MP won 3.1%. However, when it comes to translating 
those vote shares to seats, DP won 85.2% of all seats in the parliament, while the CHP 
won 14.2% and the MP won 0.2%. Similar results emerged in 1954 General Elections for 
which the same electoral system was implemented as in 1950: the DP won 57.6% of the 
votes, while the CHP won 35.4%, CMP won 4,9% and the TKP won 0.6% of the available 
votes. By these vote shares, the DP occupied 92,8% of all the seats in the parliament, 
while the CHP won only 5.7% and CMP 0.9%. The TKP could not gain any seats in these 
elections. 1957 General Elections were held with the same electoral system, and similar 
disproportionality was observed, yet the DP lost almost 10% of the votes compared to 
1954. CHP and CMP increased their vote shares by approximately 5% to 2% respectively, 
and there emerged another party namely the HP which won 3.8% of the votes and 0.6% 
of the seats (Tuncer and Danacı, 2003). These results especially in 1950 and 1954 created 
an extreme overrepresentation of the DP and underrepresentation of both the CHP and 
MP. Kalaycıoğlu (2002: 58) calculated disproportionality in representation in Turkish 
National Elections between 1950 and 2002 by using various disproportionality indexes 
which are Loosemore-Hanby index, Douglas W. Rae index, Least squares index, Largest 
deviation index and Range index (which was suggested by Kalaycıoğlu himself), and for 
almost all of the calculations, either the 1950 or 1954 General Elections seem to have the 
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highest level of disproportionality. “…Such an imbalance, which was not ameliorated by 
any institutional, cultural, and traditional norms and structures, was inimical to 
opposition, freedoms, and human rights...” (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005: 91).  
Evaluating these results, another electoral system, namely the PR system, with a district 
level threshold (çevre barajı) was implemented in the 1961 General Elections. Although 
the 1961 Constitution did not reveal any definition of a new electoral system, “the 
Election Act (Seçim Kanunu) to follow clearly stipulated that Proportional Representation 
(PR) would be used to convert votes to seats in the TGNA. Consequently, the majoritarian 
election practices of the 1946–1960 era were dropped in favor of a PR formula in 
converting votes to seats for the first time in 1961.” (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005: 94).  
This electoral system resulted in a more proportional distribution of seats in parliament. 
There were four political parties gaining seats: the CHP won 36,7% of the votes and 
38,5% of the seats, the AP gained 34,8% of the votes and 35,1% of the seats, the CKMP 
got 14% with a 12% of the seats, and lastly the YTP occupied 14,4% of the seats with its 
13,7% vote share. Although these results are more proportional when compared to the 
previous elections under majoritarian system, the most proportional elections had yet to 
be observed in 1965 when national remainder system (milli bakiye) was employed. 1965 
General Elections were the most proportional and representative elections with the lowest 
level of wasted votes.19 There was no electoral threshold, and many political parties which 
competed in the elections won seats in the parliament in parallel with their vote shares. 
The results of vote shares and seat shares were as follow respectively: AP 52.9% to 
53.3%, CHP 28.7% to 29.8%, MP 6.3% to 6.9%, YTP 2.7% to 4.2 %, TİP 3% to 3.3% 
and lastly, CKMP 2.2% to 2.5%. So, the proportionality between the votes shares and 
seats shares was quite high which resulted in a better representation in the Parliament. In 
1969, 1973 and 1977 General elections, PR with d’Hondt formula without any threshold 
was implemented, and proportionality was not such a problem. Even though those three 
elections created more disproportionality compared to 1965 elections, they worked better 
than the elections held between 1950 and 1957. However, this electoral system did not 
                                                          
19 For further details of the proportionality of the 1965 Elections compared to others, please see Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. 
2002. “Elections and Governance” in Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey by Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer 
(eds.), London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 55-71. The table titled “Disproportionality in Parliamentary Elections, 
1950-1999” in this book chapter shows the levels of disproportionality of each election calculated depending on 
various indexes.    
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last long. The military coup in 1980 resulted in many major changes, including electoral 
system design. 
Although there have been radical electoral system amendments throughout time, no major 
changes occurred in the electoral system in Turkey within the time frame examined in 
this dissertation (2002-2015). Nevertheless, 2002 General Elections has been one of the 
turning points of Turkish politics. Hence, taking the 2002 General Elections as the starting 
point of a study would yield valuable information. First of all, the party system in the 
country started to change dramatically after this year. However, this change has been 
explained by the influence of voter behavior, rather than the effects of coups and military 
regimes (Sayarı, 2016: 248). PR with d’Hondt formula and 10% threshold implemented 
in that year which has also been in effect through 1990s, and as a result of 2002 General 
Elections, only two political parties, which are the AKP and the CHP, won enough votes 
to have seats in the National Assembly. Other political parties could not exceed the 10% 
threshold, and did not have any chance to occupy seats. More specifically, the AKP won 
34.3% of the total available votes while the CHP won 19.4%. Among those which could 
not get enough votes to exceed the 10% threshold, the DYP won 9.5%, MHP won 8.4%, 
GP won 7.3%, DEHAP won 6.2%, ANAP won 5.1%, SP won 2.5% and DSP won 1.2% 
of the available votes. Other smaller parties won the remaining. A very obvious and 
interesting issue about these results is that many parties which could not even got 10% of 
the votes had been some of the most successful parties prior to this period. For example, 
in the previous elections which were held in 1999, the exact same electoral system was 
implemented, and the DSP won 22.2% of the votes, while the MHP won 18%, FP won 
15.4%, ANAP won 13.2%, DYP won 12%. Another interesting point is that the CHP got 
only 8.7% of the votes, which hindered it from winning any seats in the National 
Assembly in the 1999 elections. 
As mentioned, only two political parties gained seats in the Parliament after the 2002 
General Elections in Turkey. Since many votes were wasted in this election, fairness of 
representation was affected seriously. Both the AKP and the CHP over-represented due 
to the electoral formula: the AKP got approximately 66% of the seats in the Parliament 
with 34.3% of the total available votes, and the CHP won approximately 32.4% of the 
seats with 19.4% of available votes. Some parties who were successful in the previous 
elections were clearly punished by the voters in 2002 General Elections. The DYP, ANAP 
and the MHP in particular lost a considerable amount of their supporters, and except the 
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MHP, both DYP and ANAP almost vanished as they lost their saliency and being an 
effective party in Turkish politics. With regard to such cases, Cuzan (2015) argued that 
one of the five empirical laws of politics is the law of shrinking support. The DYP and 
ANAP experienced this shrinking support in a way, by losing a significant part of their 
votes over time, which influenced party competition to a large extent. Nevertheless, the 
results of 2002 Elections are mostly explained by the effect of the electoral system. Both 
the DYP and ANAP were identified as main center-right political parties, and there 
emerged a vacuum in this ideological stance with their disappearance. Since then, only 
the AKP and the MHP have become relevant parties on the right, but these two parties 
were not identified as centerist parties. Indeed, throughout 2000s, both parties seemed to 
move further on the right wing of the ideological spectrum. Today, two of the effective 
parties (the AKP and MHP) occupy positions on the right of the ideological spectrum, 
while the other two effective parties (the CHP and HDP) are positioned on the left of 
center. Hence, party competition changed through time compared to previous eras. 
Consequently, party strategies with regard to candidate selection operates in a pre-
dominant party system as explained in the Introduction of this Dissertation. 
 
4.2. Party Organization, Regulations on Parties and Party System in Turkey 
 
Many countries have legal regulations or laws on political parties, but in some countries, 
such as the U.S., the constitutions do not mention the political parties much, thus, such 
attitudes resemble to the uncodified arrangements in the UK (Janda, 2005: 6). On the 
contrary, various sources regulate political parties in a detailed way in Turkey.   
To start with, the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey’s article 68 regulates the 
formation of parties and (withdrawal from) membership, and article 69 demonstrates the 
principles to be observed by political parties. In the article 68, it is indicated that the 
parties shall pursue the provisions in the Constitution and law while organizing their 
activities. Moreover, along with the activities of the parties, their programs and statutes 
are required to follow several principles, e.g. they cannot be against the independence of 
the State, its integrity and territory; human rights, rule of law and secular republic. 
Furthermore, these two articles together show that the political parties can be closed by 
the decision of the Constitutional Court, if these parties do not follow the regulations 
about their activities, statutes and party programs. For example, since its foundation in 
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1961, the Constitutional Court decided to close down 24 parties in total, 6 parties while 
under the jurisdiction of the previous 1961 Constitution, and 18 parties under the current 
1982 Constitution (Sayarı, 2016: 244). State control on political parties can be explained 
by the centralist tendency of the state administration as mention in the previous pages. 
More specifically, state control through constitutional regulations, party laws and 
financial aid provided by the state itself on party activities has been an important 
characteristic of Turkish party politics (Sayarı, 2016: 243).  Nevertheless, the regulations 
on the political parties are not done only by the Constitution in Turkey. The principles 
and structures of the parties are also regulated by the Law on Political Parties (Siyasi 
Partiler Kanunu – SPK) and these parties also have their party by-laws (içtüzük) for intra-
party regulations.  
The first law on political parties in Turkey was enacted in 1965, then revised in 1983 and 
has had many amendments since then (Sayarı, 2016: 244). So, the current SPK (Act No: 
2820) of Turkey was enacted in 1983 in accordance with the 1982 Constitution of Turkey. 
Along with the article 1, the article 2 reveals that the SPK covers the provisions for the 
foundation, organization, activities, mission, authority and responsibilities, property 
acquisition, income and expenses, auditing, closure and being closed down of the political 
parties.  Besides the regulations on these topics, the SPK proposes a common and binding 
organizational form/method for all the parties, meaning that no party may found another 
organizational structure which is not in accordance with this law. This organizational 
method is parallel to the administrative organization of Turkey. Consequently, the 
organizational structures of the Turkish political parties are very similar to each other due 
to the regulations of the SPK (Bektaş, 1993: 39; Erdem, 2001: 85).  
According to the Article 7 of the SPK in Turkey, organization of the political parties are 
composed of central bodies (headquarters) with provincial (il), district (ilçe) and 
municipality (belde) organizations; TBMM groups, provincial councils and municipal 
council groups as such. An additional sentence20 shows that along with those parts, some 
other subsidiary bodies such as women’s branches (kadın kolları) and youth branches 
(gençlik kolları) can be established. 
                                                          
20 SPK, Article 7 – (Amended: 21/5/1987 - 3370/1): [Siyasi partilerin teşkilatı; merkez organları ile il, ilçe ve belde 
teşkilatlarından;Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Grubu ile il genel meclisi ve belediye meclisi gruplarından ibarettir. 
(Ek Cümle: 12/8/1999 - 4445/3 md.) Siyasi partilerin tüzüklerinde ayrıca kadın kolu, gençlik kolu ve benzeri yan 
kuruluşlarla, yabancı ülkelerde yurtdışı temsilciliği kurulması öngörülebilir.] Retrieved from: 
http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.2820.pdf. 
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According to the SPK, political parties cannot organize their offices (other than above-
mentioned branches and offices) regarding age, occupation, gender, geography or 
institutions (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000: 107); thus, regardless of socioeconomic, ethnic and 
geographical differences between regions, only one organization model is allowed for the 
whole country (Erdem, 2001: 93). Depending on this information, one can argue that 
organizational structures of political parties are quite close to each other in Turkey. Yet, 
the relationship between those offices on different levels can show variance among 
parties. For example, Ayan (2011) reveals that despite the fact that authoritarian party 
structures are common practices for four main parties in Turkey (the author analyzes the 
AKP, CHP, MHP and the DTP, as the HDP had not yet been established when she 
conducted the study), they each employ different types of structures. For example, intra-
party relationships between the party members rely on different ideologies, attitudes, 
motivations, and constellations of interests. Thus, although the structural organization 
shows clear similarities, the ties within each party structure can show differences.  
As a primary task, political parties recruit politicians. With regard to recruitment, one of 
the best-known regulations on political parties around the world is to employ quotas, 
especially for under-represented citizens. The quotas could be gender based e.g. women 
quotas, or could target the minorities, youngsters or other specific groups in a particular 
country. Among those, gender quotas are the ones which have been applied in many 
countries, especially in democracies. The rationale behind applying such a quota is to 
provide women a higher chance to be represented in both national and local politics. For 
doing so, the women should be recruited and nominated as candidates in the elections. 
Thus, in order to increase the chances of women participation in politics, legislated gender 
quotas are implemented in certain countries, such as Argentina, Belgium, France and 
Mexico. Political party quotas are adopted by several parties in some countries such as 
Australia, Sweden, Turkey and the US.21 However, gender quotas can also be optional, 
or non-existent. Some political parties can implement such practices by their own 
discretion. For example, HDP by-laws include 40% women quota in Turkey. Similarly, 
the CHP also employs gender quotas which were increased from 25% to 33% in 2012, 
and youth quotas to 20%.22  
                                                          
21 Please see the followinf link for more details: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas. 
 
22 Please see the following link for more details: http://content.chp.org.tr/file/chp_tuzuk_10_03_2018.pdf. 
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The Turkish party system has experienced various changes starting from its birth, with 
regard to the number of parties, polarization and fragmentation levels among parties and 
government types (coalition or party) on a broad spectrum (Turan, 1988; Kalaycıoğlu, 
1994; Çarkoğlu, 1998; Sayarı 2007; Sayarı, 2016). Turkey experienced various party 
system settings. The era from 1925 to 1945 is defined as single party period in the country. 
The CHP dominated the politics at the time. After this period, starting from 1945, the 
party system was defined as a multi-party system. Nevertheless, 1950-1961 period is 
specifically called as two-party system with party governments, and the number of parties 
represented in the parliament increased only after 1961 (Sayarı, 2016: 247). In addition, 
“…The turbulent developments of Turkish politics in the second half of the twentieth 
century resulted in the several disruptions in the party system and a simultaneous 
sprouting of new political parties as the old ones were either banned or faded away as 
they lost popular support at the polls.” (Kalaycıoğlu, 2013: 483).  Hence, it is clear that it 
has not been possible to observe a real continuity in party system in Turkey.  
With the results of November 1, 2015 General Elections,  
“…party competition in Turkey continued to take place within a predominant 
party system. There has been no turnover in the government for more than a 
decade, the opposition is excluded from sharing power and the AKP 
dominates the country’s electoral and party politics. In addition to its majority 
in parliament, the AKP also controls the presidency and most of the local and 
municipal administrations, including Turkey’s two largest cities, Istanbul and 
Ankara.” (Sayarı, 2016: 277). 
Hence, as Sartori explains, “For a predominant party to establish a predominant party 
system, it should take three consecutive absolute majorities, provided that the electorate 
appears stabilised, that the absolute majority threshold is clearly surpassed, and/or that 
the interval is wide.” (Sartori, 2005: 177), Turkey now experiences a predominant party 
system in which the AKP has electoral hegemony and political dominance (Esen and 
Gumuscu, 2018). Under those circumstances, possible political career opportunities seem 
to revolve around four political parties, the AKP, CHP, MHP and HDP between 2002 and 
2015.   
 
4.3. Inter-Party Competition and Intra-Party Competition in Turkey 
 
Factors affecting the party competition vary over a broad range. Some scholars explain 
the emergence of parties and the features of party competition by referring to the 
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institutional factors such as electoral rules, while others explain with reference to 
existence of certain cleavages in a society, ideologies, and characteristics of party 
systems. More specifically, Duverger (1964) explains party competition with reference 
to institutional effects (i.e. the impact of electoral rules), Lipset and Rokkan (1967) 
unearth the influence of various social cleavages in the society, Ware (1996) takes 
attention to the influence of ideologies as earlier suggested by von Beyme, and Sartori 
(1976) underlines the characteristics of party systems and their effects while explaining 
party competition. As explained in Chapter 2, party competition shapes parties’ strategies 
about candidate selection and eventually the political career patterns of individuals: 
“The degree of inter-party competition influences the importance of candidate 
selection … Inter-party competition can be reduced by the presence of a 
dominant party whose general election candidates are all but certain winners. 
The real choice of deputies in these circumstances is made at the time of 
candidate selection in the dominant party, with the general election reduced 
to little more than a formality. It is rare in mature democracies for a single 
party to be so dominant that it can be said to dramatically and universally 
reduce voter choice in a general election. However, it is not uncommon to 
have a regionally dominant party that, within its area of geographic strength, 
essentially reduces the general election to a formality with the real contest for 
the legislative seat occurring at its candidate selection stage.” (Cross, 2008: 
605).  
Inter-party competition is significant with regard to vote maximization and candidate 
nomination in accordance with that goal. Along with that intra-party competition is also 
important to mention. First of all, intra-party competition in an incumbent party and 
opposition party would be differ from each other. Especially in pre-dominant party 
systems in which one political party -which is the incumbent one- dominates the politics, 
candidate nominees may find a highly competitive environment within those incumbent 
parties.  In some electoral districts, intra-party competition can be higher in comparison 
to others. 
“...it is the nature of the political environment in which a political party 
functions that determines its chances for institutionalization. In the long 
run the survival of a political party, just like any other system, is 
dependent upon its environment. The number and the nature of political 
parties in the system, their vote shares, and their ideological positions 
have been among the most critical determinants of how a political party 
organization operates in the party system.” (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002: 43)   
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Political culture and the political party system have an important effect on the political 
parties' centralism. In Turkey, the political party system with its generally fragmented, 
polarized and competitive characteristics, makes political parties become highly aware of 
their possible competitors and their policies, and the consequences of losing elections. 
Thus, some political parties usually (re)position themselves in accordance with their 
competitors, especially if there is more than one party competing in a certain place on 
ideological spectrum.  
 “In general, the parties have no significant internal democracy. Leaders who 
make bad mistakes in government or elections survive. Corruption does not 
lead to a political fall. Ideas are not generated within parties where debate is 
discouraged. Obedience rather than competition governs the parties' political 
culture. The centrist parties have done especially badly in these categories, 
encouraging activists and voters to migrate to the fringes of the system.” 
(Rubin, 2002: 3). 
“…over the last two decades, the peripheral forces of Islamist background, as well as 
those of Kurdish ethnicity, have increasingly challenged the 'centrist' status quo, both 
inside and outside the parliamentary political arena.” (Çarkoğlu, 2008: 322). Among 
those, the Islamist parties have been some of the successful ones, and the path going to 
the establishment of the AKP may provide useful insights about the new type of party 
competition and system in Turkey today.      
Until now, many parties which adopt Islamist orientations have been established in 
Turkey, yet, many of them are closed down by the Constitutional Court or after military 
coups. More specifically, in 1970, Necmettin Erbakan founded the National Order Party 
(Milli Nizam Partisi – MNP) which carried Islamic ideas. However, the Constitutional 
Court closed down this party by underlining the religious orientation of the party which 
was defined as a threat to secularism. After the closure of this party, the founders of it 
established a new party named Islamist National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi – 
MSP), which supported the ideological framework of National Outlook (Milli Görüş). 
This ideological framework can be defined as “the basis for all the political Islamic parties 
that would succeed the MNP...” (Gümüşçü and Sert, 2009: 953), with the exception of 
the AKP. Due to the 1980 Military Coup, many parties were closed in the country, the 
MSP among them. After this period, a new party, Welfare Party (Refah Partisi – RP), 
which again carried the same ideological characteristics with Milli Görüş was established 
in 1983. This party had been successful in the municipal elections during the late 1980s 
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and eventually was also successful in the national elections in the 1990s. However, on 28 
February 1997, while the RP was in a coalition government with the DYP, which was a 
center right party, and while Erbakan was the Prime Minister, he was given a document 
prepared by the generals in a National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, MGK) 
meeting. This document revealed how to prevent the rise of political Islam in Turkey. 
Thus, it was directly related to the RP as its ideological framework was defined in an 
Islamic manner. This meeting of the MGK on 28 February has been defined as a 
showdown between the government and the military, and identified with a major 
crackdown by the secular establishment on the political Islam (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005: 158; 
Gümüşçü and Sert, 2009: 954). Within this era, the RP was closed by the Constitutional 
Court, whose decision was later upheld by the European Court of Human Rights, and 
many politicians including Erbakan were banned from politics.  
After the closure of the RP, a new party which follows a very similar path was established 
under the name of Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi – FP). Yet, this party adopted slightly 
different ideas from the Milli Görüş path, and, starting from this period, a new group 
emerged within the party, and called as Yenilikçiler (Modernists). This group was in 
search of a new line or opening (Hale and Özbudun, 2010: 8). When the Constitutional 
Court banned the FP from politics, this time two parties were established as successors to 
this Islamic party. One is the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi – SP) which was established 
by the traditionalist group, and the other is the AKP, which was established by the 
Yenilikçiler group in the FP. After the establishment of the AKP, it seemed that the AKP 
founders abandoned the Milli Görüş path. There has been more or less a similar ideology 
shared among the successors of the MSP up until the establishment of the AKP. 
Nevertheless, “The AKP rejects any continuity with the 'national outlook' parties and 
describes itself as a 'conservative democratic' party, even refraining from using the 
'Muslim democrat’ label” (Hale and Özbudun, 2010: 20). Yet “conservative” in Turkish 
is “Muhafazakar”, which is a concept that has often been used as a signal/symbol for 
“Muslim” credentials of political associations, organization and parties.  
Still, there have been various breaks with the former tradition of Erbakan’s heritage. Some 
argue that the AKP differentiates itself from its Islamist ancestors and does not associate 
itself with religion, due to the 28 September Process which ended up with the resignation 
of Erbakan and ban of his party (see e.g., Çınar, 2006: 474). Nevertheless, as a criticism 
to such arguments, Gümüşçü and Sert argued that explaining the split of the AKP from 
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the Milli Görüş path depending on the 28 February process does not provide a full 
explanation, because there was already a division within the Milli Görüş movement 
between the traditionalists and the reformists, and the 28 February Process was only 
influential on widening the gap between these two groups. According to the authors, the 
major factor that resulted in the AKP being founded was the birth of a new social base 
which started to emerge in the 1980s as a result of economic liberalization in the country. 
Eventually, when “...the emerging devout bourgeoisie equipped the Yenilikciler within 
the Milli Görüş with economic, social, and political power...” this group which 
established the AKP became more powerful compared to the traditionalists (Gümüşçü 
and Sert, 2009: 961). 
As Hale argued, the AKP realized that it should focus on “what was practical,” and 
abandoned the idea of just order (adil düzen) which was supported by Erbakan’s party by 
promoting the small enterprises which will live in accordance with the state industrial 
sector. Erbakan supported such a just order for eliminating and abolishing the interest on 
capital, and thus severed ties to a capitalist system in Turkey. The AKP, on the other hand, 
underlined that the most important source of Turkey’s economic development and 
progress is the “the strength of [our nation’s] private enterprise,” and the state’s role is to 
ensure that the market will be suitable for free competition, and there will be no obstacles 
which potentially prevent the private enterprise to perform properly in the market. Along 
with these ideas, the AKP also promoted the idea to decrease the weight of state industrial 
sector and it supported privatization and Turkey’s engagement with the global economy 
(Hale, 2005: 302). Right after its establishment in 2001, the AKP won enough seats in the 
2002 General Elections to form the government, and this started a new era in party-
competition in the country. 
Yet another explanation can be made by focusing on the importance of the electorate and 
the parties’ positioning of themselves regarding the voters. This is related to the 
adaptation approach which was explained by Ware (1996) with regard to revising party 
ideologies for adapting new political contexts. In Turkey, “…The right-wing movements 
and parties have been quite tempted to present themselves as possessing a conservative 
ideology that seems to host a relatively large number of different traits, preferences, likes, 
and dislikes…” (Kalaycıoğlu, 2007: 234). With a similar rationale, the AKP seems to 
adopt such a conservative framework to reach larger swaths of voters. Moreover, the AKP 
has been defined as a coalition which relied on the rural population, small traders and the 
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artisans, urban slum-dwellers, small and mid-range entrepreneurs, the Islamist 
bourgeoisie, young business executives and a working class (Özbudun, 2006: 547; Insel, 
2003: 297-299). This coalition is clearly not a homogeneous one, and in order to preserve 
it, the party seems to have trekked a prudent route. This process requires rapid decision-
making for continuous adaptation. Thus, a conservative framework on the one hand, 
which will appeal to a large part of the electorate, and a “change” driven decision-making 
process which eases the adaptation to the transforming ideas of the other, especially the 
business interests of the coalition of supporters. On the other hand, it seems to have been 
adopted by the AKP. For example, the AKP defines itself as conservative democrat (Hale, 
2005: 307; Özbudun, 2006: 548), but conversely, it always touches upon to the 
importance of transformation and change by underlining the search and adoption of 
“new” ideas (The AKP Party Program). This enables the AKP to appeal to a larger 
electorate in the country and increase its political power supported by the votes.  
Table 4.1. Percentage of votes of Islamist parties in parliamentary and local elections in 
Turkey (1973– 2015) 
Year Elections Party Votes (%) 
1973 Parliamentary MSP 11.8 
1977 Parliamentary MSP 8.6 
1984 Local RP 4.4 
1987 Parliamentary RP 7.2 
1989 Local RP 9.8 
1991 Parliamentary RP (in coalition with the MHP and IDP) 16.9 
1994 Local RP 19.1 
1995 Parliamentary RP 21.4 
1999 Local FP 18.4 
1999 Parliamentary FP 15.4 
2002 Parliamentary AKP 34.3 
2004 Local AKP 41.2 
2007 Parliamentary AKP 46.6 
2009 Local AKP 38.6 
2011 Parliamentary AKP 49.8 
2014 Local AKP 43.1 
Jun-15 Parliamentary AKP 40.9 
Nov-15 Parliamentary AKP 49.5 
Source: Özbudun, E. 2006. From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: The Case of the Justice and Development 
Party in Turkey. South European Society and Politics, Vol.11, No.3-4, p. 545.Original table in the above-mentioned 
source ends in 2004. Elections held after 2004 were included by the results announced by the YSK. General elections 
results are available in the following link: http://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/milletvekili-genel-secim-arsivi/2644; and local 
elections results are available in the following link: http://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/mahalli-idareler-genel-secimleri-
arsivi/2650. 
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Table 4.1 reveals the difference between the AKP’s and its ancestors’ vote share. 
Obviously, a drastic change appeared in 2002 with the AKP’s victory in the elections. 
This is closely related to the main goals of the AKP, e.g. whether it is preserving an 
ideology and trying to implement the policies derived from that ideology, or simply 
increasing its vote share to continue its power in the political life, or not has been a 
continuing matter of contention.  
Ware (1996) highlights the idea that we should place the ideological dimensions of the 
parties in context with regard to party competition: During the era of Europe’s 
transformation to liberal democracy, “there were many parties whose sole raison d’etre 
was obtaining patronage through their control of political offices,” and “the demands 
imposed by having to compete for the votes of a mass electorate may have entailed the 
embracing of an ideology...” but still,  “non-ideological aspects of politics continued to 
infect many parties well into the twentieth century.” (Ware, 1996: 17). Combining this 
with the fact that a large group of the voters in Turkey tend to vote for or support a 
conservative party like the AKP, with the motivation of expected economic benefits 
rather than voting for purely ideological beliefs (Kalaycıoğlu, 2007: 233), we can argue 
that the AKP seeks electoral victory which will keep it in power. This can be a major 
motivation for its split from the ideological path of Milli Görüş, which appealed to a 
narrow electorate by emphasizing the Islamist ideological credentials of the party.  
Although the AKP increased its vote shares after 2002 elections, they also faced 
decreased support over time. With regard to the law of shrinking support, Cuzan argues 
that:  
“The erosion of support is not uniform across the ruling party’s spell in office. 
In fact, in some cases, the incumbent party’s vote share rises, even 
substantially, in their first reelection—especially if in the prior election, when 
it was elevated to office, the electorate had fractured in the midst of an 
economic or political crisis. This also may happen when a new democracy is 
experiencing a period of electoral sorting and consolidation, as Germany did 
in the 1950s.” (Cuzan, 2015:  416). 
A similar result emerged for the AKP starting from 2002. Following an economic crisis 
which started in 2001, the AKP won the highest amount of the votes compared to other 
parties in 2002, and then continued to increase its vote share until the 2011 elections, and 
experienced a big drop on June 7, 2015 elections. But right after this election, a repeat 
election was held on November 1, 2015 and the AKP was able to recover lost ground and 
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won enough votes to form the government by its own once again. Thus, the AKP 
continued to dominate politics in Turkey, even when it lost a general election (June 7, 
2015). Regarding these circumstances, one may argue that the recruitment patterns and 
candidate selections strategies of parties are broadly influenced by the characteristics of 
party competition as well.  
 
4.4. Centralist Structures of Turkish Political Parties 
 
In Turkey,  
“…Political parties usually have oligarchic structures resulting in the 
concentration of power at the top and a decline in the influence of members 
at large. Party leaders end up with a disproportionately large number of 
resources compared to other party members, including access to information, 
control over formal communication channels and accumulation of know-how 
related to political activities...” (Kabasakal, 2014: 701). 
Political parties are composed of multiple levels and branches, and the interactions among 
those different structures are regulated by various sources. This regulation is usually 
defined as “structural relationship” (yapısal bağlantı), and while some parties have 
clarified, detailed and definite rules in terms of the relations of various parts of the party, 
some others have not (Özbudun, 1974: 62). Turkish political parties are categorized in 
the first group as they practice strong structural relations with their detailed intra-party 
regulations; and depending on this categorization, the concentration of power at the 
central level of the parties has been recognized by many scholars (Özbudun, 1974: 63; 
Bektaş, 1993: 40; Hale, 2002; Ayan, 2010). Relationship between the party headquarters 
and local offices seems to be asymmetrical in favor of the headquarters; “In general, the 
parties have no significant internal democracy. … Ideas are not generated within parties 
where debate is discouraged. Obedience rather than competition governs the parties' 
political culture…” (Rubin, 2002: 3). To illustrate, Ulaş and Bayraktar (2013) explain the 
concentration of power in the hands of the party leadership by underlining the 
marginalization of local party offices. More specifically, the central offices of the parties 
penetrate and often control the decision-making procedures and the decisions made by 
the local branches which leaves small room for discretion in these local offices.   
A number of factors such as genetic features, political culture and institutions can 
influence the organizational structure of political parties (see e.g., Kalaycıoğlu, 2002; 
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Ayan, 2010). More specifically, a party may initially organize its internal structure in a 
highly hierarchical manner and continue like that throughout time; or political culture of 
the country, in which dominant party leadership is a common feature, may influence the 
party structure as time passes and a strong leadership can emerge as a common practice; 
or various institutions such as laws and regulations on political parties may influence the 
internal structural relationships within a party organization. For example, strong 
leadership/leader-oriented rule within the political parties have been one of the major 
features in Turkey, and many important decisions, such as the changes in the status of 
many party members were usually taken by the leaders. Although some parties 
constituted more or less institutionalized recruitment patterns throughout time, the post-
1983 parties especially have shown certain characteristics that the selection of the 
candidates, resolution of the problems among various party organs, and the management 
of the parliamentary party group that have been controlled by the central branch and 
sometimes specifically by the leader of the party in question; and by having the ability to 
control the candidate nomination, and access to the various sources of patronage, the 
leaders manage to personalize their leadership (Kalaycıoğlu, 1990: 196-197; Sayarı, 
2002: 25).  
Mainly, above-mentioned factors have been defined as the major sources of centralism in 
the parties in Turkey. But what has been the influence of the legal regulations on this 
structure? To what extent do the legal regulations affect the centralist party structure, and 
how? In order to answer such questions, it is best to turn to and analyze the regulations 
on the political parties in Turkey. Especially the SPK has been criticized by various 
scholars as causing a party structure which is hierarchically organized, thus, while the 
central levels are powerful, the local levels can find little room for decision-making 
(Çarkoğlu et al. 2000). It is also noteworthy to consider how the parties employ a flow of 
detailed regulations from top to lower levels in a hierarchical mechanism: The referred 
characteristics of the regulations give more place to the center, to further codify its rules, 
and widen its control capacity.  
The regulations provided by the SPK seem strict by their nature. Yet, not only this 
characteristic per se, but also the indirect help of it for the survival of centralist 
administration matter. In other words, such regulations can be interpreted as building a 
hierarchical structure within the political parties: Very similar to the state administration 
structure, which empowers the center and makes the local levels such as district and 
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provincial administration bodies to be depended on the decisions of this center, these 
regulations provide a structure for the political parties which provide little room for 
decentralized relations within the parties.  
Articles 19 and 20 of the SPK reveal the regulations on the structure of the provincial and 
district organizations of the political parties in detail. Nevertheless, the SPK provides 
some room for the political parties to regulate their local organizations in terms of certain 
issues. For example, in accordance with the Article 7 of the SPK, both the AKP and the 
CHP built up all referred organs and parts such as municipality organizations, district and 
provincial organizations, party headquarters and other organizations such as women’s 
branches and youth branches, and street (mahalle) and village (köy) level representatives 
under the district branches. Yet, these lower level representatives are under the 
responsibility of the district branches. The reason for organizing such a structure is that 
the SPK does not allow local branch organizations at a lower level than the municipal 
level such as bucaks (sub-districts), but the parties need to have some representatives in 
other places in order to communicate with the electorate such as those living in villages 
as well. Thus, political parties also have representatives, but legally they have to put them 
under the control of the district branches. Such kind of a necessity –whether it suits the 
national party headquarters’ purposes in the first place or not- creates a dependency of 
the lower levels to the higher levels of the party organization in the first place. This may 
further feed the hierarchical structure within the party. 
Some of the regulations of the SPK seem to intend to create a rather democratic nature in 
the parties. For example, the SPK indicates that the parties will hold a national convention 
(Büyük Kongre) at least once in three years, and the party chairman (Genel Başkan) must 
nominate himself/herself for re-election. Additionally, there may be other contestants as 
well. Nevertheless, it is very unlikely that the party chairman can be outed from power in 
these conventions (Hale, 2002: 185). Meaning that, in many political parties, changing 
the leader of the party via intra-party elections is not a common practice in the country. 
On the contrary, the current party leaders sometimes point out his or her successors. Thus, 
we observe a tendency that the leaders decide and nominate, and the other members of 
the party usually accept this decision. At this point, the current leader of the party may be 
consolidating his or her power by gaining the re-approval of the members of the party. 
Consequently, such a practice can enable the national party headquarters to further 
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concentrate the control power in its hands. So, unintended consequences can emerge out 
of the regulations of the SPK, which further consolidates centralist structure of the parties. 
Similarly, party by-laws may create several restrictions on the autonomy of the local 
branches. For example, both the AKP and the CHP have long, detailed party by-laws, and 
for instance, the election process and method of the district or provincial party bosses, 
their responsibilities, relations with different organizations within and without the party 
are regulated by these by-laws.23 Some parties do impose election term limits  such as in 
the case of the AKP: the by-law of the AKP limits the election of the same chairman (in 
district and provincial areas) with 3 ordinary successive periods at most.24 All the 
branches of the party should act accordingly, and for example, even if a local branch 
thinks that a local party boss will be successful if he/she is elected one again (after 3 
periods), the party by-laws restrict it. In other words, these local branches are bounded by 
these regulations. Similar regulations are also available for legislative candidates of the 
party. As another example, remembering the incentives referred by Ayan (2010), we can 
interpret that certain kinds of incentives can be used for consolidating the power of the 
center and increasing its control capacity. For example, the Article 43/F of the CHP by-
laws allows the party headquarters/party’s central actors to dismiss a local branch’s 
members, if there emerges a vote loss compared to the previous elections in that specific 
area (province, district or smaller areas) (CHP, 2012: 60). Even if the center does not use 
this right so much, such kind of an article can make the local branches to feel under 
pressure of the center (see e.g., Ulaş and Bayraktar, 2013). 
 
 
4.5. Clientelism and Its Patterns in Turkey 
 
Along with the centralist tendencies and similar organizational structures of political 
parties, another common characteristic seems to be adopting clientelistic relations with 
the electorate. The literature provides various definitions of political clientelism. To start 
with, “…In a clientelistic relationship, the more powerful individual, or the patron, may 
                                                          
23 For example, the AKP by-laws article 17 regulates different parts of the party organization. Please see the 
following link for more details: http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-tuzugu. 
 
24AKP by-laws, Article 36. Retrieved from: http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-tuzugu. 
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or may not be someone who holds and official position such as local party boss or deputy 
in the parliament…” (Sayarı, 2011: 81). Similarly, patronage is defined as the 
“…distribution of state resources on a nonmeritocratic basis for political gain” 
(Mainwaring, 1999: 177). Other scholars define clientelistic relations as a “patronage 
based, voter-party linkage” and they underline that citizen-politician linkages are 
generally based on “direct material inducements targeted to individuals and small groups 
of citizens whom politicians know to be highly responsive to such side-payments and 
willing to surrender their vote for the right price.” (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007: 10). 
Similarly, Stokes’ definition of clientelism also focus on voting: “…Focusing on 
clientelism as a method of electoral mobilization, I define it as the proffering of material 
goods in return for electoral support, where the criterion of distribution that the patron 
uses is simply: did you (will you) support me?” (Stokes, 2007: 604-605). In addition, 
according to Stokes (2007), the distributive criterion of electoral support is the factor that 
distinguishes clientelism from other materially-oriented political strategies such as pork 
barrel politics in the U.S. and the programmatic redistributive politics both of which rely 
on different criteria rather than electoral support. 
With regard to clientelism in Turkish politics, literature also unearths the relations 
between political elites -especially the parliamentary elite- and constituents. Since the 
beginning of the multiparty era, political parties in Turkey are typically described as cadre 
or catch-all parties with strong clientelistic features (Kabasakal, 2014: 707). According 
to Sayarı (2011), we can observe political clientelism and party patronage in various 
aspects of Turkish political life. To illustrate, a considerable number of people who stop 
by the offices of the deputies for seeking personal assistance from these parliamentary 
elite are seen as a sign of the importance attached to the clientelistic relations (Sayarı, 
2011: 88).25 Similarly, Kalaycıoğlu (1995) examines the relationship between deputies 
and constituents regarding clientelistic linkages and finds out that constituency demands 
from the deputies have been mostly the personal ones. Concomitantly, a significant 
number of the deputies (more than a half) have been spending their time –as a regular 
activity- on “finding jobs and providing other services or benefits for constituents” 
(Kalaycıoğlu, 1995: 47, 49). More specifically, the demanded services and goods have 
                                                          
25 Sayarı (2011: 88-89) also refers to a survey which was conducted on this issue and which reveals that more than 
half of the parliamentarians receive between 50 and 300 visitors every week. For more information please see: Turan, 
İ. 2000. Parlamentoların Etkinliği ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi. In Devlet Reformu: TBMM’nin Etkinliği. 
İstanbul: TESEV.  
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been “jobs and employment, favorable treatment from the bureaucrats and state officials, 
assistance in finding medical care in Ankara, and influence peddling in a variety of 
different issues (Sayarı, 2011: 89). 
Historically, clientelistic relations and patronage linkages have occupied a considerable 
place in Turkish political life, both in the Ottoman and Republican era (Güneş-Ayata, 
1994; Özbudun, 2005; Sayarı, 2011). In the early 20th century, clientelistic linkages 
continued to be a significant factor in Turkish social and political life, and various 
political parties adopted such personal ties, including clientelism through the Republican 
time in Turkey: During the late Ottoman times, as the political parties started to emerge, 
e.g. the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası - ITF), people from 
prominent notable families had a chance to enter into politics. Some of these people have 
become deputies in the parliament while some recruited as local party bosses of the ITF. 
In the provincial organizations of this party, influential notables have been recruited into 
the ranks through “systematic use of patronage and economic regulation” at late Ottoman 
times (Sayarı, 2011: 85).  
After the establishment of the Turkish Republic, similar to the previous recruitment 
patterns of the political parties, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) which served as the 
single party through 1923-1946, recruited notables from the leading families in the 
Anatolia as the deputies or the local organization leaders of the party. This recruitment 
pattern of the CHP was regarded as serving the interests of both the (1) party/center –as 
having chance to control the periphery through the notables’ clientelistic ties with the 
peasants, and the (2) notables –as having chance to maintain and even strengthen their 
social and economic influence in the local areas (Sayarı, 2011: 85). Nevertheless, after 
the transition to the multi-party era in Turkey, political clientelism and party patronage 
started to occupy a broader scope. As the party competition increased with the multi-party 
period, the competing parties regarded the clientelistic relations between the notables and 
the local constituents as one of the most prevailing tools for electoral mobilization, 
especially in the rural areas, which cover almost the two third of the electorate. With this 
recruitment pattern, there emerged 
“…a rapid extension of their organizational networks to the provincial towns 
and villages of Anatolia. Hence the formation of voter alignments among 
Turkey’s predominantly rural electorate during the late 1940s and 1950s was 
accomplished largely through a process of vertical mobilization. Political 
parties concentrated their efforts in recruiting members of notable families 
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and faction leaders who used their networks of clientelist relationships with 
the peasants to mobilize electoral support” (Sayarı, 2011: 86-87).  
 
After the Ottoman times, clientelism has continued to be a significant issue affecting 
Turkish politics in various periods up to today. Especially after the 1970s, with the 
increased significance of local elections, the relationship between the parties and voters 
started to rely on more clientelistic ties:  
“…Given the large concentration of voters in urban areas, political parties 
have increasingly viewed local elections as crucial in expanding their 
electoral popularity in the national political arena. Control of the 
municipalities of sprawling metropolises such as Istanbul, Ankara, and İzmir 
provides a party with considerable political influence and visibility in national 
politics. It also enables the party to gain access to new sources of political 
patronage (through municipal jobs, zoning regulations, contracts for street 
repairs, etc.) that can be utilized to recruit new activists and supporters...” 
(İncioğlu, 2002: 73).  
 
One of the reasons for the existence of clientelistic relations in the country is that the 
periphery has always had considerable dependency to the center in Turkey, and this in 
turn, created an environment in which the “personal dependencies in the form of patron-
client relationships” proliferated and endured (Güneş-Ayata, 1994: 49). Thus, along with 
the clientelistic practices of political parties, electorate’s perceptions about the political 
elite and voting in elections are other explanatory factors of clientelistic relations. 
“…voters have heterogeneous distributive preferences and that they develop expectations 
about the capacity of party elites and party activists to deliver excludable goods, such as 
handouts, public-sector jobs, and public works.” (Calvo and Murillo, 2012: 854). Under 
these circumstances, distribution of goods seems to be one of the most observed practices. 
For example, 
“If the elected representative has the reputation of being good in party 
activities, it will be assumed that he will bring resources to the constituency 
–which is considered more important than being a good legislator. Similarly, 
municipal council members are considered to be intermediaries of resource 
allocation rather than decisionmakers on the patterns of resource distribution. 
They see effectiveness as having direct links with voters and party members, 
solving their problems and advising them; they are not interested in macro 
projects. Their primary target is to have an ample supply of resources for their 
own constituencies; thus, their scope is usually limited to daily activities.” 
(Güneş-Ayata, 1994: 60). 
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Peculiarities of economic development process of the country, especially characteristics 
of industrialization also influenced the persistence of clientelism in the country. 
Industrialization had and has a significantly important role in terms of people's economic 
and social transformations, which may shape the relationships between political parties 
and voters. Consequences of unequal distribution of industrial areas lead to different 
socioeconomic development outcomes for citizens. Socioeconomic inequality, domestic 
immigration, formation of new groups such as urban poor seem to strengthen informal 
networks and clientelistic ties between parties and the electorate. 
A historical background of industrialization in Turkey shows that the country is a 
relatively late industrialized one, compared to other developed countries. Due to the fact 
that Ottoman Empire could not become capable of achieving the level of industrial 
development of the capitalist Western countries, the Turkish Republic had to take more 
rapid changes in order to integrate into the world economic system. One of the main 
characteristics of the Turkish economy was the central power of the state and its 
bureaucracy over the market. The control and decisions of the state bureaucrats were 
significant factors in the Ottoman Empire period, and there was no presence of an 
autonomous bourgeoisie class. Keyder mentioned that “…The Turkish bourgeoisie is a 
creation of Turkish state- the product of a slow and ambivalent process...” but he mentions 
that the regime actually did not aim to create a bourgeoisie due to the bureaucrats' 
tendency to define themselves as the inheritors of the ruling class of the precapitalistic 
empire (Keyder, 1994:45). So, historically, there was a kind of struggle between the state 
bureaucracy and the early bourgeoisie. In the Republican period, which actually started 
with the idea of liberal economy, the 1929 Economic Depression caused the CHP to 
construct an étatist economic strategy, from which again emerged the state control over 
economy. But this time a mixed economy was applied differently from the Empire.  
Although there were initiatives both in the late Ottoman and the early Republican period, 
the actual industrialization process, which is the transition from agricultural production 
to industrial was started in the early 1950s by the DP government. Keyder (1994:61) 
defined this period as a break of the formation of Turkish bourgeoisie which became more 
independent from the state. In this period, the state’s control of the economy was as little 
as possible, in accordance with liberal economy prospects. After the DP period, from the 
beginning of the 1960's the government of the AP followed the import substitution 
method as the major industrial strategy. So, the state intervention in the market increased 
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again. This policy was employed until 1980, which was another turning point of Turkish 
industrialization, with the emergence of liberal economic policies. After the military coup 
of 1980, a new era started with liberal economy and rising Islamism in both social and 
political realms. Industrialization and economic developments related to the removal of 
import substitution, and trade levels were high in this period.  
Characteristics of Turkish politics have been influenced by those industrialization 
processes both directly and indirectly. In particular, the unequal distribution of the 
industry among the different regions of Turkey and the causal relations of this with the 
social and economic transformation of the society. Although there were plans about equal 
allocation of the industrial institutions among different regions of the country in the 
agenda of the CHP during the single party period, the DP had no clear aim about this 
equality. As Tokgöz (1976:50) mentions, there were neither precautions about the 
underdeveloped region's improvements, nor a wholly national level development in the 
program of the DP, and it generally tended to build the factories in regard to 
political/partisan necessities rather than economic priorities.  
As a result of unequal distribution of industrial areas in the country, in the 1970s the 
movements of the workers and the importance of unions was significantly important in 
terms of political participation. The community of these workers actually had a big impact 
on Turkish politics in terms of being a social democratic welfare state during those years. 
However, their effects could not have been long lasting. The imbalance of 
industrialization was creating an inequality between the regions, cities and even within 
cities, domestic migration of the people from less developed regions to much more 
industrialized ones started rapidly. Especially between the 1950s and 1980s, migration of 
the people was large scale since the industrialization process was rapid in those years. 
One of the most important issues about the migration waves of people has been the 
urbanization process. The people -by the triggering effects of the job opportunities at the 
industrialized cities and regions- moved to the urban areas from the rural ones. The main 
challenge at the first stage of these migration movements was the need for housing. It was 
mentioned about the problems of urban areas and housing of the people that “…since the 
early 1950's, the number of gecekondus is steadily increasing in the country despite the 
fact that public and private sectors are doing their best to produce dwellings to meet the 
needs...” (Kano and Keleş, 1986: 65).  
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One reason for that practice may be that not all migrants had the chance to own publicly 
or privately built dwellings. Hence, many people migrated from rural to urban areas had 
to create their own living areas by their own opportunities. Urbanized cities became more 
and more multicultural with the variety of the people who come from different regions of 
the country. This mix in the cities created an important change in terms of solidarity of 
the groups in terms of living in the same area, or coming from similar regional parts. 
Regarding this, especially the living areas of these people which consist of gecekondus 
can be defined as the new type of periphery in the actual city. The outcome of that 
situation can be related to the integration process of the newcomers with the urban area's 
members, and it can be said that the integration was not an easy one. Rather the group 
identity of these immigrants was much more effected by their life style, political 
participation and socioeconomic conditions. Thus, new social groups, classes and 
cleavages were observed.   
Such developments led to an increased relationship between the urban poor and religious 
parties, which are mentioned in the previous pages, which included social aids to their 
policies. For example, RP underlined the idea of adil düzen, and was able to attract the 
votes of the citizens whose income levels were quite low. The result of this was the 
success of the RP, especially in local elections by winning a number of seats in several 
municipalities, and then its increased vote shares in general elections through the 1990s. 
We can observe a similar pattern for the local party actors such as chairpersons and other 
members of administrative boards of the local branches as in the municipal council 
members’ case. The interviews conducted for this dissertation reveal that the previous 
patterns of clientelistic relations somewhat continuous in Turkish politics. At least the 
perception of the people seems to continue. Especially, the previously mentioned 
“dependency to the center” idea is still in the minds of many voters. Several interviewees 
indicate that the people often visit their offices to find solutions for their problems, 
because these people think that if the local party bosses or other notable actors in the party 
engage with the solution process of the problems, the solutions will be found more quickly 
and efficiently. Thus, today, the local party elites seem to be another active actor in 
collecting the demands of the voters and distribute the sources. Yet, this is not only about 
their positions, but also about their proximity to the constituents. As the local party leaders 
are known by more people in their working area, their relations become closer. The voters 
feel themselves more comfortable while talking to these local party elites, and also reflect 
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their demands and interests more easily. Moreover, the people trust the local party elites 
as they know them more closely, e.g. if the local party chairperson in the child of that 
specific area and lives for long years in there, the voters constitute closer relations. The 
details of the interviews, interpretations and discussions are in the Chapter 7 of this 
dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
ELITE RECRUITMENT AND POLITICAL AMBITION IN TURKEY 
 
 
5.1. Recruitment and Candidate Selection Patterns in Turkish Political Parties 
 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation focused on party recruitment and candidate selection 
processes examined in relevant literature. Such processes and strategic decisions 
employed by political parties “provide important insights into how power is distributed 
within party organizations.” (Cross and Gauja, 2014: 22). This chapter explains those 
processes and decisions specifically in Turkey, then continues with political ambition and 
career decisions of politicians in the country. 
Various studies unearth the recruitment patterns within Turkish political parties by 
analyzing the socioeconomic backgrounds of local party elites in the country (Frey, 1965, 
Tachau, 1973; Güneş-Ayata, 1994; Çarkoğlu et al., 2000; Uysal and Topak, 2010). 
Similar studies have additionally been done with regard to legislative elites and 
ministerial recruitment patterns (Kışlalı, 1976; Kalaycıoğlu, 1995; Sayarı and Hasanov, 
2008, Sayarı and Dikici-Bilgin, 2011). In those studies, scholars generally focus on 
personal characteristics including socioeconomic backgrounds of the political elite, their 
relationship with the electorate, and their political experience. Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 
of this dissertation provide examinations of such characteristics and political ambition of 
politicians in the country in a detailed way. Before that, explaining several factors which 
influence elite recruitment and political ambition may be helpful. 
Turkey has a party-centered political system with a tradition of centralist party structures. 
Not only do Turkish politics revolve around political parties, but the political parties 
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revolve around their own centers. Thus, studying the political parties would provide a 
beneficial understanding of Turkish politics in general. One significant difference 
between candidate selection processes of political parties in Turkey and various European 
countries is that “grassroots members in many European parties have gradually been 
given greater opportunities to nominate candidates.” (Norris, 2006: 106) while “…the 
changes in laws that regulate party structures and nomination procedures have been in the 
direction of limiting members’ input and enhancing the power of the party leaders and 
central organs” in Turkey (Kabasakal, 2014: 706). Nevertheless, it is possible to observe 
the dominance of party center in candidate selection process in some other parliamentary 
democracies such as New Zealand (Salmond, 2003) and the UK (Williams and Paun, 
2011). In Turkey, a similar practice is observable: Party centers have considerable 
discretion on the decision-making process in recruitment and candidate selection.  
 
As Schattschneider argued, whoever selects the candidates is the true owner of the party. 
It can be grassroots or the party leadership. For the Turkish case, although the leader-
centered party structure has been a common and on-going characteristic, one cannot deny 
the existence of factors other than those pertinent to the decisions of leaders. The reason 
for this is that as Ayan (2009: 7-8) argued, “The authoritarian party leader at the national 
level must take into account the skills, perceptions and interests of the local party actors 
because the potential effectiveness of the party leader’s power depends on these actors’ 
interests, perceptions and skills…” So, party leaders’ decisions may also be affected 
occasionally by the characteristics of the local party elites. Moreover, there have been 
primary election regulations for a large portion of the candidates. Between 1946 and 1960, 
political parties were nominating their candidates in elections in accordance with the rules 
and regulations indicated in their own by-laws, and both the CHP and the DP nominated 
their candidates with the decisions of their local level organization (Kabasakal, 2016: 
241). According to previous Parliamentary Elections Act (Law no: 360) enacted in 25 
May 1961, the political parties shall nominate their candidates and rank them on the party 
lists in accordance with their party by-laws by the decisions of local branches in 
respective electoral districts with democratic means. Moreover, nomination by the 
headquarters can be done if an enabling rule is written in their by-laws or if it is accepted 
by the general congress of the parties. Nevertheless, this law is limited the number of 
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candidates nominated by the central offices of the parties to only 10 percent.26 Law on 
Political Parties (Law no: 648) which was enacted in 16 July 1965 limited the discretion 
of the central organs of the parties on nomination even further by indicating that the 
portion of the candidates nominated by the central organs is limited to 5% Two major 
parties, the AP and CHP nominated their candidates mostly by primaries from 1961 to 
1980 (Kabasakal, 2016: 241, 243). Such regulations enable the local branches of the 
parties to be more active and influential on the candidate nomination processes. However, 
these practices did not last long. Although the current Law on Political Parties (Law no: 
2820) which was enacted in 1983 after the 1980 military coup imposed compulsory 
primaries at its first stage, primaries became optional by the amendments made in 1986 
(Kabasakal, 2016: 243). Thus, after this stage, party leaders had the opportunity to solely 
control the nomination processes. Among the parties analyzed in this dissertation, the 
CHP implements primaries, but to a limited extent. The party does not employ primaries 
in every electoral district. This may imply that political parties do not necessarily prefer 
inclusive selectorate methods in candidate selection processes. For example, Erdem 
(2013: 56) argues that, today, it is not possible to rank a candidate in the party list in an 
electable place without the consent of the party leaders. This tradition of leader-centered 
candidate nomination process had a negative effect on the participation of local branches 
of parties in decision making. It made them almost non-functional, thus, sometimes the 
votes gained by some parties are even less than their registered members in certain small 
districts (Kabasakal, 2016: 245). Hence, with regard to recruitment and candidate 
selection, demand side seems to play more major roles compared to supply side, thus the 
candidate characteristics and selection are determined by the party leaders.  
 
 
5.2. Regulations on Candidate Nomination in Turkey 
 
Political parties’ candidate selection practices are also influenced by many other factors. 
What affects the candidate nomination processes? Electoral systems and party systems, 
                                                          
26 Please see, previous Milletvekili Seçim Kanunu (Law No: 306), 25 May 1961, Article 15:  
“Siyasi partiler aday listelerini ve adayların listedeki sıralarını kendi tüzükleri gereğince, seçim çevrelerinde demokratik 
usuller dairesinde yapacakları yoklamalarla, oy verme gününden önceki 35 inci gün tesbit ederler. 
Siyasi partilerin merkezlerindeki yetkili organları tarafından aday tesbit edilmesi ve bu adayların listedeki sıralarının 
tayini, tüzüklerinde bu yetkinin bulunmasına veya genel kongrelerince bu husuta karar verilmiş olmasına bağlıdır. 
Ancak, bu suretle tesbit edilecek Merkez adaylarının sayısı, hiçbir suretle, o siyasi partinin seçime katıldığı illerde 
göstereceği adaylar toplamının yüzde 10 unu geçemez.”  
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relative sizes of political parties functioning in the system, regionality of the parties, 
administrative system of the country and party ideologies are some of the mostly 
referenced factors which shape candidate selection (Lundell, 2004; Shomer, 2014; 
Kernell, 2015). Another element determining the candidate nomination is the composition 
of the selectorate. In other words, who selects and nominate candidates is important. As 
explained in Chapter 2, inclusive and exclusive selectorates would generate quite 
different consequences (Hazan and Rahat, 2006; Rahat, 2007; Indriðason and Kristinsson, 
2015). In addition to that, internal relations in the parties, degrees of party discipline and 
internal democracy also have significant effects on nomination process (Rahat, 2007; 
Cross and Blais, 2012). As indicated in Chapter 2, some legal requirements are applied 
to candidacy processes in many countries. Hence, along with above-mentioned factors, 
legal regulations and party regulations also contribute to shaping the pool of eligible 
candidates. 
Who can run as a candidate in elections? Determinants of the answer of this question do 
not only rely on party decisions or political ambition, but also legal regulation. In almost 
each country, there are such regulations to show who is eligible to be a candidate and who 
is not. Some factors such as age, education, residency or occupation would be included 
in these regulations. The Parliamentary Elections Act regulates the eligibility of 
individuals to be candidates in elections in Turkey. 
According to the original Article 10 of the current Parliamentary Elections Act (Law no: 
2839) enacted in June 10, 1983, every Turkish citizen who is 30+ years old can be elected 
as an MP.27 However, this article amended in October 19, 2006 by lowering the age to 25 
and older. Later in 25 April 2018, the age limit was again lowered to 18 with the Article 
8 of Law 7140.28 Nevertheless, this is not the only criterion for being eligible to be elected 
as an MP. Article 11 of the same law indicates who cannot be elected as MPs: 
a) Those who are not at least primary school graduates, 
b) Legally determined to be mentally incompetent, 
                                                          
27 Milletvekili Seçim Kanunu (Law No: 2839), dated 10 June 1983, Article 10: 
“Otuz yaşını dolduran her Türk vatandaşı milletvekili seçilebilir.” 
 
28 Milletvekili Seçim Kanunu (Law No: 2839), dated 10 June 1983, Article 10: 
“Onsekiz yaşını dolduran her Türk vatandaşı milletvekili seçilebilir.” 
*“Bu maddede geçen "Otuz yaşını" ibaresi, 19/10/2006 tarihli ve 5552 sayılı Kanunun 1 inci maddesiyle "Yirmibeş 
yaşını" olarak değiştirilmiş olup, daha sonra 25/4/2018 tarihli ve 7140 sayılı Kanunun 8 inci maddesiyle bu fıkrada 
yer alan “Yirmibeş” ibaresi “Onsekiz” şeklinde değiştirilmiştir.” 
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c) Those who has unfinished relations with military service, 
d) Those who are banned from public services, 
e) Those who were sentenced to 1 year or more imprisonment, or heavy 
imprisonment, except involuntary crimes, 
f) Those who committed certain crimes indicated in the subsections of this article. 
After indicating the eligibility to be elected as an MP, Article 12 of the Parliamentary 
Elections Act (No: 2839) shows the eligibility for being a candidate in general elections. 
According to this article, every Turkish citizen with eligibility for being elected as an MP 
can be a candidate in general elections regardless of being a member of a political party.29 
Moreover, Article 16 regulates in more detail the nomination process and independent 
candidacies. According to this article, political parties cannot nominate their candidates 
in a joint or collective list. If a person is not a member of a party, but nomination will be 
done by a political party, there should be a written consent of that person. No one can be 
nominated as candidate (and be elected) by more than one political party, or in more than 
one electoral district in the same elections by the same party. Similarly, according to the 
same article, independent candidates cannot become candidates and be elected for more 
than one electoral district.30 
When it comes to Local Elections, strategies of the parties would change. For mayoral 
positions, there is only one seat to be filled for each municipality. Thus, the electoral 
system works as if it is a plurality system. In Turkey, among all the candidates running 
for a certain mayoral position, the one who gets the highest vote will be elected as mayor. 
Thus, the individual characteristics of these candidates would be much more influential.  
                                                          
29 Milletvekili Seçim Kanunu (Law No: 2839), dated 10 June 1983, Article 12: 
“Bir siyasi partiye mensup olsun veya olmasın seçilme yeterliğine sahip her Türk vatandaşı bu Kanun 
hükümlerine göre milletvekilliğine adaylığını koyabilir. 
(Değişik : 28/3/1986 - 3270/28 md.) 298 sayılı Seçimlerin Temel Hükümleri ve Seçmen Kütükleri Hakkında 
Kanunun 14 üncü maddesinin 11 inci fıkrası gereğince Yüksek Seçim Kurulunun tespit ve ilan ettiği seçime 
katılabilecek siyasi partiler, 2820 sayılı Siyasi Partiler Kanunu hükümlerine göre, bütün seçim çevrelerinde aday 
gösterebilirler. (Son cümle mülga: 27/10/1995-4125/21 md.)” 
 
30 Milletvekili Seçim Kanunu (Law No: 2839), dated 10 June 1983, Article 16: 
“Siyasi partiler anlaşarak müşterek liste halinde aday gösteremezler. 
Siyasi partilere kayıtlı olmayan kimselerin, herhangi bir siyasi parti tarafından aday gösterilmeleri, kendilerinin 
yazılı muvafakatlarına bağlıdır. 
(Ek fıkra: 13/3/2018-7102/16 md.) Seçimlere katılma yeterliliği taşıyan siyasi partinin seçime katılmaması halinde, 
bu partinin üyesi, kendisinin ve üyesi olduğu siyasi partinin yazılı muvafakati alınarak, başka bir siyasi parti 
tarafından aday gösterilebilir. 
Bir kimse aynı zamanda değişik siyasi partiden veya aynı partiden aynı seçim için birden fazla seçim çevresinden 
aday olamaz, aday gösterilemez ve seçilemez. 
Bağımsız adaylar da, aynı seçim için birden fazla seçim çevresinde aday olamaz ve seçilemez.” 
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Gender discrimination in the candidate nomination process in local elections is not 
exceptional. Several studies underline the fact that political parties refrain from 
nominating female candidates in the local elections in Turkey (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000; 
Uysal and Topak, 2010; Tür and Çıtak, 2010). Nevertheless, this practice is not peculiar 
to Turkey, and research reveal that it is common even in consolidated democratic regimes 
(Ballington, 2004; O’Neill and Stewart, 2009). 
Another important regulation on legislative candidacy is about required resignation of 
possible candidates form their current offices in Turkey. Articles 18 and 19 of the 
Parliamentary Elections Act (Law no: 2839) regulates this process. According to Article 
18 of this law, if individuals with certain offices such as judges, public prosecutors, 
academicians, mayors, military officers, local party branch chairpersons and executive 
committee members, municipal council members do not resign from their offices prior to 
general elections, they cannot nominate themselves or be nominated by political parties 
as candidates.31  
Along with legal regulations such as the rules written in the SPK, party regulations, party 
by-laws, and other documents also provide several requirements for eligibility of 
candidates in both local and national elections. For example, the CHP by-laws provide 
the methods of candidate selection procedures of the party; however, a detailed 
explanation and regulation is provided by another document on the regulations on 
selecting MP candidates. According to this regulation, for example, any person who 
would like to be a candidate of the party in elections must be a member of the party at 
least for one year, and must not have any party fee debt.32 “…More common requirements 
are less demanding, such as minimal length of membership prior to the presentation of 
candidacy and pledges of loyalty to the party (Hazan and Rahat, 2006: 111). For example, 
the CHP by-laws indicate that an individual’s candidacy in general elections is up to the 
                                                          
31 Milletvekili Seçim Kanunu (Law No: 2839), dated 10 June 1983, Article 18: 
“Hakimler ve savcılar, yüksek yargı organları mensupları, yüksek öğretim kurumlarındaki öğretim elemanları, 
Yükseköğretim Kurulu, Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu üyeleri, kamu kurumu ve kuruluşlarının memur 
statüsündeki görevlileri ile yaptıkları hizmet bakımından işçi niteliği taşımayan diğer kamu görevlileri, aday olmak 
isteyen belediye başkanları ve subaylar ile astsubaylar, aday olmak isteyen siyasi partilerin il ve ilçe yönetim kurulu 
başkan ve üyeleri ile belediye meclisi üyeleri, il genel meclisi üyeleri, kamu kurumu niteliğindeki meslek kuruluşları 
ile sendikalar, kamu bankaları ile üst birliklerin ve bunların üst kuruluşlarının ve katıldıkları teşebbüs veya 
ortaklıkların yönetim ve denetim kurullarında görev alanlar genel ve ara seçimlerin başlangıcından bir ay önce 
seçimin yenilenmesine karar verilmesi halinde yenileme kararının ilanından başlayarak yedi gün içinde görevlerinden 
ayrılma isteğinde bulunmadıkça adaylıklarını koyamazlar ve aday gösterilemezler.” 
 
32 CHP, Milletvekili Aday Saptama Yönetmeliği, article 3. 
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decision of the party assembly (parti meclisi) if that person is not a member of the party.33 
However, AKP regulations do not require party membership prior to candidacy in local 
and national elections.34 Requirements indicated by political parties may aim to secure a 
certain quality of candidates, their loyalty to the party, or their prior experience in politics. 
Moreover, such requirements may ease to selects candidates out of a large pool of 
candidate nominees or applicants. Nevertheless, “At times, parties will ignore their own 
candidacy regulations, largely due to electoral consideration...” (Hazan and Rahat, 2006: 
111). Thus, some parties would lower their requirements if they think that it will bring 
electoral success. Wertman (1988) highlights that the Italian Communist Party nominated 
some candidates although they are not the members of the party, and although the party 
was an exclusive one with regard to its candidate selection process. Similar practices are 
observable in Turkish politics. For example, AKP by-laws regulate the term limit for 
parliamentary candidates, and any candidate can only be nominated for three successive 
terms only. Nevertheless, in certain elections, the party decided to stretch that regulation 
as the party leadership wanted to nominate long time serving or prominent members of 
the party as candidates, even if they meet the three-term limit.35 Hence, parties may flex 
their own regulations for electoral gain. Such strategic decisions eventually affect 
candidate selection processes and composition of elected politicians. 
 
 
5.3. Political Career Paths in Turkey 
 
Some studies listed above also include analyses of political career paths of party elites 
(e.g. Rallings et al., 2008, 2010; Uysal and Topak, 2010). They generally focus on certain 
points, for example why people want to become party elites in the first place (Lawson 
1976) and what kind of a political career path they draw. Within these studies, personal 
motivation and interests seem to be the triggering factors as well as “being asked to be a 
                                                          
33 CHP party by-laws, article 53. Please see the following link for more details: 
http://content.chp.org.tr/file/chp_tuzuk_10_03_2018.pdf. 
 
34 AKP, Seçim İşleri Adaylık İşlemleri Yönetmeliği, article 12. Please see the following link for more details: 
http://m.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-yonetmelikleri#bolum_. 
 
35 AKP, Seçim İşleri Adaylık İşlemleri Yönetmeliği, article 13. Please see the following link for more details: 
http://m.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-yonetmelikleri#bolum_. 
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member or to occupy specific position” by the other party elites. Thus, it seems as if 
individuals do not have all the control on their recruitment and career mobility. In most 
of the cases, the upper level party elites have a significant impact on their recruitment and 
career mobility. Therefore, we can argue that “...recently the dominant method in all 
parties to select their national and local candidates has become an elite decision at the 
national level and on some occasions an elite decision at the local level for local 
candidates...” (Kemahlıoğlu, 2012: 51).  
Additionally, competition within the party may have a special effect on political career 
mobility. As Kemahlıoğlu (2012: 7-8) explains, competition among the same party’s 
elites (a lower-level politician and a higher-level politician in this case) can emerge as:  
“…The follower’s ambitions to move up in the party hierarchy poses 
threats to the leader’s position in the party. Since the leader and follower 
both need their party to be successful, they are in an interdependent 
position and the leader who is facing a potential challenger has to decide 
whether to support the follower symbolically or financially...”  
We can infer that there can emerge a critical evaluation of the leaders to nominate 
someone as a legislative candidate, or to help this person to climb the political career 
ladder. Thus, we can also expect that as the gap between that lower level party elite and 
leader narrows down, the leader may try to find a way to make this person not to become 
a challenger, or, as that gap becomes wider, the leader may not spend that much attention 
to the upward political career mobility of the lower ranked party elite. 
Figure 5.1 shows possible political offices one can hold, and simplified conceivable paths 
from one office to another for achieving higher level office. Transferring from one office 
to another may require satisfying several criteria. For example, the MHP by-laws indicate 
that, any party elite serving as provincial or district party branch chairperson or executive 
committee member have to resign from the respective party office prior to their candidacy 
in local and national elections.36 Similar regulations are in effect for others who occupy 
public offices, mayoral positions or offices in some organizations such as chambers in 
Turkey. 
 
 
                                                          
36 MHP party by-laws, article 94. Please see the following link for more details: 
https://www.mhp.org.tr/usr_img/_mhp2007/kitaplar/mhp_parti_tuzugu_2009_opt.pdf. 
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Figure 5.1: Possible ways of political career mobility in Turkey 
 
 
Political career mobility does not always and necessarily follow linear patterns. In 
addition, occupying a national level political position (e.g. becoming an MP) may not be 
a step-by-step advancement for all political elites in different countries. Although in some 
countries, such as Belgium, Italy and Switzerland, political careers show clearer patterns 
such a path does not apply to some cases such as Kenya, Korea and Turkey since “…the 
European elites must pass through well-ordered career steps and thus more homogeneous 
pathways to parliament.” (Kim and Patterson, 1988: 388), and since the politicians in 
European countries pursue their careers in a relatively more “well-ordered political 
world” (Kim and Patterson, 1988: 340). The case in Turkey is discussed in Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 7 of this dissertation. Before that, following sections provide previous studies 
conducted on political elite and career patterns in Turkey. 
 
5.4. Political Elite in Turkey: Party and Parliamentary Elites 
 
Political parties as organizations consist of individuals working together in various 
positions and levels within them. These individuals may be defined as the building blocks 
of these organizations, as each of them has specified tasks to fulfil. Thus, parties as 
organizations are affected by the characteristics of the individuals who work for them.  
Political party elites -both in local and national levels- occupy positions which are 
provided by certain decision-making power, and thus, their acts and attitudes would 
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influence parties’ internal functions and relationship with other organizations (see Uysal 
and Topak, 2010: 12). This is also applicable for the interactions between the parties and 
the constituency. Hence, explaining who occupies those positions, or more specifically, 
revealing the characteristics of the party elite is quite an important task to fully understand 
politics. 
A number of scholars have analyzed party elites in Turkey with specific reference to local 
party bosses (Tachau, 1973; Frey, 1975; Çarkoğlu, 2000; Uysal and Topak, 2010; 
Kocapınar, 2018). More specifically, Tachau (1973) focus on biographical information 
of provincial party members in Turkey with regard to their age, place of birth, occupation 
and education which are helpful variables to reveal social changes between generation 
with regard to recruitment, social mobility, social diversification and modernization 
respectively. In her study conducted between 1977 and 1980, Ayata (1992) examined and 
explained the CHP’s party structure and political stance by analyzing the attributes of 
delegates, members and chairpersons of the party. A similar study was conducted in the 
1990s which includes above-mentioned variables as well as birth place of fathers of the 
party bosses, gender, years spent in the party and candidacy to other public office 
(Çarkoğlu et al., 2000). A relatively recent study also examines the socioeconomic 
backgrounds of local party elites by focusing on similar variables and by conducting in-
depth interviews with those political actors of relevant parties in Turkey (Uysal and 
Topak, 2010). All these studies provide an examination of party elite in Turkey, and 
explain party organizations in different time periods.  
Compared to party elites, parliamentary elites occupy a broader space in the literature of 
political elites’ studies in Turkey. One of the most prominent studies on legislative elite 
in the country has been Frey’s (1965) The Turkish Political Elite, in which he examined 
the characteristics of MPs who served between 1920 and 1957. Similar variables 
indicated above such as age, education, birth place and occupational backgrounds are 
used in his study to reveal the composition in the parliament. Not only the socioeconomic 
characteristics of political elite, but also the consequences of those were examined in this 
study. For example, both Tachau (1973) and Frey (1970) linked education levels of the 
political elite to modernization levels of politics. In order to understand who can occupy 
legislative seats, one important feature that Frey (1965) employs is “localism” which 
shows whether a political actor is serving in his or her birth place. Following Frey’s study, 
Tachau (1977) conducted a study with similar variables on parliamentarians in Turkey 
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who got seats as a result of the 1973 General Elections. One of the most significant 
findings in this research is that the 1973 assembly’s composition showed similarities with 
the 1920, 1950 and 1961 assemblies; yet, the level of ideological fragmentation surpassed 
the previous ones. In addition, the composition of MPs showed some changes, especially 
in terms of occupational diversity “with the appearance of sizeable contingents of teachers 
and religionists” (Tachau, 1977: 312). In accordance with Frey’s examination of 
parliamentarians, Şaylan (1976) describes the occupational composition of the legislative 
elite who served from 1961 to 1976 in Turkey; Kışlalı (1976) explains the changes in the 
composition of these political elites between 1920 and 1973 with regard to education, 
gender and age; and Turhan (1991) identifies the alternation of legislative elites from 
1876 to 1980 by analyzing age, education and occupation. Kalaycıoğlu (1995) analyzed 
the Turkish parliamentarians’ “attitudes towards their parties and opponents,” “political 
beliefs and values” and “social backgrounds” in 1984 and in 1988. The author unearthed 
the relationship between the deputies and the constituents regarding clientelistic linkages 
and found that constituency demands from the deputies have been mostly personal ones. 
Studies on parliamentary elites continued through the 2000s as well: Sayarı and Hasanov 
(2008) examine the results of 2007 General Elections and propose that there is a new 
political class of legislative elites; and some other studies analyze how composition of 
legislature alter through time and how this affects political development, power structures 
within parties and representation of different genders (see e.g., Arslan, 2004; Sesli and 
Demir, 2010; Gökçe, 2011). Moreover, studies on ministerial elite provide better 
understanding of top-level political composition in the country, such as Sayarı and Dikici-
Bilgin’s (2011) research focuses on age, gender, education, locality, occupation, length 
of ministerial career, and parliamentary party affiliation of ministers in Turkey. These 
above-mentioned studies provide helpful information about the (changing) patterns of 
party recruitment in political parties, and relationship between social alternation and 
parliamentary composition in Turkey.  
One of the most significant explanations, especially in national political elite studies is 
that there has been a broadening of the political elite in the country specifically after 1950 
(see e.g., Tachau and Godd, 1973). Relying on the personal backgrounds, especially 
occupational and educational characteristics of the MPs served in the TBMM, Frey 
(1965), Dodd (1969) and Tachau and Good (1973) highlighted the visible alternation in 
the composition of the TBMM. More specifically, a considerable change occurred 
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through time with regard to occupational backgrounds of the MPs in the National 
Assembly (Tachau and Good, 1973). 
This composition change in the TBMM was not only measured by the occupational 
backgrounds of the MPs, but also the birth places of the MPs and their localism levels. 
With regard to birth places, Tachau and Good (1973) underlined that large swaths of the 
MPs who served before 1950 were natives of the regions showing the highest levels of 
development, while this picture changed after this period, as large groups of MPs coming 
from less developed regions of the country won seats in the TBMM. For example, “…in 
1943, close to one half were born in the Marmara and Aegean regions as against only 13 
percent from the least developed eastern regions.” while in 1969, 35% of the MPs came 
from eastern regions which are less developed (Tachau and Good, 1973: 555). With such 
changes, the levels of localism which indicated whether an MP is representing a district 
where he or she born increased as the number of MPs born in various regions occupied 
seats in the TBMM (Frey, 1965; Tachau and Good, 1973). Thus, previous studies on 
political elite in Turkey had similar methods to analyze the composition of these elites, 
and the consequences of their composition. 
     
5.5. Political Ambition and Career Patterns in Turkey 
 
Chapter 3 explains various theories of political ambition from static to dynamic, and from 
progressive to regressive ambition of political actors (Schlesinger, 1966; Prewitt and 
Nowlin, 1969; Black, 1972; Soskice et al., 1992; Fox and Lawless, 2005, 2010, 2011; 
Vanlangenakker, 2010; Kerevel, 2013). This Chapter inspects the main determinants and 
consequences of political ambition and career paths in Turkey, scrutinizes the nature and 
commonalities of top political elites, and ends with the case of independent politicians in 
a party-dominated political environment.  
Turkish politics has been defined as party politics throughout time (Tachau, 1973; Sayarı, 
2011). In a political environment lead by political parties, the party recruitment plays a 
major role in the fate of politicians’ careers, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
Nevertheless, even under such conditions, a politician’s ambition is significant for their 
careers. Where is the balance between supply side and demand side? It is clear that the 
salience of party decisions on recruitment process is much higher than the political 
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ambition of individuals. Meaning that, even though a person has political ambition, if he 
or she is not selected or recruited by any political parties, it is quite difficult for that person 
to enter politics. 
Although political ambition theories usually put emphasis on static or progressive 
ambition, it is not always possible for politicians to be re-elected in their current office, 
and not all political actors desire to run for a higher office (Kerevel, 2013: 2). According 
to this argument, non-linear career paths are possible. For example, among Mexican 
federal deputies, less experienced ones are seeking for lower office while higher offices 
are desired by more experienced deputies. Nevertheless, many other factors such as 
electoral rules, candidate selection and clientelistic relations with the voters would affect 
deputies’ decisions for their careers (Kerevel, 2013: 2). To illustrate, one deputy serving 
in national parliament would then decide to run for a lower office such as a mayoral 
position in local politics. Is there such a practice in Turkey? Indeed.  For example, one 
MP served as a deputy and a minister for several years, then ran for mayoral position and 
was elected. Does this mean that mayoral position provides lower salience? Not 
necessarily. It would depend on the relative significance or salience of the office, and, the 
importance of that office may change over time. Mayoral offices experienced this change 
which made them become more influential in politics in Turkey. İncioğlu (2002: 73) 
explains that this change which occurred during the 1970s with the increased migration 
from rural to urban regions resulted in “concentration of voters in urban areas” and 
expansion of the importance of local elections as follows:   
“The growing importance of local elections, especially those concerning 
municipal administrations, is further underscored by the fact that the mayors 
of large metropolises have become more influential in national politics than 
many legislators serving in the parliament in Ankara. In the past, becoming a 
mayor was generally viewed by many as a stepping stone for entry into the 
parliament. Today, aspiring leaders are likely to prefer the top political 
position in a city with millions of inhabitants to serving as a parliamentarian 
in Ankara—especially if the prospects of becoming a cabinet minister or 
entering into the party’s executive organs appear to be limited...” (İncioğlu, 
2002: 73-74). 
In a similar fashion, “…It is sufficient to conclude that governors of New York will 
behave as though they were Presidential candidates while governors of Mississippi or 
South Dakota will not.” (Schlesinger, 1966: 9). A quite similar practice is also observable 
in the Turkish case. Among all the 81 cities in the country, a few of them contain the 
majority of the population, and play an important role in the country’s politics both 
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nationally and locally. İstanbul is the most populous and critical city in Turkey with its 
15 million residents. Although it is not the capital city of the country, it is economically, 
socially and politically significant. Similar to what Schlesinger (1966) underlines, the 
local officials of İstanbul are given at most importance in Turkey.  
It is evident that parties use their candidate lists as strategic tools in electoral competition 
(Ecevit and Kocapınar, 2018). Such power of the party headquarters on the candidate 
selection process shapes the behavior of parliamentary elites to signal that they would 
like to be re-nominated, and shape the career paths of these politicians. For example, 
parliamentary speeches of the MPs seem to be related to the likelihood of being re-
nominated in the next elections (Yıldırım et al., 2017), and vote loss and seat loss in an 
electoral district decreases the continuity of candidate lists in Turkey (Ecevit and 
Kocapınar, 2018). Depending on these, political actors and parties may determine their 
strategies with regard to recruitment and nomination processes. So, if an MP wants to be 
re-nominated, being visible in the parliament may increase his or her chance to fulfil this 
goal. This visibility can be achieved by parliamentary speeches as mentioned above, but 
there can also be other forms of behavior, which, employed by the MPs reveal that they 
would like to be observed by the party leaders, and to signal that they want to be re-
nominated. Kalaycıoğlu (1990: 193) shows that “…a deputy’s unruly legislative conduct 
appears to have boosted his popularity rather than failing to decrease his chances of re-
election. It seems as if unruly legislative behavior has been rationalized by the deputies 
and their constituents alike as symptomatic of uncompromising devotion to the interests 
and ideals of the latter.” Thus, it seems that some political actors even adopt unruly 
behavior to increase their likelihood to be re-nominated.  
Findings on varying political ambition of politicians in turkey are available in the Chapter 
7 of this dissertation. 
 
5.6. Independent Politicians 
 
One important decision of the candidates is whether running on a party ticket or as an 
independent in elections. “Running as an independent candidate may appear to constitute 
an act of courage in an environment in which political parties are the main actors in 
electoral process...” (Turan, 2013: 158). In fact, particularly after 1980, laws in Turkey 
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are prepared so that not too many party groups are formed in the TBMM. Nevertheless, 
especially during the 1990s, the number of parties both run in elections and in parliament 
was not notably low. According to Turan (2013: 163), “if the number of parties increase 
in an election, so the fragmentation increase, then the number of independent candidates 
might increase as well.” However, as he underlines, the data do not justify these 
expectations. So, one cannot observe many independent politicians and candidates in 
Turkey. One reason for this is that the possibilities of being elected are quite different for 
the candidates running on a party ticket and independents (Erdem, 2013:55).  
Nonetheless, independent candidates are not exceptional in the Turkish case; but the way 
many independent candidates running as independents differ from a case where a 
candidate who does not have any membership or affiliation to any party. Since Turkey 
implements a 10% electoral threshold, and since it is not easy for some political parties 
to exceed this threshold, there emerged a practice that such parties would prefer to make 
their candidates to run as independents. Since especially the HADEP, BDP and DTP 
employed this method in order to eliminate the limitations brought by 10 percent 
threshold, many scholars argued that such independent candidates should be 
differentiated from the ones who do not have any affiliation with any political parties, and 
run on their own. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
ELITE RECRUITMENT AND POLITICAL AMBITION BY EMPIRICS: THE 
TURKISH CASE 
 
 
The main research question of this dissertation is “What are the determinants of career 
patterns of political elite in Turkey?”, and in addition to that, there emerge two sub 
research questions. The first one is related to political recruitment patterns and strategies 
in general elections: “Why and how do some individuals become first-ranked candidates 
even though they have never run in general elections prior to their candidacy?” The 
second one is related to political ambition: “Why do some individuals become candidates 
in general elections even though their electability chances are low?” Although these two 
sub questions are mentioned to be related to political recruitment and political ambition 
separately, they are not completely disconnected to each other or mutually exclusive. 
Thus, while explaining these topics, both elite recruitment and political ambition theories 
are useful to mention in the following sections.  
Determinants of political career patterns are not constant and may change over time. For 
example, a parliament may be dominated by legislators whose socioeconomic 
backgrounds are more homogeneous, but that composition may be altered by sociological 
changes in the society, emergence of new relevant parties in the political systems or 
closure of existing parties. Eventually, a change may also occur within the composition 
of party groups in legislature. Examining the composition of legislative elites and 
observing the variance among parties or change over time provide useful insight about a 
country’s politics in general, recruitment patterns of parties and political ambition 
characteristics of those elites. 
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Turkish politics was defined as party politics (Sayarı, 2011), parties are centralist with 
leader-oriented tendencies (Hale, 2002; Ayan, 2010; Kabasakal 2014), and PR system 
with closed party lists is implemented in general elections in the country within the time 
frame examined in this dissertation. One may argue that in a political environment 
dominated by political parties and which implements closed party lists in elections, 
parties do not necessarily give that much importance to the individual candidates’ 
attributes as electors are voting for the party lists as a whole rather than individual 
candidates which eventually decreases the significance of the personal qualities of these 
candidates (see e.g., Carey and Shugart, 1995). Nevertheless, the findings show that even 
under closed party list systems, parties tend to revise their candidate lists especially if 
they lose electoral support and seats in particular districts (Ecevit and Kocapınar, 2018). 
Thus, examining the party strategies in recruitment and nomination processes is still 
noteworthy even under closed party lists systems, and the following sections show that 
parties choose their candidates and party elites strategically. 
With regard to the determinants of political career patterns in Turkey, five hypotheses 
will be tested in this Dissertation in the upcoming pages. The first one is about the effect 
of party ideologies on the composition of legislative elite in the country. First of all, the 
four parties included in the analysis, namely the AKP, CHP, MHP and HDP, are 
representing different ideological stances. The AKP defines itself as a conservative 
democratic party and has significant religious sentiments, the CHP represents the secular 
democratic strand, the MHP has strong Turkish ethnic nationalist sentiments, and the 
HDP is mainly representing Kurdish ethnic nationalist strand. One would expect that 
these ideological differences yield to differing strategies in terms of elite recruitment and 
candidate selection. For example, a political party with strong religious sentiments may 
have more MPs with religious educational background, or a political party which largely 
represent a certain ethnic group may have a considerable group of MPs who can speak 
the mother tongue of the represented. Similarly, parties pursuing liberal economic goals 
may have larger groups of businessmen as their legislative elite while leftist parties may 
have more MPs with labor backgrounds, or left-wing parties such as those internalize 
feminist ideology may have larger groups of women representatives. One reason to argue 
such an effect is that those characteristics hint about ideological stance of the candidates, 
and ideological proximity of those candidates to the parties desired by party selectorate. 
Another reason is that such characteristics may increase the public appeal of those parties, 
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hence party selectorate strategically select those individuals. Regarding these, the first 
hypothesis appears as follows: 
Hypothesis 1a: Ideological differences of parties have impact on the socioeconomic 
composition of their MPs. 
Besides the differences among political parties in terms of their elite recruitment, one may 
also expect to see some commonalities. Many individuals apply to political parties to run 
in elections as candidates. Since the number of candidacy positions are definite, it is not 
possible to nominate all those individuals on party lists. Even though there would be a 
possibility that all the applicants could be chosen, political parties might not select all of 
them since those parties may want to choose candidates with particular qualities or 
attributes. In other words, there should be specific factors which differentiate selected 
candidates from others. For example, a political party may select its candidates among 
those who spend time in any level of the party prior to the elections (see e.g., Fiers and 
Secker, 2007), or close connections to party leadership which may turn into an invited 
candidacy or appointment by those leaders (Koop and Bittner, 2011) may enable 
individuals to run in elections with party tickets. The latter was identified as 
“parachuting” candidacy (Koop and Bittner, 2011) or “parachutists” (Pedersen et al., 
2007) which was usually differentiated from career politicians who have longer 
experience in other offices as well as legislative office. Hence, the former one is about 
individuals who worked in local party branches or occupied positions in party 
headquarters. In other words, those individuals hold “pre-parliamentary party experience” 
(Ohmura et el., 2018). Such individuals who have party experience may have higher 
chance of being re-selected and re-nominated by the respective parties compared to others 
who does not have any such experience. Regarding these, the second hypothesis is as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 1b: Acquiring party experience has a positive effect on re-nomination of the 
MPs in the next elections.37 
Certain attributes of individuals such as legislative experience as well as party experience 
may be important factors for being chosen by political parties to be nominated in general 
elections. Although the number of newcomers (i.e. freshman MPs) is quite high in the 
                                                          
37 The null hypothesis is as follows: 
H1b0: Acquiring party experience has no effect on re-nomination of the MPs in the next elections.  
114 
 
TBMM (see, e.g. Kalaycıoğlu), a number of MPs still serve for multiple terms. One might 
expect that parties reward such MPs by nominating them in electable districts (where the 
party has large swaths of supporters) and candidacy ranks (usually the top ranks). 
Nevertheless, newcomers who do not have any prior legislative experience are also 
nominated by political parties. The reason is that,  
“…parties may also make room on their lists for less accomplished 
candidates, including regional or local politicians, or even outright novices. 
This may give young talent opportunities to demonstrate their political 
acumen, or reward long-serving, but only moderately successful party 
members. The latter strategy serves the office-seeking motivations of party 
loyalists while the former develops the party’s potential to meet broad vote, 
office, and policy goals in the long term…” (Pemstein et al., 2015: 1425).  
 
Thus, it is not surprising to observe that new candidates are nominated in party lists even 
though they did not run in legislative elections or become MPs before. What is surprising 
is to see such newcomers to be ranked first on the party lists.38 Hence it is noteworthy to 
examine the underlying factors which cause to this issue. Then, the question appears as 
“Why and how do some individuals become first-ranked candidates even though they 
have never run in general elections prior to their candidacy?” One reason may be public 
appeal of certain individuals: Political parties may nominate some candidates who can 
mobilize the voters and make the party gain more votes in a specific district regardless of 
these individuals’ former candidacy experience. For example, publicly famous figures 
may be selected by parties; or star candidates may be appointed to party lists by party 
leaders (Koop and Bittner, 2011). If this is the case, those publicly known individuals 
may receive a request or an invitation from a political party -especially from the party 
leadership- to run in elections, even if they do not have any prior political experience or 
candidacy in general elections. There have been a few cases like this in various political 
parties in Turkey by the nomination of film directors, sportsmen, singers and artists; 
however, those individuals were not ranked first on candidate lists (they were though 
ranked in winnable places), and several of them had prior political experience such as 
mayoral candidacy or previously politically active father. Another reason may be 
selecting individuals who have proximity to leaders of the parties or other political 
experience even though they did not run in general elections before. While nominating 
such individuals, parties may prefer to nominate them as first-ranked candidates as a 
                                                          
38 These candidates are defined as first-time first-ranked candidates through this dissertation. 
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reward and guarantee for electability; however, there may still be considerable 
competition for the first ranks as there will be other prominent members of the parties 
who additionally have legislative (candidacy) experience. Thus, there should be another 
explanation for the question above. One would expect that if there is no real or 
considerable competition over first ranks on party lists, individuals with no prior 
candidacy experience may directly occupy those positions. The reason for this argument 
is that being nominated as a first-ranked candidate on a party list does not always translate 
as being rewarded. Depending on the party’s electoral base and success in a given district, 
individuals who are ranked first would have even less chance of electability compared to 
the ones who are nominated in districts with larger voter support even though they are 
not first-ranked candidates on the party list ballots. Under those circumstances, investing 
in politics does not seem to be a rewarding act for those individuals. Hence, there may be 
two important reasons to see first-time first-ranked candidates in electorally flawed 
districts for parties: Individual politicians who previously run in elections in such districts 
may be tempted not to invest to that position anymore, which opens those positions to 
newcomers; or the parties would be inclined to change previously competed candidates 
as they cannot increase the parties’ vote support. Thus, parties strategically choose new 
candidates who have potential public appeal and has the highest chance to contribute to 
boosting the votes of the party. Then, with regard to this first sub research question, the 
following hypothesis occurs: 
Hypothesis 2: Inadequate electoral support (i.e. insufficient vote share to win seats in a 
particular district) for political parties increases the number of first-time first-ranked 
candidates on party lists in general elections. 
Becoming a candidate on party lists in general elections is not an easy task. It requires 
both individuals’ devotion to politics and parties’ decision to select those individuals as 
their candidates. Such a dual decision is repeated in each and every election. Hence, 
occupying a candidacy positions in one election does not automatically result in 
individuals’ being transferred to the candidate list in future elections. This is also 
applicable to the elected individuals, i.e. the MPs. Once elected, not all MPs can make 
the candidate lists in the upcoming elections. That means being elected in one election 
does not necessarily secure the position of those politicians on the party list ballots in the 
next one. Both endogenous and exogenous factors may determine the appearance (or lack 
of it) of an MP’s name on the candidacy lists in the next set of elections. For example, an 
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MP may resign from the party, choose another position (e.g. mayoral positions) or exit 
politics completely (endogenous factors); or the party may not choose to continue with 
that individual as their candidate; or that MP’s position may be annulled by law 
(exogenous factor). Hence, the process of continuing as an MP over several legislative 
terms is a complex one. Besides those, one considerable factor is the leadership change 
in political parties which may shape the continuity of those MPs’ legislative careers. As 
explained in Chapter 4, political parties in Turkey have centralist structures by which the 
leaders of those parties become the most powerful person in the party. Thus, any change 
in leadership position may be accompanied with a change in the composition of 
candidates and MPs of that party. Although leadership change is not easy or common in 
parties in Turkey39, we may still observe a number of cases through 2002 to 2015. 
Regarding this, another hypothesis appears as follows: 
Hypothesis 3a: Party leadership change decreases the continuity of candidates on party 
lists in the general elections following this change.40 
Generally, many candidate nominees or applicants compete to be selected by the parties 
and be nominated on their lists. As indicated above, however, not all candidate nominees 
can achieve this goal. Those who are selected and nominated by the parties become closer 
to their legislative careers. Nevertheless, not all candidates among even the ones selected 
enjoy the same chances of electability on the party lists. Some are nominated on the higher 
ranks or safe positions which show higher likelihood of becoming an MP, while others 
need to compromise to be nominated as lower rank candidates. It is underlined for the 
Hypothesis 2 that first-ranked candidacy may secure electability to a large extent, but 
those candidacy positions are not necessarily winnable positions, especially for the 
candidates in districts with small electoral support for their parties. Nonetheless, 
candidates on those ranks still have possibility to be elected, even if it is a small chance. 
However, the ones who are nominated at the very end of the candidate lists usually do 
not have any chance to be elected even in districts with large swaths of supporters for 
their parties. Only in districts where a political party gain all the seats in previous 
                                                          
39 Details of party leadership change in Turkey are examined and discussed under “Intrainstitutional Ambition in 
Turkey” section in Chapter 7. 
 
40 The null hypothesis is as follows: 
H3a0: Party leadership change has no effect on the continuity of candidates in the elections following this change. 
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elections, all candidates on that party’s list may calculate their likelihood of electability 
as being high. However, there may not be many districts like that for many parties. Then, 
why do some individuals become candidates even though they know that their electability 
chance is quite low?  
Political parties need to fill their candidacy positions to compete in elections; hence, they 
seek for possible candidates who can be placed on their lists. It may not be so difficult for 
political parties to find a sufficient number of candidates with large groups of applicants 
in Turkey. Still, requiring some candidates be on non-winnable positions and asking them 
to invest in campaign process is not an easy process without losing the motivation of those 
candidates. Hence, political parties may compromise with those low rank candidates by 
providing other promotions such as higher offices within the party organization, 
candidacy in local politics or another candidacy in future general elections. Depending of 
those expectations, candidates with low chance of electability may still accept candidacy 
regardless of the chance of electability. In other words, those individuals may believe that 
their investment in a candidacy rank which will not bring success in the current elections 
would bring other opportunities in future elections. Hence, with regard to second sub 
research question mentioned above, the following hypothesis emerges: 
Hypothesis 3b: Candidates who accept to be ranked in non-electable positions expect to 
push their ranks to electable positions over time or be rewarded by other positions in the 
party. 
Analyzing the candidate lists and alternation of candidate ranks furnishes helpful results 
to answer the above-mentioned question and test the Hypothesis 3b. Nevertheless, this 
hypothesis is more about the political ambition of individuals; thus, it requires some 
individual insights. For that reason, relying on the answers of interviewees also provide 
valuable information besides quantitative data. These are examined in Chapter 7.  
As indicated before, the aim of this dissertation is to explain political career patterns of 
political elites in Turkey by detailed analyses of elite recruitment by parties and political 
ambitions of individual politicians. In order to explain political career patterns in the form 
of the above mentioned research questions, socioeconomic backgrounds of political elites 
including age, gender, education, foreign language, localism and occupation; political 
experience backgrounds including served terms in the TBMM, bill initiation and 
committee/commission membership; party experience including local branch 
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membership, chairmanship and women/youth branch memberships; local politics 
experience such as mayoral positions and municipal council membership; civil society 
organizations membership, public office experience, party ideology, district size and 
electoral results in districts were examined. Introduction of this dissertation provided the 
details of data collection, operationalization of variables and methods employed in this 
study. The following sections provide more detailed description and comprehensive 
analysis of the compiled data, and answers to research questions by testing the hypotheses 
listed above. 
 
6.1. Data Analysis and Findings 
 
In order to answer the main research question and test the hypotheses, a unique dataset 
on the socioeconomic backgrounds, legislative experience, party experience, local 
politics experience and civil society experience of the elected MPs between 2002 and 
November 2015 General Elections was created. This dataset (MPs Dataset) consists of 
information on 2,750 MPs served through 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 25th and 26th terms in the 
TBMM.41 To answer the sub research questions, MP Candidate Dataset was compiled in 
addition to MPs Dataset. The total number of MPs in the TBMM has been 550 per each 
election between 2002 and November 2015 General Elections in Turkey. Thus, political 
parties running in the general elections fielded 550 candidates in each election. In 2002, 
2007 and 2011 elections, data were compiled for three political parties namely the AKP, 
CHP and MHP, as the HDP was not formed back then, and a total of 1,650 candidates are 
available for each election. In addition to these three parties, the HDP competed in June 
2015 and November 2015 General Elections, and for these two elections, there are 2,200 
candidates in total for four political parties. Hence, the candidate data compiled from the 
official YSK website and Official Gazette (Resmi Gazete) add up to 9,350 candidates in 
total for five general elections. Although some individuals run in multiple elections as 
candidates and some of them have been elected as MPs more than once, each one of them 
was identified as a unique observation in these datasets. The reason for this is that through 
time, their political experience, legislative experience and several personal attributes such 
as occupation may change, resulting in different observations. For example, one of the 
                                                          
41 22nd Legislative Term corresponds with the period starting with 2002 General Elections, 23rd with 2007, 24th with 
2011, 25th with June 2015 and 26th with November 2015 General Elections. These legislative terms and 
corresponding general elections are used interchangeable through the text. 
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legislative experience variables, namely the total served terms in the TBMM is a 
cumulative one, and changes from one legislative term to another for an individual 
depending on his or her presence in the TBMM as an MP. Thus, the duplicate MP names 
were not removed from the datasets resulting in the above-mentioned numbers.  
The following sub-sections reveal the results of analyzed data. More specifically, 
subsection 6.1.1. explains the determinants of political career patterns of political elite in 
Turkey with specific reference to MPs served in the TBMM. This section provides 
information about the profiles of the MPs with regard to their socioeconomic 
backgrounds, legislative, party, local politics, civil society and public office experiences. 
Moreover, Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b are tested in this section. Following this, 
section 6.1.2. explains why some individuals are nominated as first-ranked candidates 
without any previous candidacy or legislative experience by testing the Hypothesis 2 and 
providing descriptive analysis of the MP candidate data. Finally, section 6.1.3. discusses 
the motivations of the candidates who compromise to be nominated in non-electable 
positions by specific reference to political ambition and tests the Hypothesis 3a and 
Hypothesis 3b. 
 
6.1.1. Determinants of Career Patterns of Political Elite in Turkey 
 
Various studies focused on socioeconomic backgrounds of MPs in order to better 
understand the composition of the legislatures in different countries (see e.g., Norris and 
Lovenduski, 1995; Ballington, 2004; Shomer, 2014; Kernell, 2015; Fox and Lawless 
2005, 2010, 2011) and in Turkey (see e.g. Frey, 1965; Tachau, 1973; Kışlalı, 1976; 
Kalaycıoğlu, 1995; Sayarı and Hasanov, 2008; Sayarı and Dikici-Bilgin, 2011). One of 
the goals of this Dissertation is to expand the scope of the previous research by additional 
variables and by examining the candidates’ attributes more in detail in order to understand 
and explain the political career patterns in the country. “Who are the MPs in Turkey?” 
Answers to this question yield clues about the determinants of political career patterns in 
the country. By the analysis of socioeconomic and political backgrounds of the MPs, one 
may understand which attributes increase the likelihood of becoming legislative elite in 
the country. According to the MPs Data compiled for this Dissertation, it seems that 
political parties show variance among each other with regard to certain characteristics of 
their MPs such as gender, education and knowledge of foreign language, while some 
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other attributes such as age, localism and professions seem to show commonalities among 
parties. Details of such analyses are provided in the following subsections. 
 
6.1.1.1. Age 
 
Many political elite studies examined the age distribution of the politicians in order to 
understand which age groups occupy larger amounts of seats in legislature or other levels 
of political offices. Quandt (1969), for example, proposed two main methods to analyze 
the age distribution of politicians: First one is calculating the portions of political elite by 
an age range of 5 years. In other words, showing the age distribution of the elite for each 
five-year age groups. The second one is simply indicating the average age of the political 
elite. Although the second method provides only a simplistic perspective of average age, 
analyzing the distribution of age groups might yield better understanding to compare 
various groups of political elites, e.g. MPs of different political parties. 
Various levels of political parties provide opportunities for different age groups. For 
example, a young individual may choose to start his or her political career by becoming 
a member of a youth branch of a political party, or an elderly person may decide to enter 
politics as a local party branch member after his or her retirement. For legislative elites, 
legal regulations may put an age limit, thus the analyses should be done taking that issue 
into consideration. In Turkey, eligibility for running as a candidate in general elections 
requires various factors as explained in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. Regarding the age 
regulations, according to the original Article 10 of the current Parliamentary Elections 
Act (Law no: 2839) enacted in 10 June 1983, every Turkish citizen who is 30+ years old 
can be elected as MP. However, this article was amended on 19 October 2006 by lowering 
the minimum age limit to 25. Later, on 25 April 2018, the minimum age limit was further 
lowered to 18 with the Article 8 of Law 7140. However, since this dissertation focuses 
on the time period between 2002 and 2015, this age limit implemented in 2018 is not 
taken into consideration in discussions of the analyses. 
Graph 6.1 shows the average age of all MPs served in corresponding legislative terms 
following the general elections. The lowest average is in the 22nd Legislative Term, and 
the highest comes right after that in the 23rd Legislative Term. It seems that the average 
age of the legislators did not considerably change over time; however, there is still a slight 
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increase. One might expect that lowered minimum required age for legislative candidacy 
between 2002 and 2015 would decrease the overall average age of MPs. Yet, it seems 
that political parties do not necessarily recruit larger numbers of young individuals as 
their legislative candidates.  
One may interpret from this graph that usually middle-aged MPs have been serving in the 
TBMM between 2002 and 2015. Nevertheless, this graph by itself is not sufficient to 
analyze the age distribution and differences (or similarities) among political parties in the 
TBMM.  
Graph 6.1: Average age of MPs in the TBMM (2002-2015) 
 
 
In order to compare political parties, Graph 6.2 provides the age distribution of MPs in 
different parties for the same legislative terms. It seems that the AKP, CHP and MHP 
MPs have a normal distribution with regard to age variable while the HDP has slightly 
different distribution. According to this graph, the number of MPs who fall in 25-34 age 
range is dismally low in almost all parties compared to the total level of MPs in the 
TBMM.    
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Graph 6.2: Age distribution of the MPs by parties (2002-2015) 
 
 
Average age in the TBMM is 49.9 between the 22nd and the 26th legislative terms. 
Nevertheless, not all parties show the same results: Average age of the AKP MPs is 48.7 
between the 22nd and the 26th legislative terms. It is 52.2 for the CHP, 53.0 for the MHP, 
and 46.4 for the HDP in the same time frame. These results show that the HDP, in average, 
had the youngest group of MPs, followed by the AKP. On the other hand, the CHP and 
MHP MPs are older on average. Regardless of these slight differences, broadly 
represented groups in the TBMM coincide with middle to upper age groups in the society. 
Considering the age distribution in Turkey, it may be interpreted that a large group of the 
society who drop in the age range of 20 to 35 are not sufficiently represented in the 
TBMM. 
 
Going into further details, Table 6.1 reveals the minimum (Min), maximum (Max) and 
average (Avg) age of the MPs from different parties in different legislative terms. With 
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regard to maximum age, the CHP seems to tend to select the oldest MPs among others. 
Nevertheless, the number of such MPs is not very high.  
Table 6.1: Minimum, maximum and average age of MPs (2002-2015) 
  2002 2007 2011 Jun-15 Nov-15 
Parties Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg 
AKP 30 69 46.2 30 72 49.3 27 73 48.7 27 73 49.4 29 75 50.1 
CHP 32 78 51.7 39 83 55.0 30 77 53.0 29 77 51.0 29 77 51.0 
MHP N.A. N.A. N.A. 35 77 52.0 42 73 54.0 31 72 53.0 36 72 54.0 
HDP N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 26 72 46.8 26 72 46.0 
Note: Independent candidates are not included in this calculation. 
 
Results on minimum age provide better insights about the recruitment strategies of 
political parties. Total number of MPs who are either 30 years old or younger between 
200242 and November 2015 is 31 which is dismally low compared to total number of 
MPs. Many of these MPs are either from the AKP or the HDP, but a small group also 
appears in the CHP. Unique observations in the data show that only one MP (from the 
HDP) was 26 years old during the respective election year, and two MPs (both from the 
AKP) were 27 years old when they were elected. Four MPs from the CHP were either 29 
or 30 years old when they were elected to legislative office during the time period 
analyzed in this Dissertation. As indicated above, considering the lowered required 
minimum age limit through time, one might expect that higher numbers of young MPs to 
appear in the TBMM. However, the results imply that the strategies of the parties 
generally revolve around middle-aged individuals rather than youngsters. Even if parties 
select young individuals as their candidates, they may be placing those in non-electable 
positions which eventually hinder those to occupy seats in the National Assembly. These 
findings also show that the parties tend to stick with relatively more experienced43 
individuals as their candidates and MPs. Hence, all in all, middle aged group dominated 
the TBMM between 2002 and 2015. 
 
 
                                                          
42 Since the minimum required age limit was 30+ in 2002, the calculation includes only those who were 30 years old 
when they are elected in 2002 General Elections. 
 
43 Experience does not necessarily mean political experience here. Older individuals may also be preferred by the 
parties as they somehow show their life experiences with regard to their occupations, success in other areas rather 
than politics, or membership to other organizations.  
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6.1.1.2. Localism 
 
Birth places of political elite have been a significant variable to analyze starting from Frey 
(1965)’s prominent work on political elite in Turkey. Localism refers to a case that a 
political actor was born in the district that he or she is serving in or representing. For 
example, if large groups of MPs were born in the electoral districts that they represent, 
we may say that there is high localism in those districts. In other words, if the percentages 
of the MPs born in the same constituency from where they are elected increases, the 
localism increases as well. Results revealed that localism has been high in the country 
both in the case of party elite and legislative elite. To illustrate, Tachau (1973) found that 
87 out of 100 party elite were born either in the same province or the region where they 
serve. Similarly, on average, 79 percent of the local party chairpersons of the AKP and 
CHP served through 2012 were categorized as locally born which shows high localism 
(Kocapınar, 2018). The reason for calculating localism is to infer whether those 
politicians have close connections to their districts. Besides party elite’s localism, 
legislative elite’s birth places have been examined by various scholars. 
One of the first and most prominent scholars who calculated and examined localism of 
MPs in Turkey was Frey, and he underlined the clear changes in localism over time as 
follows: 
“…the incidence of deputies born in their constituencies seems to reflect quite 
well the tendencies toward “localism,” that is, having deep roots in the 
constituency and commitment to its interests and views. In the First 
Assembly, the incidence of “localism” was high. Over three-fifths of all 
deputies had been born in the provinces they represented. With the Kemalist 
consolidation of power, however, localism declined rather precipitously, 
reaching a nadir of 34 percent in the Fifth Assembly, during which Atatürk 
died. In the İnönü era it rose somewhat and then sharply accelerated with the 
advent of the multiparty system. That rise was interrupted in the Thirteenth 
Assembly, when a secure victory was gained by the Justice Party. But in the 
Fourteenth Assembly, “localism” climbed to a new high. Over three-quarters 
of all deputies were born in the provinces they represented. A major 
consequence of competitive party politics has apparently been strong pressure 
toward greater representation of local interests among elected political 
leaders.” (Frey, 1975: 57). 
 
Hence, localism increased over time in Turkey inferring that political parties tend to 
select their candidates who are children of their towns, who may have close connections 
with the electorate in the city or who know their districts well. This increasing trend of 
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localism were later revealed by other scholars as well which also coincide with the results 
of this dissertation. It was underlined that localism is notably high in many districts both 
in the case of MPs (Frey, 1975) and local party elites (see, e.g. Çarkoğlu et al., 2000; 
Kocapınar, 2018). Nevertheless, there have been some differences among cities: “the 
more populous and well developed provinces of the West and South have lower 
proportions of locally born politicians” (Tachau, 1973: 278) and hence, migrant receiving 
cities have low localism compared to migrant sending ones (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000). For 
example, by a further analysis of political actors’ fathers’ birth places, it was explained 
that metropolitan areas such as Marmara, Ege and Akdeniz regions may show lower 
localism of political elite as these are migrant receiving places, while Karadeniz, 
Southeast Anatolia and East Anatolia regions are the migrant-sending places and have 
more party elite serving in the cities that they were born (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000: 60-61). 
Similarly, it was revealed that the lowest localism of local party elites was in migrant 
receiving cities such as İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir, Bursa and Kocaeli, localism has been 
considerably high even in those cities with at least 50% localism (Kocapınar, 2018). Data 
analyzed in this dissertation also show similar patterns with regard to localism of the 
MPs.   
 
Table 6.2: Localism of the MPs by parties (2002-2015) 
Party 
Local 
Born (%) 
Local 
Resident (%) 
Non-Local 
born (%) Total 
AKP 68 22 10 100 
CHP 60 27 13 100 
MHP 60 21 18 100 
HDP 47 35 18 100 
 
Table 6.2 shows localism of the MPs by parties. In this table, local born category shows 
the MPs who were born in the electoral districts where they are elected while non-local 
born category shows the ones who were born in another district rather than the one they 
represent. Nevertheless, measuring localism with only these two categories may not be 
sufficient, as it was also referred as to have close connections or deep roots in the 
constituency (Frey, 1975). Even though some MPs were born in different provinces rather 
than their constituencies, they have been living in those constituencies where they entered 
the election process, which enables them to construct a linkage with the population of that 
district. Hence, in addition to local-born category, a local resident category was also 
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calculated to show the percentages of the MPs who have spent long years in the 
constituencies they represent.44 By the help of this addition, it is easier the recognize the 
strategies of the parties while selecting their MP candidates.  
When we look at only the local born category, localism is high especially for the AKP, 
CHP and MHP. However, if we take both local born and local resident categories into 
consideration, we observe high localism for all parties. It seems that most of the parties 
tend to select MP candidates (and eventually MPs) who have public appeal, know the 
district well, or are publicly known in the constituency. Among those, the HDP seems to 
be an interesting case regarding the category of local born as it has the lowest percentage 
of MPs who drop in this group. MPs of the HDP who were neither born in nor become a 
resident of districts are from Adana, Ağrı, Ankara, Antalya, Bursa, Diyarbakır, İstanbul 
(all), İzmir, Mardin, Şanlıurfa, Van, Batman and Siirt. Many of these districts are either 
in the Southeast Anatolia or East Anatolia regions which provide large swaths of 
supporters of the HDP. Moreover, those MPs were born in electoral districts which are 
very close to the ones from where they are elected. Hence, one may interpret that these 
MPs were also publicly known figures in their constituencies.  
Overall, no dramatic differences are observable among parties with regard to localism. 
Additionally, high localism patterns in the country seem to continue. Hence, it may be 
argued that political parties strategically select their candidates regarding their localism. 
As indicated in Chapter 4 of the dissertation, political parties previously recruited the 
“members of notable families and faction leaders who were able to use their networks of 
clientelist relationships with the peasants to mobilize electoral support” (Sayarı, 2011: 
86-87). Today, political elites’ proximity to the electorate still seems to be a significant 
factor for political parties even if they are not necessarily from notable families. A more 
detailed examination of this practice is available in Chapter 7 of this dissertation. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
44 Those who were elected as MPs in particular districts (even though they were not born there) in previous elections 
are also included in local residents’ category. 
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6.1.1.3. Education and foreign language 
 
Data reveal that political parties do not show dramatic differences with regard to 
education levels (i.e. primary school, high school or university) of their MPs in the 
TBMM. More specifically, large swaths of MPs are university graduates in each 
legislative term analyzed in this Dissertation.  
Table 6.3: Number of MPs with regard to education level (2002-2015) 
Education Level AKP CHP MHP HDP Independent Total 
Primary School Graduate 7 9 1 6 1 24 
High School Graduate 71 64 22 39 22 218 
University Graduate 1528 618 221 94 47 2508 
Total 1606 691 244 139 70 2750 
 
As shown in Table 6.3 and Graph 6.3, primary school graduates compose the smallest 
group for each party, while the group of high school graduates is slightly larger than group 
of primary school graduates. For the AKP, CHP and MHP, university graduates compose 
at least 89 percent of all the MPs of those parties. Whereas, the HDP seems to have the 
lowest percentage of university graduates while recruiting more high school graduates. 
Nonetheless, university graduates still compose the largest group in this party, which is 
in line with the other parties.  
Graph 6.3: Percentages of Education Levels of MPs (2002-2015) 
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Under the light of these results, it is possible to argue that the TBMM contains a 
considerably large group of university graduates in general. Hence, differentiating parties 
from each other is not that easy with regard to education levels of the MPs. Nevertheless, 
when we further analyze the details of the education attainment, there emerge significant 
differences among parties especially in terms of religious education and foreign language 
knowledge. Along with other personal attributes such as gender, age, education and 
occupation, the knowledge of foreign languages also provides some insights about the 
characteristics of MPs from different parties. For example, an examination of the foreign 
languages may give useful clues about the ideologies of parties (see e.g. Sayarı and 
Hasanov, 2008). Table 6.4, Graphs 6.4-6.6 and Figure 6.1 provide insights about how 
parties’ MP compositions differ from each other depending on their ideological stance. 
Increased electoral support of Islamist parties in Turkey in the recent times was explained 
in Chapter 4. Two important indicators of Islamic values and attributes of individuals in 
political elite studies have been Islamic education and knowledge of Arabic language. 
For example, it was found for the 23rd Legislative Term deputies that “…73 out of 341 
AKP deputies know Arabic, presumably as a result of their training at the Imam-Hatip 
schools.” (Sayarı and Hasanov, 2008: 345). Hence, analyzing those attributes is 
noteworthy to understand the variance among political parties. Table 6.4 shows the 
number of MPs who attended Islamic religious education schools including primary 
schools, high schools and university education (e.g. İlahiyat Fakültesi) between 2002 and 
2015.  
Table 6.4: MPs and religious education backgrounds (2002-2015) 
Religious 
Education AKP CHP MHP HDP Independent Total 
Yes 260 6 7 6 0 279 
No 774 675 228 128 68 1873 
N.A. 572 10 9 5 2 598 
Total 1606 691 244 139 70 2750 
 
These data rely on the biographies of the MPs, and some MPs only indicate their 
education levels but do not provide details about what kind of school they had attended. 
Thus, data have some limitations at this point since no information is available for 598 
out of 2750 MPs regarding their educational institutions. Still, the data provide insights 
as it compose a larger group for which those details are available. It is observed that the 
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AKP has the largest group of MPs with Islamic religious education background. Although 
we observe similar patterns in other parties, the numbers are quite low. Besides Islamic 
education background, Arabic Language knowledge which is closely related to Islamic 
education may also provide information about ideological differences among parties. 
Graph 6.4: Number of MPs with Arabic language knowledge (2002-2015) 
 
Graph 6.4 shows the change in number of MPs who speak Arabic as a foreign language 
by parties over five national elections as well as the increasing trend for the AKP as shown 
with dotted line. It is clear that the AKP MPs contain a larger group compared to the other 
MPs.  
Number of MPs who indicated in their biographies that they both have religious education 
and Arabic Language knowledge is 188 out of available observations. Some MPs only 
indicated that they attended Islamic religious schools, yet they did not mention knowledge 
of Arabic. Even though Islamic religious education goes hand in hand with Arabic 
language, it seems that not all MPs with such education speak Arabic. Thus, religious 
education background was not automatically considered as an indicator of knowledge of 
Arabic in the dataset.  
Although the number of MPs who attended religious schools and can speak Arabic is 
relatively low compared to the ones who indicate only religious education (but no 
knowledge of Arabic) background, it is even lower compared to the ones who indicated 
that they know Arabic. More specifically, 429 MPs indicated in their biographies that 
they know Arabic. Figure 6.1 shows the total number of MPs with regard to this issue. It 
is clear that the group of MPs who speak Arabic is larger than the one with religious 
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education background. One may argue that Arabic Language knowledge can be identified 
as a proxy for religious education, yet, since the MPs do not indicate this in their 
biographies, it is not regarded like that in this dissertation. 
Figure 6.1: Number of MPs with 
religious education background and 
Arabic language knowledge 
 
Moreover, knowledge of Arabic Language seems to have different importance for 
different parties. While the AKP MPs who indicate their foreign language knowledge as 
Arabic generally have Islamic education, the HDP and CHP members indicating Arabic 
language as their foreign language are usually from the districts in which Arabic can be 
spoken among residents. Hence, it may be an indication of selecting MPs with public 
appeal rather than an ideological strategy of candidate selection for the latter.  
In addition to the fact that parties differ from each other with regard to Arabic language 
knowledge of their MPs; and increased number of MPs who can speak Arabic in the 
TBMM, trend in religious education is also noteworthy. Graph 6.5 shows the increasing 
trend of the number of MPs with religious education background (dotted line in the graph 
is the trend line). 
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Graph 6.5: Number of MPs with religious education background (2002-2015) 
 
It is observable that the number of MPs with religious education background increased 
over time between 2002 and 2015. Although these numbers are only a small portion of 
all the MPs, this increasing trend may show that more individuals with religious education 
background seem to be winning seats in the TBMM compared to past legislative terms.  
That increasing trend is not only observable for the MPs who attended religious schools. 
Change in the number of MPs who speak Kurdish also provide insights about how the 
composition of the TBMM changed with regard to language proficiency.  
Graph 6.6: Number of MPs with Kurdish language knowledge (2002-2015) 
 
It is clear that the number of MPs proficient in Kurdish increased over time from 2002 to 
November 2015. It reached its peak level in 2015, and data show that a large portion of 
those MPs are from the HDP. Hence, it can be interpreted that the presence of the HDP 
in the TBMM increased the number of MPs who speak Kurdish. 
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Overall, one may argue that ideological stance of political parties seems to affect their 
MPs composition with regard to educational backgrounds and foreign language 
knowledge in the TBMM. 
 
6.1.1.4. Gender 
 
In many early books and articles written on elite recruitment and political careers, 
scholars tend to refer politicians as men (see e.g., Weber, 1958; Schlesinger, 1966). This 
was not a coincidence as politics has been dominated by men both in local and national 
levels. However, starting especially from early 1990s, many studies conducted 
specifically on political careers of women in order to examine the politicians other than 
men. The results usually indicated the presence of gender gap both in local politics and 
national politics in various countries (see e.g., Fox and Lawless, 2010; Matthews, 2014; 
Butler and Preece, 2016). It is revealed that the political parties tend to filter women on 
their candidate lists which dramatically lowers the likelihood of the women to be elected 
(Kunovich and Paxton, 2005; Yıldırım and Kocapınar, 2018). Even some women with 
similar qualifications with their male counterparts seem to encounter the problem of being 
ignored in nomination processes to a broad extent even in most consolidated democracies: 
“Highly qualified and politically well-connected women from both major 
political parties are less likely than similarly situated men to be recruited to 
run for public office by all types of political actors … women’s recruitment 
disadvantage depresses their political ambition and ultimately hinders their 
emergence as candidates.” (Fox and Lawless, 2010: 310). 
Gender gap in local and national level politics is observable in Turkey as well. In other 
words, gender distribution among MPs is dispersed in Turkey like in many other countries 
examined by various scholars (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Rallings et al., 2008; Fox 
and Lawless, 2010). One solution to eliminate gender gap in politics has been employing 
gender quotas. Although there is no legally binding rule for gender quotas for national or 
local candidates in elections in Turkey, the CHP and HDP implement quotas as stated in 
their party by-laws as explained in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.  
Table 6.5 shows the gender distribution of MPs by parties between 2002 and 2015. It is 
clear that gender gap appears in favor of male MPs, and three out of four political parties 
dominantly have men as their legislative elite. Only one political party, namely the HDP, 
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shows a difference from the others with a relatively larger share of female MPs which is 
32 percent in total between 2002 and 2015.   
Table 6.5: Gender distribution of MPs in the TBMM (2002-2015) 
Party Male Male (%) Female Female (%) Total 
AKP 1437 89 169 11 1606 
CHP 617 89 74 11 691 
MHP 232 95 12 5 244 
HDP 139 68 66 32 205 
Total 2423 88 321 12  2746 
Note: The total number of MPs does not add up to 2750 as there are independent 
candidates elected through 2002 and 2015 general elections. Moreover, the HDP 
did not run as a party in elections prior to June 2015, however, there were 
independent candidates who were affiliated with the HDP’s predecessors, and these 
independent candidates are also added to the HDP in calculations. 
 
Although women representatives are still a small group in the TBMM, the percentages of 
nominated female candidates and elected women show an increasing trend over time even 
though there emerged a slight decline in November 2015 as shown in Graph 6.7. 
Graph 6.7: Percentage of female MPs in the TBMM over elections (2002-2015) 
 
Thus, one may argue that more women started to occupy seats in the TBMM from 2002 to 
2015; however, this increase is still far away from closing the gender gap in the country. 
In order to better understand the strategies of parties on candidate selection with regard to 
gender, analyzing the candidate lists and number of women on those may provide useful 
insights. As Table 6.6 indicates, although the percentages of female candidates and elected 
women varied between 5 percent (AKP) to 8 percent (CHP) and 3 percent (AKP) to 5 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
2002 2007 2011 Jun-15 Nov-15
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
F
em
al
e 
M
P
s
General Elections
Female MPs
Linear (Female MPs)
134 
 
percent (CHP) respectively in 2002 General Elections, parties tend to include more women 
on their candidate lists recently. 
Table 6.6: Percentages of women candidates and elected MPs by Parties (2002 - 2015)* 
Election Year Nominated Women Candidates (%) Elected Women MPs (%) 
  AKP CHP MHP HDP AKP CHP MHP HDP 
2002 5 8 N.A. N.A. 3 5 N.A. N.A. 
2007 12 10 7 N.A. 9 9 1 N.A. 
2011 14 18 12 N.A. 14 13 6 N.A. 
2015 (J) 18 19 12 43 17 16 5 40 
2015 (N) 13 21 13 38 11 16 8 39 
Total 12 15 11 40 10 11 4 40 
Grand Total 16% 11% 
*This table does not include the independent candidates affiliated with the predecessors of the HDP who had 
run in elections prior to 2015. 
 
Nevertheless, the percentage of women on those lists reveals that the gender gap is far from 
being closed in parallel to the previous analysis of MPs. Compared to the AKP, CHP and 
MHP, the HDP seems to be the one with the highest share of the females on the party list 
which consequently increases the percentage of women MPs elected from this party, an 
also in the composition of the TBMM. Graph 6.8 further illustrates the difference on the 
party list with regard to the gender of candidates. 
Graph 6.8: Percentages of female candidates on Party Lists (2002-2015) 
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the candidates in elections shall be women. Similarly, according to the CHP by-laws, there 
are candidacy positions reserved specifically for women and young people in local 
elections (municipal council positions). The percentages of women candidates and elected 
MPs reveal that those regulations in the by-laws have positive affect on increasing the 
portions of women and decreasing the gender gap in national politics. The HDP has the 
largest portion of nominated women with 43 percent in June 2015 and 38 percent in 
November 2015 General Elections. It is followed by the CHP which increased its portion 
of nominated candidates through time from 8 percent in 2002 to 21 percent in November 
2015; then comes the AKP with a similar trend to the CHP, but with a drop in November 
2015. The MHP nominates relatively less women on their candidate lists compared to 
others.  
Eventually, the percentages of elected women are in line with the nomination. However, it 
seems that the HDP has the highest proportionality between nominated and elected women 
percentages while the percentages are lower compared to nomination in other parties. This 
may be a signal of the women candidates’ ranking on the party lists. If women are 
nominated in lower ranks rather than top ranks, or if they are generally nominated in non-
electable positions (e.g. in districts with no sufficient electoral support for parties), then 
even though the women are selected as candidates, they may not make to the TBMM. 
 
6.1.1.5. Occupation 
 
Particular occupational backgrounds which provide political elite with certain amount of 
wealth (for spending to cover their party expenses and election campaigns) and flexible 
working hours have been identified as quite important factors to have more chances to be 
recruited and be sustainable in politics by various political actors (Norris and Lovenduski, 
1993; Güneş-Ayata, 1994; Uysal and Topak, 2010). Hence, by analyzing the occupational 
backgrounds of the political elite, answers can be found for the questions of what type of 
occupations do we observe in different parties, and whether there is any clear pattern for 
political parties to select one occupational group over the others and identify whether the 
party elites believe that certain jobs ease developing political careers.  
For example, with regard to legislative recruitment strategies in the UK, it was explained 
that “Observers of political elites have commonly noted that MPs tend to be drawn from 
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the better educated and more affluent sectors of society, with few women or racial 
minorities.” (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995: 93). Consequently, parliaments have been 
thought to be unrepresentative with regard to particular groups in the societies, as some 
others are overrepresented. Regarding this, one important case is occupational 
backgrounds. Previous studies underlined that large groups of legislative elite have some 
particular occupations such as being teachers or lawyers in various countries (see e.g., 
Tachau, 1977; Norris, 1997; Cotta and Best, 2000).  In a similar vein, it seems that lawyers 
consist the largest group within the TBMM in different legislative terms and overall 
between 2007 and 2015 in Turkey. Table 6.7 below shows the number of MPs in different 
occupational categories.  
Composition of MPs’ occupational backgrounds has not stayed unchanged over time in 
Turkey. For example, certain professions which dominated the National Assembly lost 
their salience especially after 1950:  
“The broadening of the Turkish political elite from 1950 on is indicated by 
data on the socioeconomic and political backgrounds of Members of 
Parliament. Prior to 1950, the largest single occupational group in the 
Parliament consisted of civilian government officials, who accounted for 20-
25 percent of the membership. Military officials were the second largest 
group with 15-20 percent of the members, followed in turn by law (10-15 
percent), commerce, trade, and banking (10-15 percent), and education (5-10 
percent). After 1950, the largest single grouping was made up of lawyers (27-
32 percent), followed by trade, commerce, and banking (16-20 percent); civil 
servants dropped below 10 percent, as did military officers (the latter two 
categories combined accounted for only 16 percent of the members in 1961 
and 1965, and less than that in other sessions). Inasmuch as the civil and 
military bureaucracy represents the old, established Ottoman-Turkish elite, 
the decline in the proportion of parliamentary deputies with this type of 
background is notable.” (Tachau and Good, 1973: 554). 
 
Even broadened alternation is observable in recent legislative terms in the country as well. 
Data compiled for this Dissertation show that the percentage of MPs who formerly served 
as military officers is quite low which reveals the continued decline in the number of such 
MPs as formerly underlined by Tachau and Godd (1973). Moreover, a decline is also 
observable in civilian government officials category. For example, although MPs who 
occupied public offices are still observable, they no longer compose the largest group as 
in pre-1950 period. Indeed, between 2007 and 2015, the most crowded profession group 
137 
 
is composed of lawyers; then engineers/architects, academicians, medical doctors and 
businessmen dominated the most seats in the TBMM. 
Table 6.7: Distribution of occupational categories in the TBMM (2007-2015) 
Occupation Number of MPs Percentages (%) 
Lawyer / Legal Expert (Hukukçu) 410 18.6 
Engineer / Architect 302 13.7 
Academician 215 9.8 
Medical Doctor 170 7.7 
Businessman/Trader 142 6.5 
Executive 112 5.1 
Economist 108 4.9 
Teacher / Instructor 102 4.6 
Self-employed 76 3.5 
Public Office (including bureaucrats, 
diplomats and governors) 71 3.2 
Pharmacist / Dentist / Veterinarian 61 2.8 
Financial Advisor / Accountant 60 2.7 
Journalist 49 2.2 
Legislative Expert 43 2.0 
Others 211 9.6 
N.A. 68 3.1 
TOTAL 2200 100 
 
Alternation in the percentages of professional backgrounds of the MPs also brought more 
heterogeneous composition of occupations in the TBMM. In other words, today, the 
occupational backgrounds of the MPs in the TBMM is more diversified.  
Although different political parties seem to recruit varying numbers of individuals from 
various professions, above mentioned most numerous groups (as seen in Table 6.7) seem 
to dominate in each of those parties with slight differences. For example, lawyers, 
engineers and academicians are respectively the largest top three profession groups in the 
AKP; while it is lawyers, medical doctors and engineers in the CHP; academicians, 
engineers, medical doctors in the MHP; and self-employed, lawyers and engineers in the 
HDP respectively. All in all, today lawyers seem to be a significant profession group for 
all political parties. 
Above mentioned results (examined through age, education, foreign language, gender and 
occupation variables) show socioeconomic composition of the TBMM in general and 
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party groups in details. With regard to socioeconomic backgrounds of the MPs, the 
following hypothesis was indicated in the beginning of this chapter: 
- Hypothesis 1a: Ideological differences of parties have impact on the 
socioeconomic composition of their MPs. 
Overall, above mentioned results support Hypothesis 1.a, but partially. Although all 
parties show somewhat similar composition about age and localism characteristics of the 
MPs, a clear difference among parties’ MP composition is observable especially with 
regard to gender, education and knowledge of foreign language. It seems that parties 
positioned more on the left of the ideological spectrum, namely the CHP and HDP tend 
to recruit and nominate more females in general elections in the country, and eventually 
have larger groups of female MPs; whereas parties on the right strand namely the AKP 
and MHP recruits less women compared to them. Moreover, parties with Islamic 
sentiments (e.g. the AKP) seem to recruit more MPs with Islamic religious education 
background while the number of such MPs is dismally low in other political parties. 
Lastly, party ideologies seem to affect the composition of MPs with regard to knowledge 
of foreign language. While parties with Islamic sentiments contains more MPs who can 
speak Arabic, parties with particular ethnic sentiments have more MPs who can speak the 
mother tongue of this ethnic group. For example, the HDP has the highest portion of the 
MPs who speak Kurdish whereas it is not applicable for the MHP which pursues ethnic 
Turkish sentiments.  
Besides socioeconomic background of the MPs, political experience also delivers useful 
information about the determinants of career patterns of political elite in Turkey. The 
following section is dedicated to the analysis of such attributes.   
 
6.1.1.6. Party, civil society organizations, public office and local politics 
experiences of MPs 
 
Besides age, localism, education and foreign language attributes, gender and occupation, 
political experience is also vital to understand who can become members of the legislative 
elite in a country. Data on Turkey reveal that not many MPs are coming from local party 
offices, but rather, a significant portion of them are starting from the higher levels of party 
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offices, i.e. positions at party headquarters. Table 6.8 shows the percentages of MPs 
having prior particular experiences.  
Table 6.8: Party, civil society organizations and public office experiences of MPs 
  
Local Party Organizations  
(%) 
Party Headquarters 
(%) 
Other Organizations 
(%) 
Party 
Women or 
Youth 
Branch 
Membership 
District 
Branch 
Member 
District 
Chairperson 
Provincial 
Branch 
Member 
Provincial 
Chairperson 
Headquarter 
Membership 
Proximity 
to Leaders 
Membership to 
Civil Society 
Organizations 
Public 
Office 
AKP 7 4 6 15 14 41 45 57 31 
CHP 4 6 6 10 9 32 38 62 30 
MHP 16 1 2 4 7 37 40 40 47 
HDP 3 0 4 6 5 44 49 63 6 
 
It seems that many MPs have membership in civil society organizations both prior to and 
during their legislative terms. In that regard, portion of MPs having membership to civil 
society organizations exceeds the portion of MPs having local party organization 
experience. Additionally, many MPs indicated in their biographies that they are members 
of multiple civil society organizations. So, some of the MPs did not hold a local party 
chair or other positions while they have been members -especially executive members- 
of various civil society organizations. This shows that the networks of those individuals 
within those organizations may ease their connectivity with parties and their chances to 
become MPs may be positively affected. One reason to argue this is that level of civil 
society membership in Turkey is not high. Although many civil society organizations are 
formed in the country, number of members of these organizations is less than 10 percent 
of the adult population of Turkey (Kalaycıoğlu, 2016: 232). Under these circumstances, 
members of those civil society organizations may be identified as small networks which 
may increase their chances to connect with other MPs, higher level party officials or 
prominent members of the parties who may have an influence in the candidate selection 
process.  
Another important issue interpreted from the Table 6.8 is that one third of the MPs of the 
AKP and CHP occupied public office (or gained bureaucratic experience) prior to their 
legislative careers. The portion of such individuals are even higher among the MHP 
members with 47 percent. Nevertheless, it seems that the HDP MPs differ from others by 
the lowest level of public office experience. For many of the HDP MPs, having party 
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headquarter experience or civil society organization membership seem to be more 
common attributes rather than holding a local or national public office.  
Besides above-mentioned attributes, local politics experience (mayoral positions and 
municipal council membership) may also give important clues about political career 
patterns. MPs Data show that MPs who formerly hold mayoral positions (5 percent in 
total) or municipal council membership (9.7 percent in total) seem to compose a small 
group, yet it is still important to see the presence of this group which shows a progressive 
ambition among those individuals from local to national level.45 Nevertheless, the results 
suggest that individuals with local politics career seem to continue in local level rather 
than having a transition to national level politics in future.  
For all the parties analyzed in this Dissertation, MPs’ party headquarter experience and 
proximity to the party leadership seem to be a significant factor. Especially for the AKP 
and HDP, portion of MPs who served in the party headquarters and who had closer 
relations with the party leaders is noteworthy. This is also true for the CHP and MHP; 
however, the portion of such MPs in these parties are smaller compared the AKP and 
HDP.  
Figure 6.2: Portions of MPs with specific experience   
 
Figure 6.2 is an inverted pyramid showing the portions of MPs with specific experience 
without party differentiation. Although the portions are different from one party to 
                                                          
45 However, data also show that some individuals prefer to become mayors even if they are already elected as MPs, 
and they resign from their legislative offices. Details of these cases are discussed in Chapter 7 of this Dissertation. 
MPs with civil society organizations experience 
MPs with party headquarters experience and/or proximity to 
leadership 
MPs with public office experience
MPs with provincial party branch 
experience
Local politics experience
MPs with district party  
branch experience
MPs with women or 
youth branch 
experience
% decreases as 
arrow goes down 
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another, this depiction emerges when we analyze all MPs served between 2002 and 2015. 
It seems that a considerable amount of the MPs has civil society organization experience 
while little do have district party branch experience in general. Nevertheless, having party 
experience seem to play important roles in political career of the MPs. 
Duration of party membership of MPs (including local and national party office 
experience) in Turkey has been analyzed by several scholars (see e.g., Tachau and Good, 
1973; Gençkaya, 2000). The findings of such studies suggest that not many MPs have 
local party experience; however, holding an office in party headquarters seem to be 
playing an important role in becoming MPs.  
“…neither appointive offices nor local elective offices nor local party offices 
have been very important as channels of recruitment to the national political 
elite. This conclusion is surprising in view of the evidence of increasing 
localism and deconcentration of politics in the 1950s and 1960s. This 
apparent paradox suggests that, in fact, local party functionaries and locally 
elected officials are not very powerful or prominent and that these positions 
are often bypassed by those on the way up the ladder of political success. This 
is not to say that local party organizations play no significant role, nor that 
the individuals involved have no political ambitions. It is more likely either 
that large numbers of these people were unsuccessful in their bids, or that they 
simply failed to report this aspect of their careers after election. On the other 
hand, it is clear from other evidence that those who aspire to national political 
office expend great efforts to dominate or at least to have a voice in the 
provincial party organizations. Rather than staffing the organizations 
themselves, however, they tend to work through supporters, clients, or 
hangers-on upon whom they rely to protect and enhance their political career” 
(Tachau and Good, 1973; 556). 
This argument is still applicable to the recent political career paths in the country once 
the data is analyzed with regard to the local party experience of the MPs. Nevertheless, 
although the number of MPs with local party experience is low, such attributes seems to 
be playing important roles in the candidacy processes of those MPs in future elections. In 
other words, having party experience in various levels seem to have positive effects on 
re-nomination of MPs in next general elections once they are elected in the previous ones. 
Regarding this argument, Hypothesis 1b was indicated in the previous section as follows: 
- Hypothesis 1b: Acquiring party experience has a positive effect on re-nomination 
of the MPs in the next general elections. 
In order to test this hypothesis a binary logistic regression analysis is done using the 
variables of party experience and re-nomination. More specifically, the dependent 
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variable is whether an MP elected in an election (t) is re-nominated in the next election 
(t+1). Hence, it is either 1 or 0. Thus, binary logistic regression is preferred for testing the 
Hypothesis 1b. Independent variables are party experience variables which are women or 
youth branch membership, district branch experience, provincial branch experience and 
party headquarters experience. These variables are grouped depending on a factor 
analysis of various independent variables.46 
Table 6.9 shows the output of binary logistic regression with above mentioned variable 
(Model 1).  
Table 6.9: Binary logistic regression output of re-nomination of the MPs 
 Candidacy in Next Election (t+1)  
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Women or Youth Branch Experience 0.450** 
(0.227) 
0.096 
(0.304) 
 
District Branch Experience 0.420** 
(0.162) 
0.249 
(0.214) 
 
Provincial Branch Experience 0.567*** 
(0.102) 
0.501*** 
(0.136) 
 
Party HQ Experience 0.176*** 
(0.031) 
0.298*** 
(0.045) 
 
Local Politics Experience  -0.055 
(0.054) 
 
Candidate Rank (t)  -0.001 
(0.023) 
0.015 
(0.018) 
Total Served Terms in the TBMM  -0.407*** 
(0.072) 
-0.317*** 
(0.065) 
Ministerial Experience  0.223*** 
(0.078) 
0.360*** 
(0.070) 
Number of Initiated Bills  0.016 
(0.006) 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
Public Office Experience  -0.013 
(0.040) 
 
Party Vote % in District (t-1)  -0.002 
(0.003) 
 
Number of Elected MPs in District by 
Parties (t-1) 
 -0.013 
(0.020) 
 
Education 
 
 0.238 
(0.181) 
 
Constant -0.179 
(0.054) 
-0.685 
(0.540) 
0.032 
(0.129) 
Observation 2200 1574 1645 
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.06 0.02 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                          
46 Please see Appendix for details of the factor analysis and grouping of the variables. 
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It seems that party experience does have a positive effect on re-nomination of the MPs in 
the next elections. Hence, the Hypothesis 1b seems to be supported by the findings under 
these circumstances. More specifically, the effects of provincial branch experience and 
party headquarters experience are statistically significant on re-nomination of MPs in the 
next election, and these variables have positive correlation with the re-nomination 
variable. District branch experience also have positive effects on re-nomination chances 
of the MPs, but its significance level is lower than the other two variables. In a similar 
vein, women branch or youth branch experience also have positive correlation with 
candidacy in next elections, however, this variable’s significance level is also lower than 
the provincial experience and party headquarters experience. Nevertheless, overall these 
results suggest that party experience in general increases the likelihood of an MP to be 
re-nominated in the next election.  
Of course, party experience is not the only quality of the MPs. Along with that, legislative 
experience and behavior may play an important role in re-nomination processes of MPs. 
Several studies reveal that legislative behavior and activities of the MPs are some of the 
determinants of re-nomination and continuing legislative career (see e.g., Marangoni and 
Russo, 2016; Fernandes et al., 2017; Yıldırım et al., 2017). Regarding these, another 
binary logistic regression was run with additional variables which are local politics 
experience (mayoral positions and municipal council membership), public office 
experience, total served terms in the TBMM, ministerial experience, total initiated bill by 
MP, candidate order of the MPs during the elections, education level, parties’ total 
number of seats in a given district and their vote percentages. When we add these new 
variables into logistic regression (in Model 2 in Table 6.9), provincial branch experience 
and party headquarters experience still have statistically significant effect on re-
nomination of MPs in the next elections, but district branch experience loses its 
significance. Additionally, legislative experience (e.g. total served terms in the TBMM 
and ministerial positions) seems to play a major role in nomination in the next elections, 
but in opposing directions. While ministerial experience increases the likelihood of re-
nomination, total served terms in the TBMM seem to decrease one’s chance to be selected 
as candidate in the next set of elections. 
Overall, one may argue that party experience as a pre-parliamentary experience enable 
the MPs to be seen as more outstanding by political party selectorates than those who do 
not have such experience. In a similar vein, holding a ministerial position increases an 
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MPs likelihood of being re-nominated in the next elections, and this show that incumbent 
parties tend to reward and re-nominate their prominent members in the future elections. 
 
6.1.2. First-Ranked Candidates 
 
As indicated in previous pages, PR system with closed party lists is the current electoral 
system in Turkey. Under such a system, being nominated as top candidates on the party 
list ballot papers during the elections usually increases the chance of being elected. Hence, 
competition over higher ranked candidacy positions is significant, and being ranked first 
on the party lists is a clear reward for many candidates. One may expect that those who 
enjoy such top rankings are the ones having the best qualities among the other candidates. 
Some of those qualities may be long term party experience, being legislative elite for a 
long time or having local politics experiences which enable the individual politicians to 
be more engaged and knowledgeable about politics. 
Party leaders and some prominent members generally run as first-ranked candidates on 
party lists. For example, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ran as the first-ranked candidate in 
İstanbul District 1 in 2007 and 2011 General Elections. Since he was elected as the 
President of the country in August 2014, he did not run in general elections after 2011. 
Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu became the CHP leader in May 2010. Previously he ran as CHP 
candidate in İstanbul District 2 in the third place in 2002 and in the fifth place in 2007. 
After becoming the party leader, he ran in the first rank in the CHP candidate list in 
İstanbul District 2, but then he became the only party leader with a candidate ranking 
other than 1 with his rankings in June 2015 (2nd candidate in İzmir District 2) and 
November 2015 (2nd candidate in İzmir District 2). Nevertheless, one may argue that there 
is practically no difference between being the first or second candidate in İzmir on the 
CHP ticket as the party has a large group of supporters there. Similarly, the MHP leader 
Devlet Bahçeli has been running as the first-ranked candidate in party list in Osmaniye -
where he is from- since the 2002 General Elections while the leader of the HDP, 
Selahattin Demirtaş was nominated as first-ranked candidate in June 2015 and November 
2015 Elections in İstanbul 1. Previously he ran as an independent candidate in Hakkari in 
2011, and Diyarbakır in 2007 without any rank as ranking is not applicable to 
independents. Not only party leaders but also prominent party members (e.g. those who 
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served as ministers) seem to be nominated on top of the party lists signaling that those are 
the ones who are given at most importance in the parties for MP positions. Moreover, 
former legislative experience (i.e. serving as an MP) or candidacy experience in general 
elections may increase the chance of an individual to be nominated in the top ranks in 
party lists.   
Nonetheless, one can still observe that some individuals without any prior candidacy and 
legislative experience may be ranked first in candidate lists in general elections. Then, 
why and how do some individuals become first-ranked candidates on party list ballots 
even though they had never run in general elections prior to their candidacy?  
Table 6.10 shows the percentages of all first-ranked candidates between 2007 and 
November 2015 General Elections in Turkey. It seems that the AKP has the highest 
portion of the first-ranked candidates with previous legislative candidacy experience 
while the CHP shows the lowest percentage of such candidates. In other words, while the 
first ranks on party lists are occupied by previously experienced candidates in the AKP, 
the CHP tends to recruit new candidates for their first ranks in the party lists. The MHP 
and HDP show similar results with regard to first rank candidates, and more than half of 
their candidates occupying the first row on the lists are previously experienced ones. This 
picture may provide several insights: First, as the incumbent party, the AKP has higher 
intra-party competition for the party lists, and thus, the ones with more legislative 
experience (either as candidates or as MPs) are promoted more and selected as first-
ranked candidates.47 Second, the CHP tends to try new candidates over different elections 
regardless of their legislative experience or prior candidacy.  
When we analyze the data in detail, it seems that these strategic decisions of parties while 
nominating their first-ranked candidates have connections with electoral success of 
parties in particular electoral districts. First time first-ranked candidates are usually 
nominated in electoral districts where political parties are electorally unsuccessful. 
 
                                                          
47 This argument may be perceived as contradicting to the results in the previous section with regard to negative 
effects of total number of served terms in the TBMM on re-nomination. However, the analysis here only covers the 
first-ranked candidates, which is a quite smaller group compared to all candidates (85 candidates out of 550 per each 
party). As covered in the previous section, especially holding ministerial positions as a specific legislative experience 
increases the likelihood of re-nomination of an MP in the next elections. It seems that approximately 40 percent of 
the MPs in the first-ranked candidacies with previous legislative candidacy experience have served as ministers in 
single or multiple legislative terms. Hence, it is not actually contradicting with the above-mentioned results. 
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Table 6.10: Percentages of first-ranked candidates (2002-2015) 
Election  
Years 
First-ranked candidates with previous 
legislative candidacy experience  
(%) 
First-ranked candidates with no prior 
legislative candidacy experience  
(%) 
  AKP CHP MHP HDP AKP CHP MHP HDP 
2007 64 34 47 N.A. 36 66 53 N.A. 
2011 74 39 62 N.A. 26 61 38 N.A. 
2015 (J) 76 58 55 38 24 42 45 62 
2015 (N) 93 76 82 80 7 24 18 20 
Total 73 43 55 52 27 57 45 48 
Note: The percentages do not include the previous candidacy and legislative experience prior to 2002 General 
Elections. 
In some cases, prominent members of the parties are nominated as first rank candidates 
even though they have never run in general elections before, but these candidates are 
generally nominated in the districts where parties have large swaths of supporters.  
Table 6.11: Number of first-time first-ranked candidates by parties (2007-2015) 
  2007 2011 2015 (J) 2015 (N) Total 
AKP 31 22 20 7 80 
CHP 56 53 36 20 165 
MHP 45 32 25 15 117 
HDP N.A. N.A. 53 17 70 
Total 132 107 134 59 432 
Note: The HDP did not run as a party in general elections prior to June 2015. For this 
reason, data is not available for the party in 2007 and 2011. Although independent 
candidates who were affiliated with the HDP’s predecessors run in 2007 and 2011 elections, 
there was no candidacy ranking for these independent candidates. Thus, they are not 
included in this calculation. 
Still, not all parties share the same strategies in the same districts while nominating their 
candidates. Table 6.12 shows the number of total first-time first-ranked candidates along 
with the electoral districts which experienced the highest number of such candidates.  
Table 6.12: Total number of first-time first-ranked candidates and their distribution to 
electoral districts (2007-2015) 
Party 
Name 
Total Number of First-
Time First-Ranked 
Candidates 
Total Number of 
Electoral Districts 
Highest Number of First-Time First-Ranked 
Candidates by Electoral Districts 
AKP 80 56 Ağrı (3), Hakkari (3), Tunceli (3), Bayburt (3) 
CHP 165 81 Ağrı (4), Gümüşhane (4), Hakkari (4) 
MHP 117 63 
Bingöl (4), Erzincan (4), Hakkari (4), Iğdır (4), 
Kars (4), Kırklareli (4), Mardin (4) 
HDP 70 60 
Ankara 2 (2), Çorum (2), Erzincan (2), 
Eskişehir (2), Hatay (2), Isparta (2), 
Kastamonu (2), Kırıkkale (2), Kütahya (2), 
Ordu (2) 
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The AKP nominated 80 first-time first-ranked candidates between 2007 and November 
2015 general elections in total. 12 out of these 80 candidates were nominated in districts 
where the party did not get any seats in the previous elections (t-1). By selecting those 
candidates, the party gained 5 seats in the current (t) elections, showing that their selection 
of new candidates increased their chance to win seats. Although there are several districts 
in which the party did not win any seats and nominated such candidates (12 candidates in 
total in 5 elections in Ağrı, Hakkari, Iğdır, Tunceli and Şırnak), this is not as common as 
in other parties. In other words, AKP nominates first-time first-ranked candidates even if 
the party gained seats in a given district in previous elections. One reason for this strategy 
may be the increased competition for candidacy among those districts.  
The CHP nominated 165 first-time first-ranked candidates between 2007 and November 
2015 general elections in total. Out of these candidates, 92 of them were nominated in 
districts where the party did not win any seats in the previous elections (t-1). In 2007, 
2011 and November 2015 general elections, the CHP gained 3 seats in total out of these 
districts. This may show that in some of these districts, the strategical selection of 
candidates helps to improve electoral success for this party as well. 
 
Number 
of MPs 
Elected 
in (t-1) Frequency Percent Cumulative 
0 313 72.45 72.45 
1 43 9.95 82.41 
2 30 6.94 89.35 
3 21 4.86 94.21 
4 8 1.85 96.06 
5 6 1.39 97.45 
6 4 0.93 98.38 
7 3 0.69 99.07 
8 1 0.23 99.31 
10 1 0.23 99.54 
14 1 0.23 99.77 
16 1 0.23 100 
Total 432 100  
 
 
Number 
of MPs 
Elected 
in (t-1) Frequency Percent Cumulative 
0 264 61.11 61.11 
1 57 13.19 74.31 
2 43 9.95 84.26 
3 25 5.79 90.05 
4 18 4.17 94.21 
5 5 1.16 95.37 
6 4 0.93 96.3 
7 6 1.39 97.69 
8 4 0.93 98.61 
9 2 0.46 99.07 
10 1 0.23 99.31 
13 1 0.23 99.54 
14 2 0.46 100.00 
Total 432 100   
Table 6.13: Number of MPs elected in 
districts in (t-1) with first time first-
ranked candidates in (t) 
Table 6.14: Number of MPs elected in 
districts in (t-2) with first time first-
ranked candidates in (t) 
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Table 6.13 reveals that more than 61% of the candidates with first-time first-ranked 
condition were nominated in districts where political parties could not gain any seats in 
the previous elections (t-1). As it seen in Table 6.14, it is even higher in districts where 
those parties could not win any seats in two elections before (t-2) the current one. In other 
words, if a party cannot win any seats in a particular district, it tends to revise its candidate 
list in that district in the future elections and replace the first-ranked candidate with 
another candidate even if the latter one does not have any general election candidacy 
before. 
Between 2007 and November 2015 general elections, almost 39% of the first-time 
candidates are first-time first-ranked candidates. With respect to first-time first-ranked 
candidates, the following hypothesis was indicated in the beginning of this chapter:  
- Hypothesis 2: Inadequate electoral support (i.e. insufficient vote share to win seats 
in a particular district) for political parties increases the number of first-time first 
rank candidates on party lists in general elections. 
The results above reveal that Hypothesis 2 is supported especially for the opposition 
parties. In addition to those results, a binary logistic regression analysis was run to test 
the Hypothesis 2. For this analysis, data on all first-ranked candidates are used. Hence, 
data include all first-ranked candidates from four parties regardless of their previous 
candidacy or legislative experience. Dependent variable of the above-mentioned analysis 
is binary, and it shows whether a first-ranked candidate has previous experience or not. 
More specifically, if one candidate is first-time first-ranked candidate (who has no prior 
experience) dependent variable’s value is 1, if a candidate already has candidacy 
experience, it gets 0. Table 6.15 shows the outcome of this binary logistic regression 
analysis.  
It seems that party votes in the previous elections (t-1) negatively affect the emergence 
of first-time first-ranked candidates. In other words, as the number of votes for the party 
in question decreases in a district, likelihood of nomination of first-time first-ranked 
candidates increases. Hence, Hypothesis 2 seems to be accepted under these 
circumstances. 
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Table 6.15: Binary logistic regression outcome of first-time first-ranked candidates and 
electoral results 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Party Votes in District (t-1) -5.07*** 
(1.14) 
-2.44** 
(1.22) 
% of Party Votes in District (t-1) -0.032*** 
(0.005) 
-0.023*** 
(0.006) 
Party Seats in District (t-1) 0.181*** 
(0.067) 
0.305*** 
(0.070) 
District Magnitude  -0.072*** 
(0.022) 
Rate of Continuity of Favorites  -3.506*** 
(0.344) 
Constant 0.395*** 
(0.103) 
0.955*** 
(0.170) 
Observation 1120 1120 
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.22 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
One may also interpret that likelihood of nomination of the first-time first-ranked 
candidates are higher in small size districts by looking at how number of votes affects the 
emergence of such candidates. Indeed, the data demonstrate that 60.5 percent of the first-
time first-ranked candidates in total were nominated in small size districts: 12 percent of 
those candidates were nominated in four member districts, 27.5 percent of them in three 
member districts and 21 percent of them in two member districts. Hence, it also shows 
that likelihood of nominating first-time first-ranked candidates is lower in larger districts 
compared to smaller ones.  
Above-mentioned results also reveal the strategies of parties with regard to recruitment 
patterns and nomination. It seems that the parties try to increase their votes by nominating 
new candidates other than the ones who already run as candidates but could not contribute 
to bringing any seats to the party in question. As being the incumbent party, the AKP only 
shows 8 first-time first-ranked candidates in districts where the party could not gain any 
seats in the previous elections. Since the number of such cases is low for the AKP, it is 
not easy to justify the Hypothesis 2 for the AKP case. Yet, it seems that many of the first-
time first-ranked candidates of the opposition parties were nominated in districts where 
those parties could not gain any seats in the previous elections. 48 percent of the CHP’s 
first-time first-ranked candidates were nominated in districts where this party had not won 
any seats in the previous elections (t-1). When we analyze this for the (t-2) elections, the 
numbers become even higher with 63 percent. The results are even higher for the MHP 
as 90 percent of first-time first-ranked candidates were nominated in districts with no 
150 
 
gained seats in previous elections (t-1). A large number of those who were nominated as 
first-time first-ranked candidates in districts in which the CHP and MHP already won 
seats in the previous elections is publicly known figures.    
Between 2002 and November 2015, the CHP won seats in 5 districts in which it did not 
win any seats in (t-1) elections by nominating first-time first-ranked candidates. As an 
extended case, the MHP won 34 seats in 28 different districts even though it could not 
win any seats in those districts in the previous (t-1) elections. 19 out of these newly gained 
seats were in 2007 General Elections. Numbers are higher than the CHP’s as the MHP 
could not win any seats in the previous elections (2002 General Elections). This shows 
that their strategy to nominate those first-time first-ranked candidates worked well at least 
in some electoral districts.  
Table 6.16: Occupational backgrounds of first-time first-ranked candidates 
Occupation  
Number of 
Candidates 
Percentage of 
Candidates (%) 
Lawyer 58 13.1 
Engineer 52 12.1 
Doctor, Pharmacist, Veterinarian 50 12.1 
Academician 28 6.1 
Self-Employed 26 6.1 
Businessman 26 6.1 
Manager 25 6.1 
Teacher, Educator 25 6.1 
Economist 15 3.0 
Trade 14 3.0 
Governor, Public Officer 14 3.0 
Retired 9 2.0 
Contractor 8 2.0 
Guilds 7 2.0 
Worker 6 1.0 
Journalist 6 1.0 
Business Manager 5 1.0 
Financial Consultant 4 1.0 
Unionist 4 1.0 
Technician 3 1.0 
Public Servant 3 1.0 
Farmer 3 1.0 
Others 41 9.1 
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Lastly, besides electoral success and gained seats in districts, public appeal seems to be 
an important factor for first-time first-ranked candidates. One way to measure public 
appeal is to analyze the occupational background of these candidates. Table 6.16 shows 
the distribution of occupations of first-time first-ranked candidates of all parties. 
Among those occupation groups, lawyers, engineers, doctors, pharmacists, veterinarians 
and teachers seem to have proximity to the public and can eventually build connections 
with the electorate more broadly. This may increase the public appeal of the individuals 
with those occupational backgrounds. Moreover, businessman and self-employed 
individuals may be significant for parties as those people have more flexible time and 
certain amount of wealth to spend for party expenses and more specifically for electoral 
campaign processes. Hence, parties which try to increase their vote shares and win at least 
one seat in a district may strategically choose such individuals as their candidates. Details 
of these are discussed in Chapter 7 by providing more insights from interviews. 
 
 
6.1.3. Candidates with Low Chance to be Elected 
 
As explained in Chapter 4, political parties show centralized and exclusive candidate 
selection characteristics in which the party lists are prepared and ranked by the party 
headquarter members, and finalized by the leadership in Turkey. Additionally, closed-
party lists which do not enable voters to reflect their preferences directly about the 
candidates are used in general elections. Under those circumstances, the competition 
among eligible candidates for candidacy positions becomes quite significant, especially 
with regard to candidacy ranking. One would expect that, under open-party list systems, 
candidacy ranks will not be determinative on the chances of candidates’ electability as 
the electorate vote for the candidates rather than the parties as a whole; however, close-
part lists yield to the opposite case. If a candidate is ranked at the very end of the party 
list, and if the party does not have electoral support to win all the seats in a district, that 
candidate’s chance to be elected would be almost zero.  
As mentioned in the previous section, it is not only the lower ranks on the party lists 
which decrease the likelihood of a candidate’s electability. Candidates with the first ranks 
may also lose elections if their party does not have enough votes from a district to win a 
seat. Especially for some parties which constantly lose elections in certain districts, it is 
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quite hard for a candidate to be elected even if he or she is on top of the list. Hence, it 
does not really matter to be nominated as the first-ranked or last-ranked candidate in such 
districts from electorally unsuccessful parties’ lists. Nevertheless, all four of the political 
parties nominate candidates in all electoral districts; and for all of them, there are some 
candidates who accept to be nominated in lower ranks, or non-electable places determined 
by the parties’ electoral success in particular districts. Then, why do some individuals 
become candidates even though their electability chance is low? 
Starting with the continuity in the composition of the TBMM may provide useful insights 
about legislative politics and political career patterns in Turkey. The data on MPs between 
2002 and November 2015 general elections show that even though some experienced 
members of the TBMM continue to serve through multiple legislative terms, the number 
of newcomers seems to be higher than those. Out of 2,750 MPs served between 22nd 
(2002) and 26th (November 2015) legislative terms, 1,632 unique MPs appear. Table 6.17 
shows those unique MPs’ total number of terms spent in the TBMM. It is obvious that 
the group of MPs who occupied seats in the TBMM only once is the most crowded one. 
More than half of the total numbers of MPs (53 percent) served through 22nd to 26th 
legislative terms are newcomers. The second largest group consist of the MPs with two 
terms experience; nevertheless, there is a considerable difference even with this group 
and the one covering the MPs with one term experience only. Legislatively most 
experienced MPs are those who served in each and every term between 22nd and 26th, and 
there are only 7 MPs in this group. This shows that the MP turnover is high in the TBMM. 
Table 6.17: Total number of MPs by served terms in the TBMM (2002-2015) 
Served Terms Total number of MPs 
 
% of MPs 
1 863 52.9 
2 500 30.6 
3 196 12.0 
4 66 4.0 
5 7 0.4 
Total 1632 100.0 
Note: Although there are MPs who have been serving in the 
TBMM prior to 2002 General Elections, this table shows only 
the calculation within the time frame mentioned above. 
Previous studies showed that institutionalization of the TBMM has been quite low (see 
e.g., Kalaycıoğlu, 1990). One of the most crucial factors for that was the high turnover 
rate of the MPs serving the TBMM and consequently the “scarcity of senior deputies” 
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(Kalaycıoğlu, 1990: 215). This trait seems to be continuing in the TBMM in the recent 
period. In other words, the number of newcomers is higher compared to the experienced 
members of the TBMM as the data on 22nd to 26th legislative terms also show that 
continuity of the MPs with legislative experience (two terms and more) is not higher than 
47 percent.  
Although 2002 General Elections can be seen as a breaking point for many political 
parties with large electoral support through 1990s such as the DYP and ANAP, as they 
could not win any seats in the TBMM and almost perished electorally afterwards, not all 
individual MPs who served prior to 2002 were eliminated from the TBMM. Among 2750 
MPs, 142 of them have served as MPs prior to 2002 (any term before 22nd Legislative 
Term) and had chance to have legislative positions starting from 2002.48 Table 6.18 
reveals the number of MPs who previously served in the TBMM prior to 22nd Legislative 
Term and appeared again between 22nd and 26th legislative terms. Although their number 
was higher in 22nd and 23rd legislative terms, they occupied less seats over time and 
reached their lowest level in the 26th Legislative Term.  
Table 6.18: Number of MPs who served prior to 22nd legislative term and afterwards 
Election Year Legislative Term Number of MPs 
2002 22nd 89 
2007 23rd 82 
2011 24th 33 
2015 (J) 25th 18 
2015 (N) 26th 14 
Note: Although the total number of MPs adds up to 236 in 
this table, there are 143 MPs in total once the duplicate 
names in multiple legislative terms are removed. 
 
Analysis of the legislative term experience by parties shows that the AKP has the highest 
number of MPs who previously served in the TBMM prior to 22nd Term. One may think 
that it is interesting as the AKP was founded in 2001, and the 2002 General Elections was 
the first competition for this party. Nevertheless, many MPs in this group had been MPs 
from RP and/or FP prior to 2002. As explained in Chapter 4, the FP was formed after the 
closure of the RP, and identified itself as a successor of this party to a large extent. Since 
the AKP was founded by the modernist group that had emerged within the FP, a group of 
                                                          
48 Please see Table 6.18 and note attached to that for details. 
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people who previously served in the FP either as legislative elite or party elite took roles 
in the AKP’s various levels over time. Some of those individuals became members of the 
group of founders of the AKP, some became founder chairpersons of local party offices 
and others run in elections with the AKP ticket starting from 2002. Nonetheless, the 
number of these MPs dropped throughout the 21st Century as shown in the Table 6.19. A 
similar declining trend is also available for the CHP and MHP. It is not surprising to 
observe this decrease as many of the MPs served prior to 2002 are now quite old and may 
become politically less ambitious over time. Moreover, new individual politicians are 
competing to get positions in candidacy lists and the TBMM, thus, those previously 
experienced members of the TBMM may face increased competition. In addition, 
especially the first drop between 22nd and 23rd legislative terms seems to be related to the 
resignation of several MPs from the AKP and CHP.49 
Table 6.19: Number of MPs who served both prior to 22nd Legislative Term and 
afterwards by parties 
  Number of MPs 
 Party 22nd Term 23rd Term 24th Term 25th Term 26th Term Total 
AKP 55 37 17 5 7 121 
CHP 29 23 4 6 5 67 
MHP N.A. 17 9 7 2 35 
HDP 2 3 3 0 0 8 
Total 86 80 33 18 14 231 
Note: Total number of all MPs who served prior to 22nd Legislative Term and afterwards is 
236; however, there were 5 independent candidates in total who did not have any affiliation 
with the party groups in the TBMM when they run in elections. They are not included in this 
table. 
The CHP has the second highest number of pre-2002 experienced MPs in the 22nd Term. 
It is expectable for a party with a long history in the country’s politics to observe many 
MPs to continue to serve in the TBMM; however, the number of such politicians is not 
high. One reason for the low levels of continuity in MPs served prior and post 2002 era 
in the CHP can be that the party could not occupy any seats in the 1999 General Elections 
right before the 2002 Elections. The party won 8.7 percent of the votes which did not 
enable it to exceed the 10 percent electoral threshold. Party’s votes share was not high 
back in 1995 General Elections as well, it won 8.9 percent of the seats in the TBMM with 
10.7 percent of the votes which is slightly higher than the 10 percent threshold. Hence, 
                                                          
49 A considerable number of MPs resigned from their parties during the 22nd Legislative Term. These cases and their 
reflections on political ambition are examined in Chapter 7 of this dissertation. Please also see the following link for 
more details: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/2-partiyle-basladi-7-partiyle-bitti-6657172. 
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the loss of electoral support and seats from 1995 to 1999 elections might have 
demotivated many individual politicians not to continue with the CHP in the 2002 
General Elections. Moreover, the DSP which has very close stance to the CHP 
ideologically, led by the former leader of the CHP, Bülent Ecevit, was more successful 
both in the 1995 and the 1999 general elections, and some politicians formerly engaged 
with the CHP shifted to the DSP through that period. Although the calculations in Table 
6.19 were done including all MPs served prior to 2002 regardless of their parties, the low 
levels of continuity of such MPs in 2002 and afterwards may also reveal that not many 
MPs formerly served as DSP MPs were selected as candidates in 2002 by the CHP. Even 
though a number of previously elected MPs were elected as CHP MPs in 2002 and 2007 
general elections, there is a dramatic decline in those MPs’ number in the 24th Legislative 
Term. Additionally, as it can be understood from the Table 6.20 below, the lowest level 
of continuity of the candidates of the CHP in general elections was in 2011. These may 
be interpreted as consequences of leadership change in the CHP.50 After a long Baykal 
leadership period in the party, Kılıçdaroğlu was elected as the leader of the party on 22 
May 2010.51 That was a new era for the CHP, and there emerged many changes in the 
composition of party headquarters as well as the party lists in general elections. Hence, 
formerly elected MPs from the Baykal era seem to be eliminated from the lists in 2011 
General Elections in which the CHP competed for the first time under Kılıçdaroğlu 
leadership. Both the continuity of the candidates and MPs show that many of the former 
candidates either could not make to the party lists or were nominated to unelectable 
positions (e.g. low ranks on the party lists or districts with small electoral base which does 
not enable to gain any seats). 
Since the MHP could not win any seats in the 2002 General Elections, calculation is not 
available for it for the 22nd Legislative Term; however, especially from the 23rd to the 24th 
legislative terms, it shows a clear decline in the number of MPs who occupied seats in the 
TBMM prior to 2002.  
 
 
                                                          
50 Please see the following pages for more details on party leadership change and continuity in candidate lists. 
  
51 For more details on the political career path of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, please see the official webpage of the CHP: 
https://www.chp.org.tr/ozgecmis/kemal-kilicdaroglu. 
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Table 6.20: Continuity in candidate nomination (2002-2015) 
 
Party 
Continuity of Candidates (%) 
2002 2007 2011 2015 (J) 2015 (N) 
AKP 15 34 27 28 54 
CHP 20 21 13 20 58 
MHP 29 18 22 15 44 
HDP N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 43 
 
With regard to continuity of the candidates and MPs, the following hypothesis was 
proposed in the beginning of this chapter: 
- Hypothesis 3a: Party leadership change decreases the continuity of candidates in 
the elections following this change.52 
Regarding the above-mentioned results, it can be argued that this hypothesis can be 
falsified under certain conditions only. In other words, the process and characteristics of 
leadership change plays an important role in continuity of the candidates. If the newly 
elected leader of a party is personally close to the former leader, and/or if the heritage of 
the former leader is still influencing the party, no considerable or dramatic changes occur 
in the continuity of the candidates and eventually the MPs. For example, leadership 
change in the CHP seems to lower the continuity of candidates from 2002 to 2011, 
whereas no dramatic continuity drop is observable in the AKP from 2011 to 2015, through 
which the AKP faced a leadership change as Erdoğan was elected as President of Turkey 
in 2014 and leave his party leader position to Davutoğlu.53 However, if the new party 
leader does not show that much of a proximity to the former leader of the party, both 
candidate list and consequently the MPs may be modified under this new leadership. 
Hence, it seems that not all leadership changes yield to a sizeable revision of the candidate 
lists or the composition of party group in the TBMM. Under some circumstances the usual 
levels of continuity may continue.  
Continuity of candidates on party lists gives clues about the career patterns of the MPs. 
Lower levels of continuity mean that many of the MPs do not stay in their offices for long 
                                                          
52 The null hypothesis is as follows: 
H1c0: Party leadership change has no effect on the continuity of candidates in the elections following this change. 
 
53 Please see the following link for more details: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/ahmet-davutoglu-genel-baskan-
secildi-27088866. 
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periods. If one MP is not nominated in the next set of elections, it is a clear indication that 
his or her legislative career ends at least for that term. Of course, such individuals may be 
nominated in another election, yet it still creates a break in their national level political 
careers.  
Nevertheless, although the continuity in candidate lists is not very high, a group of MPs 
still continues to appear on the candidate lists in multiple elections. Hence, with regard to 
continuity of the candidates, reshuffles in the candidate lists are also noteworthy to 
analyze. Although some candidates run in multiple elections, their list rankings may 
change from one election to another, and such alternation in candidate rankings provides 
useful insights about career mobility of the legislative elites. Table 6.21 shows the 
candidate ranking change in consecutive general elections through 2002 and November 
2015 in Turkey.54  
Table 6.21: Candidate ranking change in consecutive general elections (2002-2015) 
Candidate 
Ranking 
Change Frequency 
Percent 
(%) Cumulative 
-11 1 0.09 0.09 
-10 2 0.17 0.26 
-9 1 0.09 0.35 
-8 2 0.17 0.52 
-7 4 0.35 0.87 
-6 4 0.35 1.22 
-5 10 0.87 2.10 
-4 17 1.49 3.59 
-3 22 1.92 5.51 
-2 61 5.34 10.85 
-1 116 10.15 21.00 
0 657 57.48 78.48 
1 129 11.29 89.76 
2 61 5.34 95.10 
3 24 2.10 97.20 
4 14 1.22 98.43 
5 8 0.70 99.13 
6 2 0.17 99.30 
7 3 0.26 99.56 
8 2 0.17 99.74 
9 1 0.09 99.83 
11 1 0.09 99.91 
20 1 0.09 100.00 
Total 1143 100.00   
Note: Candidates running in different districts in consecutive 
elections, and independent candidates are not included in the 
calculation.  
                                                          
54 As the latest general elections is November 2015 General Elections included in the dataset, candidate ranking 
change is not calculated for the MPs who were selected in November 2015 General Elections and nominated as 
candidates in the next elections (June 2018). 
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Although no change occurred in the nomination rankings of over 57 percent of the MPs 
who were nominated in consecutive elections between 2002 and November 2015, there 
is still a significant number of MPs whose rankings have changed over time. Table 6.21 
shows the frequency of ranking changes, i.e. how many MPs’ rank changed with the 
specific number shown in the table. Candidate ranking change is calculated by subtracting 
the candidacy rank in current elections (t) from the candidacy rank in next elections (t+1). 
Negative results in the table mean that MPs climbed towards to top on the candidacy lists. 
In other words, they are better off with regard to their rankings. Positive results, on the 
other hand, mean that the MPs are given lower level ranks on the lists in current elections 
(t) even though they were nominated on the higher ranks in the previous elections (t-1).  
Even though the numbers are not high, several MPs have jumped directly to the top of 
the candidate lists, while some others had to lose their positions in top ranks. There is 
even one MP who fell back by 20 ranks from one election to another (CHP candidate in 
İstanbul District 1 from 2011 to June 2015 elections). This MP was ranked second in 
2011 General Elections and elected as an MP; however, nominated as 22nd in June 2015 
General Elections. Back in that time, the CHP won 11 seats from İstanbul 1 in 2011, and 
regarding this fact, nominating the MP on 22nd rank was clearly placing him in a rank 
which is not likely to be elected. Not surprisingly, that individual was not elected in June 
2015 General Elections as the CHP won 11 seats from that district again. As an opposite 
case, several MPs were granted by much better ranks on party lists compared to their 
previous ranks. For example, an MP from the AKP was nominated as the 13th candidate 
in 2002 in İstanbul District 2, then this individual jumped to 3rd rank in 2007 and to the 
1st rank in 2011 General Elections. This illustrates a clear upward mobility on the 
candidate list for this MP. Another MP from the AKP had even a higher leap by being 
nominated as the 4th rank candidate in İstanbul District 1 while previously occupying 15th 
rank in the same district in 2011.  
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Graph 6.9: Change in candidacy from one election to another 
 
Nonetheless, the number of MPs being rewarded or punished in such wide ranges is not 
high. As it can be understood from the Table 6.21, almost 79 percent of 1,143 MPs either 
did not experience a change in their ranks at all or moved only by 1 point upwards or 
downwards.    
Graph 6.9 shows that most changes in candidacy happen in the first 5 or 6 ranks on 
candidate lists. Since there are not many electoral districts with more than 14 seats, it is 
expected that the graph will be skewed to the right. Inferring from above mentioned 
revisions and re-shuffles on candidate lists, high turnover rate in the TBMM may give a 
signal to individuals who would like to become MPs that the TBMM is open to 
newcomers as not many seats are constantly occupied by more experienced MPs. In other 
words, these individuals may interpret that parties tend to nominate legislatively 
unexperienced candidates as well as the experienced ones. Hence, a broad change in the 
composition of the TBMM is possible, and they themselves can have a seat in the 
legislature. This may make individuals to invest more in candidacy process. Even if they 
do not have chance to be elected by their initial candidate rankings, they may still believe 
that possibility of being nominated in upper ranks in the future is still prevalent. 
Moreover, it is also possible to observe that some candidates are nominated in different 
districts in different elections which may also increase their likelihood of being elected.  
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 depict some examples on the re-shuffles on candidate lists in electoral 
districts of İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir. The reason to select these districts as cases is that 
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these three cities have the largest district magnitudes and hence the longest candidate lists. 
Examining the alternation within those lists is important to see how lower ranked 
candidates may become higher ranked candidates over time. 
Figure 6.3: Alternation in candidacy lists (from June 2015 to November 2015)* 
 
*Since the HDP did not compete in general elections as a party prior to June 2015, the 
favourite candidate category could not be applied to this party. Hence, “candidate in previous 
elections, favourite” category is not observable in the graph, and all previously nominated 
candidates are included in “candidate in previous elections, not favourite”.  
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Figure 6.4: Alternation in candidacy lists (from 2011 to June 2015) 
 
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 present the alternation within the party lists in general elections. It is 
evident that the composition of those lists may dramatically change in consecutive 
elections. This may happen in three ways: First, new candidates may be included in the 
lists; second, existing candidates may be reshuffled within the list; third, the 
amalgamation of these two. We usually observe the amalgamation of the first two 
possibilities especially in districts with large magnitudes such as İstanbul, Ankara and 
İzmir.   
With regard to the candidates who have low chances to be elected, the following 
hypothesis was indicated in the beginning of this chapter:  
AKP
CHP
MHP
AKP
CHP
MHP
AKP
CHP
MHP
AKP
CHP
MHP
AKP
CHP
MHP
AKP
CHP
MHP
AKP
CHP
MHP
New Candidate
Candidate in Previous Elections, Favourite
Candidate in Previous Elections, not Favourite
İSTANBUL 1
İSTANBUL 2
İSTANBUL 3
ANKARA 1
ANKARA 2
İZMİR 1
İZMİR 2
162 
 
- Hypothesis 3b: Candidates who accept to be ranked in non-electable positions 
expect to push their ranks to electable positions over time or rewarded by other 
positions in the party. 
Inferring from the revisions of the lists, one may argue that the individuals who 
compromise to be nominated from non-electable positions expect to improve their 
standings on the party lists through time. From the perspective of political ambition 
theories, such individuals may be identified as possessing progressive ambition as they 
still aim for the higher positions.  
As explained in the previous pages, candidacy ranking matters a lot for the electability 
chance of individuals in closed-party lists systems. Under those circumstances, politicians 
with progressive ambition (who would like to start their legislative career) or static 
ambition (who already started legislative career and would like to continue) try to 
compete for better candidacy ranks. Thus, such desires derive those individuals to push 
for increasing their candidacy rank. Nevertheless, an opposing case was also mentioned 
that candidacy ranking in general elections is not important for many individuals in some 
parties. Hence progressive ambition may not make those politicians to compete with other 
candidates to a large extent. For example, 
“I was a candidate both in June 2015 and November 2015 General Elections 
on lower ranks of the lists. However, being nominated as a lower ranked 
candidate did not bother me. We may accept to be candidates even if we know 
that our chance is quite low.”55  
Nevertheless, there may be other goals of those individuals. Some interviewees 
highlighted that being a candidate is not necessarily about winning the elections and 
getting seats in the TBMM. Candidacy may mean other valuable positions as well. This 
provides important clues about investing in politics: Accepting to become candidate in an 
unelectable position may be not only related to a political goal but also an economic goal, 
gaining public prominence and public attention. Hence, even being selected by a political 
party as a candidate means a lot for many individual politicians especially if intraparty 
competition is high in a party. Even if that candidate is nominated in non-electable 
positions, it is still signaling that this individual may eliminate others in candidacy process 
and may be regarded as more qualified and valuable by the party and the electorate. This 
makes that individual to be better recognized both in the electoral district and the party 
                                                          
55 Interview with local party chairperson of the HDP in İstanbul, 11.11.2016. 
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organization. Hence, by the help of nomination process, perceptions about an individual 
political may change in favor of that person. In other words, more people may realize that 
this person is in a smaller political elite group which contains the ones with the likelihood 
of being selected and elected. This recognition may also ease the networking process of 
this individual both in the district and party, and possible connections may enable him or 
her to constitute ties with other groups. For example, as an interviewee explained, if this 
person has his or her private occupation, more opportunities may appear with the 
candidacy of that individual.  
 
6.2. Concluding Remarks 
 
Previously, it was argued that “If we ascend the political hierarchy, from the voters 
upwards, we find that at each level - the membership of political parties, party activists, 
local political leaders, MPs, National Leaders - the social character of the group is slightly 
less 'representative' and slightly more tilted in favour of those who belong to the middle 
and upper reaches of our society.” (Guttsman, 1968). Indeed, other studies also 
represented similar findings: “…members of the British House of Commons are 
demographically unrepresentative of the British population in terms of gender, race, 
education and class.” (Norris and Lovenduski, 1993: 373). Regarding the results of 
analyzed data in this Dissertation, similar arguments can be made especially in terms of 
age, gender, education and occupation. More specifically, the overall composition of the 
TBMM between 2002 and 2015 seem to be crowded by middle aged men with particular 
professions such as lawyers, engineers and businessmen.  
Nevertheless, the data also provide some variance among the parties with regard to their 
MPs. While the parties do not show significant differences with regard to age, localism, 
education level and occupational backgrounds, there are noteworthy differences between 
parties in terms of their MPs educational backgrounds rather than the levels, foreign 
language knowledge and gender distribution. Above-mentioned results revealed that 
political parties’ ideological stances do make an impact on their MPs composition. Hence, 
political party ideologies may be regarded as a determinative factor effecting the elite 
recruitment and candidate selection processes of parties in Turkey. 
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In addition, pre-parliamentary political experience in the form of local and national level 
political party experience increases the likelihood of MPs re-nomination in future set of 
elections. Similarly, specific forms of legislative experience seem to have positive effects 
on re-nomination chances: If MPs have ministerial posts, they seem to be more likely to 
be re-nominated by their parties. However, it seems that another variable on legislative 
experience, namely total served terms in the National Assembly, lowers the chance of an 
MP to be re-selected as a candidate in future elections.  
Political party selectorates may also choose those who had no experience in general 
elections as their candidates. Even so, they nominate some of them as their first-ranked 
candidates on their party lists in general elections. Data revealed that such candidates are 
strategically selected by political parties especially in districts where they do not have 
large swaths of supporters. That is to say, it seems that political parties tend to prefer 
revising their candidates lists, especially the first ranks if they could not win any seat in 
a particular district. In fact, by such strategies, some political parties won seats in districts 
where they previously received no significant success. Hence, one may infer from those 
findings that, revisions on party lists may provide better electoral opportunities for 
political parties.  
Related to the above-mentioned explanations, data also showed that continuity on 
candidate lists are not very high in the country. This practice seems to be an opportunity 
for those who were nominated in unwinnable places or ranks. In other words, revisions 
and reshuffles on candidate lists may enable individuals who were previously nominated 
as lower ranked candidates to occupy higher and electable ranks in future elections. More 
insights about this argument is available in Chapter 7 of this dissertation.    
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CHAPTER 7 
 
VARIANCE AND ALTERNATION IN ELITE RECRUITMENT AND 
POLITICAL AMBITION IN TURKEY 
 
 
“In virtually all societies, no matter what the system of stratification, people from specific 
social backgrounds acquire a greater share of political power than do others. That is, the 
possession of certain attributes can yield decisive advantage (or disadvantage) in the 
pursuit of power.” hence, “social conditions of rule” matter for occupying certain political 
positions and acquiring power in general (Smith, 1976: 65). Nevertheless, composition 
of political elite and political career patterns in a country may change over time. Social 
change and expanded social mobility can be identified as one of the most important reason 
of such alternation in the socioeconomic backgrounds of political elite. Many countries 
went through increased social mobility and urbanization with the effects of 
industrialization and developments in economy:  
“The disintegration of the traditional social and political structures in the 
nineteenth century and accelerated economic development in the form of 
industrialization and political independence, aided by high birth rates and low 
mortality after World War II, have caused a vast movement of rural migrants 
into cities in the developing nations of Asia, Africa, and South America.” 
(Karpat, 1976: 2).  
In Mexico, for example,  
“…the Revolution sharply expanded the range and frequency of social 
mobility. […] it is argued, the political system became open to people of 
talent, at least on a relative scale, and an even-larger share of the population 
has been able to aspire to (if not attain) political office. In other words, the 
social conditions of rule have been relaxed; the passports to power have 
become less restrictive than before.” (Smith, 1979: 65).  
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Starting especially from 1950s onwards, social mobilization expanded in Turkey as well: 
migration from rural to urban areas increased, migrant receiving cities became more 
heterogeneous with regard to social composition, and more complex structures emerged 
(see e.g., Karpat, 1976, Kalaycıoğlu, 2005). Such changes also brought alternation to the 
composition of political elite as well as emergence of new political parties and developing 
alternative relationships with the electorate in the country.  
It would be easier to expect and observe a small group of people who embark on political 
career when politicians are from similar and exclusive backgrounds. However, with 
social, economic and political changes comes a higher level of social mobility, and 
political arena becomes more open to individuals who desire to become politicians from 
different backgrounds. For example, many citizens would identify a specific type of an 
MP of the TBMM prior to 1960s in Turkey. Öymen (2009: 20-21) highlights that in the 
1950s, people would think of an MP who resembles the MPs such as Fevzi Paşa, Rauf 
Bey, Fethi Bey, İsmet Paşa and Celal Bayar who served during Atatürk’s Presidency, or 
Celal Bayar, Refik Saydam, Şükrü Saraçoğlu, Recep Peker, Hasan Saka and Şemsettin 
Günaltan who served under İsmet İnönü’s Presidency, or Adnan Menderes who served 
under Celal Bayar’s Presidency up until that day. According to Öymen, many of these 
MP’s, especially those served in the early periods of Republican Era, had military 
backgrounds: Celal Bayar was not a soldier, yet he had important tasks at the beginning 
of Milli Mücadele, and Saydam was also an officer, but also a medical doctor. Other MPs 
with civilian backgrounds showed a common characteristic which is serving as deputies 
for ten, fifteen years or occupied other political offices for a long period of time. Thus, 
all of those MPs were politically or militarily experienced. Öymen continues that 
common educational backgrounds of those MPs were economy, history or law. Until 
Demirel, who entered politics in 1962 with the AP and became an MP in 1965 and then 
PM, there was no PM who had an engineering background or something similar. Indeed, 
no engineer had the chance to become a PM or President of the country back in that time 
as the highest level in politics for engineers were ministerial positions. Also, their number 
was limited and not many ministers had engineering backgrounds. A bureaucrat-engineer 
becoming an MP (Demirel) changed this picture and opened the way of politics for 
engineer-politicians such as Turgut Özal and Necmettin Erbakan for the future (Öymen, 
2009: 21). Similarly, Frey (1975: 54) underlined that “officials” such as “military men, 
bureaucrats, and teachers, all agents of the state” composed the largest groups in the 
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National Assembly during single party era while the “professionals” which are “doctors, 
engineers and especially lawyers” turned to be the largest profession groups in the 
multiparty era in Turkey. Moreover, another occupational group related to economic 
professions such as “businessmen, merchants, traders, bankers, and a few agriculturists, 
also improved its position slightly in this period.” (Frey, 1975: 54). Hence, the 
composition of the TBMM had some clear changes over time. 
For example, as explained in the Chapter 6 of this dissertation, composition of educational 
backgrounds, occupations, gender distribution and foreign language knowledge of the 
MPs also changed over time in Turkey: Although the change was not largely about the 
level of education as considerably large group of MPs is still composed of university 
graduates, backgrounds of educational institutions show more variety today. 
Additionally, although many MPs had military backgrounds with regard to their 
professions in the first period of the Republican era, then there emerged more MPs with 
engineering backgrounds and today some professional groups such as lawyers, engineers 
and businessmen are more crowded in the National Assembly. Moreover, percentage of 
female MPs increased over time, even though it is not sufficient to close the gender gap; 
and more MPs who speak Kurdish won seats in the TBMM through 2010s. Hence, more 
diverse groups of MPs emerged which are clearly different from the past composition of 
the TBMM.  
Those changes provide important clues about the change in elite recruitment and political 
ambition of individuals in the country. Expansion of opportunities to run for office made 
more individuals to try their chances in political career. The following sections provide 
examination of career patterns of political elite in Turkey with specific references to 
various political ambition theories. Additionally, recruitment patterns and variance 
among parties are also discussed in these sections. Previous chapter focused on the elite 
recruitment patters by analyzing the determinants of recruitment patters, composition of 
MPs in the TBMM and alternation within it over time. In addition to those, this chapter 
(Chapter 7) provides more personal insights about political ambition to better understand 
political career choices of individual and political career patterns in the country in 
general.56 In order to grasp political ambition types and political career prospects of 
                                                          
56 In order to better examine political ambition, several scholars conduct surveys with the MPs and other politicians 
especially by asking whether they are planning to be candidates in elections in the future, aiming for other offices or 
exiting politics completely. Another way could be analyzing the candidate nominees or applicants lists before being 
selected or eliminated by the parties to see who continues to be candidate nominees or who decide to drop out. 
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political actors, a series of in-depth interviews with 23 local party actors from İstanbul, 
Antalya, Adana, Kayseri and Denizli in Turkey were conducted. The reason to conduct 
those interviews is that those who are most knowledgeable about the power structure and 
organizational dynamics of parties are the experienced party members and activists 
(Duverger, 1964). Hence, these interviews provide complementary information about 
political ambitions and recruitment patters of parties to further explain career patterns in 
addition to the analyses in the Chapter 6. 
 
7.1. Political Ambition and Political Careers in Turkey 
 
Being a politician requires significant amount of dedication in any level of political 
offices from local party branches to legislative ones. Thus, generally, many politicians 
underline the difficulties of embarking on political career: “When asked what advice they 
would give those considering a political career, many MPs stressed the life was not for 
everybody; hard work, time, energy and dedication were essential.” (Norris and 
Lovenduski, 1993: 380). Similar arguments were provided by many of the interviewed 
party elite for this dissertation as well. Even though interviewees are not the MPs but 
local party actors such as local party chairs, women branch chairs and members, it still 
requires a huge amount of hard work. For example, some local party offices have time 
schedules to make sure that there will be at least one member in the party office during 
daytime. Not all parties seem to open their local offices each and every day in the country, 
but they are usually open six days a week. Hence, local party actors need to spend time 
in those offices to meet their visitors, citizens with demands and other members of the 
parties even if they also work for the party outside the office. Especially female 
interviewees emphasized that it is not easy to pursue a political career goal since one 
needs to spend long hours in party work and face difficulties with spending time with 
their children and family. Nonetheless, this is applicable not only for women but also men 
who need to stay at party offices or attend other meetings or occasions during day and 
night57. It is emphasized that: 
                                                          
Although the data have certain limitation since the pool of all candidate nominees are not available in this 
dissertation, it is still possible to interpret important insights from the candidate data compiled from the official 
candidate lists of four political parties, and the compiled dataset on the MPs.  
57 Several interviewees indicated that they need to spend time for the party even at night if there is an election 
campaign, or if it is election day as they stay around the ballot boxes during the election and till the ballots are carried 
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“Dedication and self-devotion are very important in politics. For example, we 
spend a considerable amount of time for the party and sometimes we cannot 
even meet our relatives for a long period of time.”58 
Moreover, during specific periods, such as election campaigns, workload increases for 
many of those party elite as they need to organize meetings, home visits or other types of 
constituency visits. They usually have face to face meetings with the electorate both in 
party offices and in other places as well. Hence, one interviewee mentioned that they have 
important duties as being local party executive committee members, 
“If we occupy a position in a political party in any level, we need to regard 
this as a duty. I mean, our responsibilities start at the point where we accept 
to fulfil the requirements of our office. We act with a state of mind to fulfil 
our responsibilities in that regard.”59  
Not only effort and time, but also spending money for the expenses of the party seems to 
be a common thing to consider for many party members. For example, one interviewee 
underlined that: 
“If you would like to be an executive committee member in the local party 
branch, you should have time and money to spend for the party. Moreover, 
you should be able to attend to all meetings in the party.”60 
Similarly, 
“You should spend time both in the party office and outside to meet 
constituency. We work hard especially during election campaigns periods. 
We visit many public places such as city bazaar, households, talk to people 
by door to door visits, open stands to inform people about our party and so 
on…”61 
Thus, those who would like to embark on a political career need to have a certain level of 
motivation and attributes to fulfil such requirements. The following subsections provide 
insights about such motivations and political derives of individuals.   
Nevertheless, before going into details of political ambition and career choices of 
individuals, it may be helpful to have a framework for possible political career paths in 
                                                          
to official electoral office. Similarly, during the month of Ramadan, parties organize iftar and sahur programs during 
which many party members spend their time during night for the party work to meet citizens. 
 
58 Interview with local party chairperson of the CHP in Pamukkale, Denizli, 26.08.2016. 
 
59 Interview with local party executive committee member of the AKP, Ümraniye, İstanbul, 22.07.2014. 
 
60 Interview with local party executive committee member of the CHP in Kayseri, in 21.10.2016. 
 
61 Interview with local women branch chair of the MHP in Kayseri, 21.10.2016. 
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Turkey. Career patterns may show difference from one country to another depending on 
the administrative system, government type or structural organizations of political parties. 
For example, federal systems may yield different possibilities for political elite compared 
to unitary systems as different levels of political offices may occur, or various types of 
offices may be available to be elected or appointed for politicians which may not be 
available in unitary systems, or vice versa. Moreover, political party structures may be 
affected by such differences which may produce varying elite recruitment patterns and 
eventually provide different paths for respective politicians. Not all countries have 
similarly structured political parties within themselves. If party organizations are not 
strictly regulated legally, parties may adopt different strategies to organize; however, if 
laws detailly regulate the parties, then the structures would resemble to each other.  
In addition to elite recruitment strategies of political parties, political ambition of 
individuals influences the political career patterns. Table 7.1 below shows possible 
political career choices and paths of individual politicians in Turkey.  
Table 7.1: Possible political career choices under different political ambition types 
Static  
Ambition 
Progressive 
Ambition 
Discrete 
Ambition 
Intra-
institutional 
Ambition 
Dynamic 
Ambition 
Regressive 
Ambition 
Seeking for  
re-election to the 
same position 
 
 
 
Any elective 
office (t) → same 
elective office 
(t+1) 
 
E.g.: 
 
MP (t) → MP 
(t+1) 
 
Mayor (t) → 
Mayor (t+1) 
 
Municipal council 
member (t) → 
municipal council 
member (t+1) 
 
Party position (t) 
→ same party 
position (t+1)* 
 
Seeking for higher 
office 
 
 
 
 
Any non-political 
office (t) → any 
political office 
(t+1)** 
 
Mayor (t) → MP 
(t+1) 
 
Local Party 
Member (t) → MP 
(t+1) 
 
CSO Member (t) 
→ MP (t+1) 
Seeking for 
retirement, 
Exiting politics, 
Resignation 
 
 
MP (t) → no 
political office 
(t+1) 
 
Party member (t) 
→ no political 
office (t+1) 
 
Mayor (t) → no 
political office 
(t+1) 
 
Municipal council 
member (t) → no 
political office 
(t+1) 
 
 
Seeking for higher 
office within the 
party 
 
 
 
Local Party 
Member (t) → 
Party Headquarter 
Member (t+1) 
 
Party Headquarter 
Member (t) → 
Party Leader (t+1) 
Not having a 
linear line of 
political career 
 
 
 
Any political 
position (t) → any 
political position 
(t+1) → any 
political position 
(t+2)… 
Seeking for a 
lower office 
 
 
 
 
MP (t) → Mayor 
(t+1) 
 
MP (t) → Party 
HQ member (t+1) 
 
MP (t) → Local 
Party Member 
(t+1) 
 
Minister (t) → 
MP (t+1) 
*Static ambition is usually used to define the decision of seeking re-election. But this category in the table does not 
only include elective offices. Party offices which requires selection, appointment or election by members are also 
included here and in the following sections.   
**This shows the initial decision of starting a political career. It can also be defined as nascent political ambition as 
proposed by Fox and Lawless (2005) especially for deciding to seek elective office. Nevertheless, the type in this table 
does not only include career decisions about elective offices but also party offices. 
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Although there can be other types of political paths, this table provides most common 
career choices. The possibilities are grouped under specific political ambition categories 
which are previously explained in the Chapter 3 of this dissertation.    
Turkey provides a case in which all political parties share the same organizational 
structure regulated by the SPK as explained in detail in Chapter 4. As a reminder, Article 
1 and Article 2 of this law reveal that the SPK covers the provisions for the foundation, 
organization, activities, mission, authority and responsibilities, property acquisition, 
income and expenses, auditing, dissolution and closure of the political parties.62 Besides 
the regulations on these topics, the SPK proposes a common and binding organizational 
form/method for all the parties, meaning that no party may found another organizational 
structure which is not in accordance with this law. This organizational method is in line 
with the administrative organization of Turkey, and consequently, the organizational 
structures of the Turkish political parties are very similar to each other due to the 
regulations of the SPK (Bektaş, 1993: 39; Erdem, 2001: 85). This eases the comparison 
of those parties with regard to recruitment patterns. 
With regard to political ambition, the following questions have been some important ones 
to answer: “Why do individuals enter politics?” “What motivates individuals to stay in 
politics?” or “When do individuals seek higher political offices?” Previous chapters 
provided review of research and theories on these topics. When we ask such questions to 
the local party chairs and members in Turkey, they usually indicate that they entered 
politics due to several deriving factors, by the influence of their friends or families, or by 
invitation from the parties. Hence, the reasons making individuals to be active politicians 
vary, yet commonalities also in the scene. The following sections explain those influential 
factors and career decisions of politicians more in detail. 
   
7.1.1. Interest, Motivation and Entering Politics in Turkey 
 
Becoming a politician is defined as the highest level and ultimate act of political 
participation (Fox and Lawless, 2005, 2011). Even though not all levels of political 
                                                          
62 SPK, Article 2 – (Amended: 12/8/1999 - 4445/1): [Bu Kanun, siyasi partilerin kurulmaları, teşkilatlanmaları, 
faaliyetleri, görev, yetki ve sorumlulukları, mal edinimleri ile gelir ve giderleri, denetlenmeleri kapanma ve 
kapatılmalarıyla ilgili hükümleri kapsar.] Retrieved from: http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.2820.pdf. 
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offices have the same salience or opportunities for individuals, politicians in any level 
may be regarded under such type of a political participation. For example, although 
becoming an MP, PM or President of the country are top levels of political careers, 
becoming a local party chair may also be regarded as one of the highest levels of political 
participation for some people. Hence, regardless of the office, becoming an active 
politician can be defined as the highest level of political participation, and such a decision 
requires intense motivation. Motivations deriving individuals to decide to become 
politicians are identified on the supply-side explanation of political recruitment, but 
demand-side cannot be ignored while studying the determinants of decisions to enter 
politics: 
“In practice supply-side and demand-side factors interact. Perceived 
prejudice by party activists, complex application procedures, or anticipated 
failure, may discourage potential candidates from coming forward. The 
concept of hidden unemployment ('Why apply? I won't get the job') is a 
perfect analogy for the 'discouraged political aspirant'. […] Nevertheless, 
despite these qualifications, there remains an important distinction between 
the factors holding individuals back from applying for a position ('I'm not 
interested', 'I don't have the right experience', 'I can't afford to move') and the 
factors which mean that, if they apply, they are not accepted by selectors 
('He's not locally known', 'She's not got the right speaking skills', 'He would 
not prove popular with voters'). The supply-side and demand-side distinction 
therefore provides a useful analytical framework to explore alternative 
explanations.” (Norris and Lovenduski, 1993: 381). 
What derives individuals to enter politics in Turkey? This question is not only about those 
who run in elections and become MPs or mayors but also about whether party elite 
working in local levels want to stay in their current position or climb the political career 
ladders. Do those individuals think that they themselves can gain another (preferably 
higher) position, or the party’s higher authorities enable them to do so? Answers gathered 
from the interviews generally reveal that the discretion of higher-level party authorities 
matter a lot for the career decisions and path of the local party members. Hence, even if 
they have specified goals, they may be waiting for the decisions of the higher rank party 
officials. For instance, even if a person wants to be a candidate for local party chair, he 
or she may decide not to do so if they do not believe that the party headquarters will not 
support this candidacy. Such cases are similar to what Norris and Lovenduski (1993) 
mentioned as “discouraged political aspirant”. One may argue that such feelings may be 
more commonly seen under exclusive candidate selection methods of political parties in 
which small and exclusive groups of selectorate will have the final decision about 
173 
 
candidate selection. Nevertheless, political careers are still not solely about the discretion 
of the party leadership or exclusive selectorate. Motivations and ambitions of individuals 
should also be taken into consideration.  
To start with, about the initial decisions of individuals to enter politics (nascent political 
ambition) one may argue that individuals may be influenced by their families and/or 
friends in developing their political selves, and political stance of those individuals may 
eventually resemble to their parents’ or friends’ political views. For instance, Kalaycıoğlu 
(2010) underlined the parental party identification’s impact on children. In a similar vein, 
other studies also showed fathers’ influence on party elites’ ideological stance and 
attendance to politics (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000; Uysal and Topak, 2010).   
Interviews conducted for this Dissertation unearth similar patterns for party elite. It seems 
that one of the most significant leading factors to start a political career, especially for the 
members of parties with long history such as the CHP and MHP, is socialization in the 
family. In other words, either their parents’ ideological stance or party experience have 
an effect on the development of nascent political ambition. For example, one interviewee 
explained that,  
“My family has been supporting the CHP for long years. My granddad even 
got telegraphs from İsmet İnönü during his lifetime. Our lifestyle, worldview 
and idea of freedom were in line with the CHP’s ideology. I became a 
supporter of the party with the influence of these. I became a member of the 
party in 1974, and started to work more actively after I retired from my job.”63 
Similarly, another interviewee underlined the impact of his father’s (who formerly served 
as the district branch chairperson in the same party) political past on his decision to enter 
politics: 
“I believe that my motivation to enter politics is somewhat a genetic thing. 
My father has been in politics for many years, so I guess it was very 
influential for me. Of course, as a secondary factor, I was influenced by my 
desire to provide some useful services for the society. Others who do not 
have any other politicians in their families also become politicians, and I 
think they are motivated by their intention to provide something to the 
society as well.”64 
Many other party actors in the CHP gave similar answers about their motivation to start 
political careers. It seems that families’ influence is not only about political party 
                                                          
63 Interview with local party executive committee member of the CHP in Kayseri, in 21.10.2016. 
64 Interview with local party chairperson of the CHP in İstanbul, Ümraniye, 17.07.2014. 
174 
 
membership, but also about participation to civil society organizations. For example, one 
said that, 
“I have been supporting the CHP since my childhood. My family identifies 
itself with the party. I have been interested in politics for many years, and for 
instance, back in my workplace and I was affiliated with labor unions.”65 
Similarly, another CHP party actor mentioned that his father was a supporter of Ecevit 
(Ecevitçi), and he had a left-wing past just as his father.66 In addition to parents’ influence, 
spouses may also influence each other with regard to become party members and 
politicians. Some interviewees mentioned that from time to time, spouses work for the 
same party as well. 
Quite similar answers were given by the MHP party actors with regard to their families’ 
influence on their motivation to start their political career. Since this party also have 
relatively longer history, parents of some of the current political elite were also 
identifying themselves with the MHP, 
“My family was the major factor for me to be a part of this party. I have a 
quite nationalist and ülkücü family. Rather than influenced by my friends, it 
was my family members. Actually, I have always been interested in 
politics.”67 
Just like they were influenced by their families, it was also indicated that they wish their 
children to be politically active, and one interviewee mentioned that her son also became 
a member of the MHP. Again from the MHP, another party actor mentioned that: 
“My father was an ülkücü and nationalist. He had been in the party 
organization previously, and he was sharing his experiences with me. I was 
not a member of ülkü ocakları but started my party career as a member of the 
MHP district branch.”68 
Both the CHP and MHP have been in Turkish political history for long years. Hence, it 
is possible for members of those parties to have parents or other relatives who formerly 
served for those parties, or had close ideological proximity to them. Compared to these 
two parties, foundation periods of the AKP and the HDP are more recent. Nevertheless, 
                                                          
65 Interview with local party executive committee member of the CHP in Kayseri, 21.10.2016. 
66 Interview with local party executive committee member of the CHP in Acıpayam, Denizli, 26.08.2016. 
67 Interview with local women branch chairperson of the MHP in Kayseri, 21.10.2016. 
68 Interview with local women branch executive committee member of the MHP in Kayseri, 21.10.2016. 
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since both the AKP and the HDP had roots in the past and had their predecessor parties, 
several interviewees from those parties also indicated similar influence. Additionally, 
some also indicated that even if their parents were not politically active, they have been 
interested in politics since their childhood: 
“I am a member of a nationalist and conservative family. My father was not 
politically active, but I have been interested in politics starting from my 
primary school years. For example, once I answered our teacher’s question 
about our plans when we grow up by saying that I would like to be a politician 
in the future.”69 
Nevertheless, not all politicians indicated that they started their political career early on. 
For example, 
“I started my political life with the AKP. Previously, I was elected to 
chairperson position of chamber of commerce in our district, and the idea of 
providing services to our district started back then. I thought that I owe to this 
city and should provide good services to that. Thus, I started to serve in 
chamber of commerce and after that I affiliated with the AKP to start my 
political life. But I did not have any prior political career.”70   
Still, interest in politics during childhood seems to be a rather common characteristic for 
many of the party members. In addition to the above-mentioned answers, an interviewee 
from the HDP mentioned that, 
“My father was a socialist and he was a member of TİP. I started to be 
interested in politics when I was in secondary school (orta okul), and I have 
been in various socialist parties.”71  
Besides the influence of family and political activity of parents, suggestions and influence 
coming from friends and party actors also motive individuals to enter politics. For 
example, 
“I entered politics in 1997 when I did not have any intention to do so. I was 
running a company where I hired 700-800 workers, became one of the highest 
tax payers in the district, had a bright economic future and many plans about 
my occupation. However, I was also familiar with the problems, difficulties 
and despair in the district which made people to had hard times. Back in 1997, 
members of the ANAP asked me to enter politics with the ticket of their party. 
                                                          
69 Interview with local party chairperson of the AKP in Merkezefendi, Denizli, 27.08.2016. 
70 Interview with local party chairperson of the AKP in Alanya, Antalya, 24.07.2014. 
71 Interview with local party chairperson of the HDP in İstanbul, 11.11.2016. 
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At first, I did not have such an intention to enter politics. However, they 
insisted. Hence, I started my political career with such a request.”72 
Thus, invitation by parties may also motivate individuals to start their political career. 
This may derive some people to actively participate in politics even though they did not 
have intentions before. A very similar story was told by another interviewee with regard 
to the beginning of his political career: 
“I started my political career as a local branch chairperson as I was asked by 
the party to run for that office. I have worked at public office for long years. 
Through my service, I visited many villages, and other parts of the city. I had 
interactions with many citizens, and we became familiar with each other. So, 
I became a person who is known by many residents of our district. I became 
a member of the party after my retirement, and then party members in the city 
invited me to run for district branch chair indicating that my experience with 
my occupation might create good opportunities both for me and the party. At 
first, I was not sure whether I can handle this, but eventually I decided to run 
for this office, and I won the race.”73 
Some individuals might need to consider their entrance to politics in greater detail. Even 
though they have required qualifications, motivation and even invitation from parties, 
they may opt out. The reason for such decisions was usually indicated by women, or about 
women and youth. First of all, the following quote reveals the possible problems that a 
woman may face in politics: 
“I believe that having women in politics is very vital. The attitude of the ones 
who occupy managerial positions matters with regard to gender issue. The 
number of women members is lower than men in our provincial branch, but 
we are trying to take attention to the importance of having more female 
members. It is not easy for a woman to be actively working in a party. No one 
told me to enter to politics, but after I decided to do so, my family supported 
me. It is very helpful and important for women to get the support of their 
spouses and families. I have a child and I do not want her to be apolitical. If 
my child wants to enter politics, I would support her.”74 
In order to tackle the difficulties and problems that women encounter in terms of political 
career, several party actors mentioned that they are trying to encourage women to 
participate more. Hence, they underlined the opportunities and encouragement provided 
by the parties: 
                                                          
72 Interview with local party chairperson of the CHP in İstanbul, Tuzla, 06.07.2014. 
73 Interview with local party chairperson of the CHP in Denizli, Acıpayam, 26.08.2016. 
74 Interview with local women branch chairperson of the MHP in Kayseri, 21.10.2016. 
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“We are in favor of full gender equality in the party and have gender quota to 
realize that goal. Moreover, we implement 20 percent youth quota to increase 
their chances of participation.”75  
Nevertheless, not only women but also young individuals seem to have concerns with 
regard to their entrance in politics. Many local party members underlined the importance 
of having young members in the parties, and indicated that starting from bottom as a 
young person and developing a political career with experiences in various levels of the 
party is valuable. Nevertheless, it was indicated by some interviewees that even though 
their local party branches have a number of women and young members, those who spend 
most of their times at the party office are mostly the middle aged men or retired people.76 
It seems that especially those who consider to be active members of the opposition parties 
feel that being affiliated with those parties may negatively affect their future with regard 
to finding jobs or staying in their current jobs. For example, it was mentioned that, 
“I did not start my political career from bottom, but of course it is a precious 
thing to start from the bottom and climb the ladders to top by gaining 
experience. This way you would have broad range of insights about politics. 
For example, it is very important for a young individual to start from the youth 
branch and aim for higher offices later. However, we do not have many young 
members nowadays. Because some of them mention their concerns about 
being members of an opposition party.”77 
Nonetheless, participation of women and youth shows diversity from one local branch in 
one district or province to another, even within same party. In other words, depending on 
geographical stance and demographical characteristics of the cities, the number of women 
and youngsters actively working for the parties change. For example, it seems that while 
it is not so easy to have female and young members in Sultanbeyli for the CHP, it is more 
likely to have more members in Kadıköy for this party. 
Besides above-mentioned concerns, which may hinder individuals from entering politics, 
there may be other constraints such as legal regulations. One can also regard this as the 
lack of opportunity to start political career. According to the SPK, every Turkish citizen 
who is at least 18 years old and who has competence to use civil and political rights can 
become members of political parties in Turkey. However, there are certain limitations to 
that regulation. For example, public servants are not permitted to become party 
                                                          
75 Interview with local party chairperson of the HDP in İstanbul, Mecidiyeköy, 11.11.2016. 
76 Interview with local party executive committee member of the CHP in Kayseri, in 21.10.2016. Also, interview with 
local party chair of the CHP in İstanbul, Sultanbeyli, in 17.07.2014. 
77 Interview with local party chairperson of the CHP in Denizli, Acıpayam, 26.08.2016. 
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members.78 Hence, even if a public servant has political ambition he or she needs to wait 
until retirement or resignation from office before this individual becomes a card-carrying 
party member. Some interviewees mentioned this while explaining their entrance into 
politics: 
“While I was a university student, I thought that the CHP was the closest party 
to my ideological stance. However, I could not become a member of the party 
since I was a public servant. Hence, I became a member of the party after my 
retirement.”79 
Still, as it can be inferred from this answer, this individual did not lose his political 
ambition for several decades, and realized his goal eventually. 
Above mentioned motivations are very important for the initial phase of becoming 
politicians. Moreover, one may argue that political ambition may continue to exist even 
if the opportunities are not yet provided to start a political career, as illustrated above. 
Nevertheless, one may still have difficulties to fulfil his or her political career aim even 
if such motivations derive that person. The reason for that is, along with motives and 
opportunities, there should be one more thing for realizing their political participation as 
a political party actor: resources. Although social mobility increased, and political offices 
became attractive to larger groups of people, and although the composition of legislative 
elite changed over time in the country, one thing still continues to be a differentiating 
factor among all aspirant individuals who desire to become politicians and who can attain 
political office: a certain amount of wealth and time to spend for politics. Significance of 
spare time and certain amount of money to spend for party and the electorate have been 
underlined by various studies (Güneş-Ayata, 1992; Schüler, 1999; Gençkaya, 2000; 
Uysal and Topak, 2010). Interviewees also emphasized, as a common characteristic 
among the four parties, that having a certain amount of wealth and flexible time is quite 
important for being a party elite and a politician in general. To illustrate, 
                                                          
78 SPK (Law No: 2820)’s Article 11 regulates the membership to political parties in Turkey. According to this article, 
public servants cannot become members of political parties. Please see the Turkish version below: 
“Madde 11 – (Değişik birinci fıkra: 12/8/1999 - 4445/4 md.) Onsekiz yaşını dolduran, medeni ve siyasi hakları 
kullanma ehliyetine sahip bulunan her Türk vatandaşı bir siyasi partiye üye olabilir. 
Ancak; a) (Değişik: 12/8/1999 - 4445/4 md.) Hakimler ve savcılar, Sayıştay dahil yüksek yargı organları mensupları, 
kamu kurum ve kuruluşlarının memur statüsündeki görevlileri, yaptıkları hizmet bakımından işçi niteliği taşımayan 
diğer kamu görevlileri, Silahlı Kuvvetler mensupları ile yükseköğretim öncesi öğrencileri siyasi partilere üye 
olamazlar.” 
 
79 Interview with local party executive committee member of the CHP in Kayseri, 21.10.2016. 
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“The most important thing is time for providing services. […] Especially 
being a local party chairperson is like working non-stop, as if working 24 
hours a day. […] it is all about voluntary act.”80  
In addition to this, 
“It requires too much time to occupy positions like local branch chairs. To be 
provincial party chair, for instance, you should definitely have a certain 
amount of time and money.”81 
Similarly, another interviewee underlined that, having no time constraint is quite useful 
to spend more time in party work, and having flexible working hours in professional 
occupations may be helpful especially during election campaign times.”82 
It seems that in order to have flexible time and a certain amount of wealth, some 
occupations provide better opportunities. For example, having your own business or a job 
with flexible hours enable individuals to focus more on party works. Even if some 
individuals work in companies owned by others, they may still find enough time to spend 
for the party, if their bosses are also supporters of the particular party. With regard to such 
issues, one interviewee emphasized that: 
“It is advantageous to engage with trade related jobs. You are less constrained 
with regard to the economy and time related issues. I mean, if you are working 
with fixed hours, it will be less flexible for you. Or you should be a retired 
person...”83 
It seems that the importance of flexible time and having a certain amount of wealth is 
usually applicable in multiple levels of political offices from local branches to legislative 
positions, especially for working in election campaign processes, election campaign 
spending and party expenses. Moreover, other features such as high level of education 
and having party experience before candidacy seem to be an important factor for 
nomination. 
“Candidates in general elections are usually selected by the party 
headquarters. There are several important factors for those candidates to be 
                                                          
80 Interview with local party chairperson of the AKP in Alanya, Antalya, 24.07.2014. 
81 Interview with local party chair of the CHP in Acıpayam, Denizli, 26.08.2016. 
82 Interview with local branch executive committee member of the AKP, Ümraniye, İstanbul, 22.07.2014. 
83 Interview with local party chairperson of the CHP in Ümraniye, İstanbul, 17.07.2014. 
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selected: education (this is important for meritocracy) and coming from the 
grassroots.”84 
The importance of free or flexible time and wealth also appears with regard to clientelistic 
relations in the country which explained in Chapter 4. Section 7.2 of this Chapter also 
provides helpful insights about who are recruited by political parties by specific reference 
to clientelism in Turkey.  
Above mentioned interests, motivations and decisions to enter politics generally explain 
nascent political ambition (Fox and Lawless, 2005). Nevertheless, entering politics is not 
the end point of realizing political career goals. Politicians develop differing desires, aims 
and future prospects after they start their political career. The following subsections 
provide examination of different types of ambitions and career choices of political elites 
in Turkey.  
 
7.1.2. Static Ambition, Legislative and Party Careers in Turkey 
 
Static ambition leads the politicians to seek to be re-elected for or re-appointed to their 
current offices (Schlesinger, 1966; Strom, 1997; Schwindt-Bayer, 2011). In other words, 
the politicians with static ambition do not seek other -especially higher- offices, and they 
desire to make long-run career out of a particular office. For example, MPs who served 
through multiple legislative terms are identified as pursuing static ambition as they run in 
general elections more than once to occupy the same office. Hence, re-nomination is vital 
for such MPs. Such individuals have static ambition as they wanted to stay in their current 
office. At this point, their continuity in candidacy matters for inferring static ambition 
regardless of their chance of being elected. Nevertheless, as discussed in the Chapter 6 of 
this dissertation, re-nomination does not necessarily mean that they will be elected again, 
thus they need to be nominated in electable positions. Regarding this, it is possible to 
infer that the respective candidate nominees in general elections need to have certain 
qualities or attributes to raise themselves above the crowd and make themselves to be 
selected by the party selectorate. 
Being re-nominated is not a hard task for party leaders and other prominent members; 
however, others need to show that they are worth to be re-nominated in future elections. 
                                                          
84 Interview with local women branch chairperson of the MHP in Kayseri, 21.10.2016. 
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Hence, MPs who pursue static ambition (i.e. seek for re-election) try to be recognizable 
by the leaders, and their behavior may be shaped by this drive. For example, political elite 
may signal their loyalty to their parties and especially to leaders in order to secure their 
selection and re-nomination. Such politicians may use many ways to show their 
enthusiasm and ambition. From parliamentary speeches (Yıldırım et. al, 2017) to unruly 
behavior in the TBMM (Kalaycıoğlu, 1990), various tools have been used by the MPs in 
Turkey, and those indeed increased the chance of re-nomination of those individuals.  
Other than parliamentary activities, one quite visible way to indicate their ambition to be 
re-nominated by showing their loyalty and hardworking characteristic is organizing 
personal webpages and updating their activities on them. For example, sharing many 
pictures with the party leaders, or pictures from electoral campaigns, local visits and 
constituency meetings clearly show those politicians’ work both to the party leadership 
and electorate. This way, MPs have chance to show their diligence and dedication to the 
party work. Nevertheless, not all MPs have personal webpages, and not all party 
selectorate or voters visits those webpages. Hence, some politicians prefer to use social 
media accounts such as Facebook and Twitter to show their enthusiasm in politics and 
their parties. On these accounts, MPs not only share their individual thoughts but also 
their parties’ stand points. They also share many photos from their constituency visits, 
party meetings and legislative activities. One may expect that MPs seeking re-election 
extensively use such accounts and other opportunities which make them to be visible.  
Thus, the reason to broadly use such tools is that visibility and recognition may play 
significant role in political careers of individuals. Visibility means not only being 
recognized by party leadership but also by the constituency. Hence, politicians usually 
attend to crowded ceremonies organized by the constituents such as weddings, funerals 
and meeting organized for the individuals beginning military service (asker uğurlama) or 
who are preparing for Islamic pilgrimage. Moreover, appearance on media also influence 
the recognizability of those individuals. For example, one interviewee emphasized that, 
“MPs’ visits to the city are quite important. For instance, they should attend 
weddings of our residents and make themselves to be more visible to the 
electorate. This also signal that those MPs work hard and spend time and 
effort for the district. However, people also follow news to see whether their 
representatives are active. Even if an MP is working hard for the constituency, 
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people may not be informed about it if that MP is not on TV while they are 
naming the problems of our city.”85  
Hence, those politicians need to be quite active to be regarded as hardworking politicians 
both by the parties and the electorate, if they desire to be re-elected to their current elected 
offices. 
Besides MPs, party elite may also pursue static ambition. Even though some individuals 
pursue progressive ambition in earlier periods of their political career, they may develop 
static ambition over time. One of the interviewees told that, 
“I started my political career at the youth branch of the party in Kayseri. Then 
I became a member of municipality council in one of the districts in the city, 
and member of executive committee of another district branch. Now I am 
serving as a member of provincial branch executive committee member. […] 
I am not planning to run for a higher office, but I would like to stay in my 
current position. I am spending a huge amount of my time in the party office, 
from 09:00 in the morning to 18:00 in the evening, 6 days a week.”86  
These individuals are still dedicated to politics, yet either do not expect to higher their 
political career even if they wanted or they do not have any motivation or will to aim any 
higher positions.   
“If someone wants to occupy a higher office in the party, that person should 
actively participate to election campaigns (should work throughout those 
activities). Such members will be evaluated regarding their hard work… I do 
not have any motivation to seek for a higher office, but I would like to stay in 
my current office. Nevertheless, we would like to open the way for our young 
members. I wish they would come and have these offices.”87 
 
It seems that especially the elderly party elite seem to have static ambition and their 
ambition eventually turns into a discrete one through time. In other words, individuals do 
not necessarily stick to one type of ambition: 
“Previously I was in a district branch of the party, then I had this position in 
provincial branch. However, I am not seeking a higher office. For me, all 
positions within the organization is important.”88 
                                                          
85 Interview with local party chairperson of the CHP in Acıpayam, Denizli, 26.08.2016.    
86 Interview with local party executive committe member of the CHP in Kayseri, 21.10.216. 
87 Interview with local party executive committe member of the CHP in Kayseri, 21.10.216. 
88 Interview with local women branch executive committee member of the MHP in Kayseri, 21.10.2016. 
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Schlesinger (1966: 10) underlined the assumption that “…one type of ambition is unlikely 
to remain constant for any one politician over his lifetime.” Answers mentioned above 
support this assumption. While initial type is progressive ambition for a politician, that 
may evolve into a static type of political ambition if that person chooses to stay in the 
current position and pursue a long-term political career there. 
 
7.1.3. Progressive Ambition in Turkey 
 
Schlesinger (1966) argued that the legislative elites who aim to occupy a higher office 
compared to their current office show different behaviors compared to the less ambitious 
politicians. A similar argument can be applied to other politicians operating in various 
levels of political offices, public offices or civil society organizations. Regarding this, 
aiming for any higher office may show progressive ambition. For example, individuals 
show their progressive ambition by running in elections (and becoming MPs or mayors) 
while previously working in non-political offices, serving as CSO members or party elite. 
Although CSO membership provide useful opportunities for political participation and 
influence in decision making process, such kind of membership may not be as salient as 
being an MP or a party elite with regard to political careers.  
Moreover, being a party elite is quite an important political career step, but its level is not 
as high as legislative office or other elective offices. If any of those party elite who 
operates in lower levels of the party branch aims for any other level in the party 
organization, this can also be identified with progressive ambition.89 As another example, 
data compiled for this dissertation reveal that municipal council members usually hold 
local party branch membership and positions such as women branch chairs or deputy 
chairs before their election. Eventually one may argue that they pursued progressive 
ambition by running in local elections while they were only operating in the party local 
branches. One example for progressive ambition is as follows: 
                                                          
89 Seeking for leadership positions in a political party is identified as intrainstitutional ambition, and it is explained in 
Section 7.1.5 in this Chapter. Nevertheless, aiming any other higher position than the current position within the party 
organization is regarded as progressive ambition here. 
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“I have been working in the party for 20-25 years. I started with youth branch 
membership and then I was elected to municipal council membership. I am 
now serving as deputy district branch chair.”90 
This person started from very bottom, and gradually increased the political position in the 
party by aiming higher levels of offices without losing his progressive ambition over time. 
A similar path prior to the current office was mentioned by another interviewee who 
started as a youth branch member of the party in the district, then served as a deputy chair 
of this branch, became a member of district branch executive committee and was 
nominated for the municipal council membership before serving in the current office.”91 
Many other similar cases were indicated by other interviewees as well. Hence, they were 
appreciating step by step promotion in local party offices. Still as it was explained, some 
others also occupy chairperson positions directly if the party believes that those 
individuals are suitable and noteworthy to appoint or elect to those positions.    
Another indication of progressive ambition is resigning from or leaving the current 
offices, in order to run for higher political offices. Massicotte et al. (2004) explained such 
decisions as follows, 
“…in a federal country where membership in a state or provincial legislature 
is incompatible with membership in the national legislature, a state 
legislature, a state legislator may run for national office without resigning his 
or her present position, thus enjoying all the advantages of incumbency, 
including indemnity, throughout the election campaign. If state legislators are 
ineligible for the national parliament, they must resign prior to running for 
office and risk having seat at all in the end.” (Massicotte et al., 2004: 40). 
 
Similar to the latter case presented in the above quotation, public servants or bureaucrats 
need to resign from their office in Turkey in order to announce candidacy in national or 
local elections. Not only public servant or bureaucrats, but also mayors need to resign 
from their position if they want to run in general elections. With this decision, they show 
that they have progressive ambition, and they want to climb the ladders of political career. 
Regarding these, one may argue that pursuing progressive ambition goals is not always 
risk-free. The reason for this is that even if a mayor or a bureaucrat resigns from his or 
her office to become candidate nominees and declare enthusiasm for legislative career, 
                                                          
90 Interview with local party deputy chairperson of the CHP in Acıpayam, Denizli, 26.08.2016. 
    
91 Interview with local party chairperson of the AKP in Merkezefendi, Denizli 27.08.2016. 
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this person may not be selected as a candidate by political parties. Under such 
circumstances, that would be a hard task for that person to continue the previous office. 
Thus, such decisions need to be given by careful calculations and considerations by those 
individuals. Nevertheless, it seems that many who decide to leave their current offices in 
order to run for legislative office usually have an insight that they can become candidates 
on party lists. Still, this does not guarantee their electability. Hence, among all political 
ambition types, progressive ambition can be regarded as one of the riskiest paths for many 
individuals, especially if there are party-centered elections rather than candidate-centered 
ones, closed-party lists rather than open-party lists, and centralized parties with exclusive 
selectorate rather than an inclusive group.  
Once, Schlesinger (1966) argued that governors of New York and Mississippi or South 
Dakota would not be acting or behaving in similar ways: While those governors of New 
York may act like presidential candidates, the others will not show a similar behavior. 
We can argue that, this is related to the relative saliency of the same offices in different 
cities. Even though same offices with same structures are occupied with different 
individuals, specific features of the cities -such as socioeconomic development levels- 
where those offices are located may influence their significance. For example, being a 
provincial party branch chairperson in İstanbul would bring way better network 
opportunities, access to resources and interaction with a large group of electorate which 
increases the recognizability of that chairperson compared to a local party branch in a 
smaller province in Turkey.  
Indeed, the data compiled for this dissertation show that a considerable number of the 
MPs who formerly served as provincial or district branch chairpersons or members are 
from largest and most developed cities of Turkey, such as İstanbul, Bursa, Antalya, 
Gaziantep and Kocaeli. Table 7.2 shows the electoral districts where MPs had local party 
experience, and where at least 5 observation occurred like that. It is clear that İstanbul as 
the largest, most populous and most developed city, has the largest number of MPs who 
previously worked in local party offices. This indicates that local party branch chairs and 
members in İstanbul enjoy more chance to be nominated in general elections and it is 
more likely for those party elite in İstanbul to embark on legislative careers. 
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Table 7.2: Cities with highest numbers of MPs with local party experience (2002-2015) 
Provincial Branch Chairpersons Provincial Branch Members 
District Branch 
Chairpersons 
District Branch 
Members 
District Name 
Number 
of MPs District Name 
Number 
of MPs 
District 
Name 
Number 
of MPs 
District 
Name 
Number 
of MPs 
İstanbul (2) 18 İstanbul (1) 24 İstanbul (1) 14 Bursa 10 
İstanbul (1) 17 İstanbul (3) 22 İstanbul (3) 11 İstanbul (1) 9 
Bursa 16 İstanbul (2) 20 İstanbul (2) 10 Aydın 8 
İstanbul (3) 12 Antalya 16 Bolu 9 Bolu 6 
Gaziantep 11 Bursa 15 Manisa 8 
Adana, 
Mersin 5 
Kocaeli, Ordu, Antalya 10 Kocaeli 13 Sakarya 7     
Malatya, Trabzon 9 Gaziantep 11 Bursa 6     
Adıyaman, Batman, 
Yalova 8 
Aydın, Malatya, 
Samsun 9 Aydın 5     
Ankara (1), Aydın, 
Bolu, Samsun 7 
Adıyaman, İzmir (2), 
Kahramanmaraş 8         
Denizli, Kırıkkkale, 
Konya 6 Bolu, Ordu, Yalova 7         
Isparta, İzmir (2), 
Kahramanmaraş, 
Mersin 5 Batman, Kırıkkale 6         
    
Afyonkarahisar, 
Ankara (1), Balıkesir, 
Bitlis, Denizli, Sivas, 
Tokat, Trabzon  5         
Note: This table shows the cities with at least 5 MPs who formerly served in respective offices indicated in table. Each 
and every observation was regarded as a unique one, hence, repetitive names of same MPs were not removed from the 
calculation.   
 
One interesting result here is that Ankara and İzmir, which are the second and third largest 
and also developed provinces have fewer MPs with party experience compared to others 
indicated in Table 7.2. This may be due to that MPs elected from these cities either have 
more top-level party elite jobs (i.e. in party headquarters), or have more proximity to the 
party leadership; hence even if they do not have local party experience, they can be 
nominated as candidates in legislative elections from electable places in the party list 
ballots. Moreover, all party headquarters are located in Ankara, and a number of party 
headquarters elite are also residents of that city. This may increase the level of 
competition over electable candidate ranks on party lists. Hence, even if local party elite 
may be nominated in general elections, they may get lower ranks while party headquarter 
members may be promoted by higher rank candidacy.  
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Shifting from one political office to another may not work in same patterns for every 
politician. For example, several interviewees indicated that being a lower level elite seems 
to be an important prerequisite prior to be a higher-level party actor. 
“I define becoming a party actor as a citizenship duty. I have been serving in 
various levels and positions of the party such as membership to provincial 
branch executive committee membership, district branch membership, party 
delegate position and so on. I believe that experiences gained through those 
positions are significant, and I think that higher level political actors should 
gradually climb political career ladders by starting from the bottom, so that 
they can be more experienced. I am planning to be active in politics in the 
future as today.”92 
 
Similarly, as explained in the Chapter 6 of this dissertation, once they were elected, local 
party experience increases the re-nomination chance of MPs in future elections. In other 
words, data reveal that there seems to be more people run for general elections coming 
from local party offices which are especially in more developed and migrant receiving 
cities; however, being a local party chairperson does not have a significant effect on 
mayoral candidacy (Yıldırım and Kocapınar, 2018). Hence, one may argue that once 
those politicians with local party experience develop progressive ambition, they aim for 
legislative office rather than municipal office, or political parties select those as general 
election candidates instead of mayoral candidates. 
Although above mentioned career paths generally follow a road from lower levels to 
higher levels of local party offices, or from local party offices to legislative offices, there 
is a significant number of political elite who directly occupy higher levels of offices 
without prior experience in almost four parties. Several interviewees underline that this 
is because those elites have certain networks in the party, they use their family ties, or 
they have shown themselves in other works for the party -rather than working in the lower 
level offices such as youth branches or district branches. 
 
While some interviewees indicated their past or current progressive ambition, others 
clearly mentioned that they do not pursue any higher offices anymore. In other words, 
                                                          
92 Interview with local party chairperson of the CHP in Pamukkale, Denizli, 26.08.2016 
. 
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even if they pursued higher office goals previously, they now lost their progressive 
ambition, and mostly developed either static ambition or discrete ambition: 
“I do not aim for any higher positions, because I do not have any kind of 
ambition to do so. I wish to see rather a younger person or a woman in this 
position (district branch chair). We should pave the wave for them.”93 
 
Political ambition does not necessarily be sufficient to achieve political career goals since 
parties’ recruitment decisions play significant roles. Related to this issue, centralist party 
structures and exclusive candidate selection in Turkey were explained in Chapter 4. 
Several interviewees hint that working hard in the party is quite important for being 
recognized and evaluated. With such hard work, the superiors such as party chairpersons 
may evaluate those members and may reward them with other positions within the parties. 
Hence, those practices eventually shape political ambition of those individuals. 
Under those circumstances, political ambition of individuals may be shaped by the signals 
or decisions of the higher-level party elite. For instance, even if a person wishes to occupy 
a higher office in the party, he or she may not necessarily pursue that goal:  
“I would like to be seeking higher office, but it is more important to make our 
party to reach higher levels of success.”94  
 
Other arguments revolve around the idea that education or hardworking may not always 
work positively in careers of some individuals. Such beliefs may also shape individuals’ 
ambition type. Some choose to leave as they see that there are not appreciated, but some 
others continue to actively work for the party even though they think that they will not be 
promoted. It is indicated that, for example, if there are particular teams in the parties, they 
may favor those who are closer to such teams, and it is not always possible to occupy 
higher positions in the party for those who are not recognized by such teams.”95   
Such practices provide insights about exclusive recruitment patterns of parties, on the one 
hand. On the other hand, an opposing case was underlined by explaining the collective 
                                                          
93 Interview with local party chairperson of the CHP in Acıpayam, Denizli, 26.08.2016. 
94 Interview with local women branch executive committee member of the MHP in Kayseri, 21.10.2016. 
95 Interview with local party member of the CHP in Adana, 04.11.2016. 
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selection of MP candidates, indicating that the candidate selection process includes a 
broader group of people, in other words an inclusive selectorate: 
“We are trying to have candidates from various backgrounds such as Alevis, 
Armenians, women, youngsters and so on. Of course, political experience is 
vital, yet our quotas in the party increases diversity in candidate composition. 
The party has various constituents (bileşen), and we are collecting their 
suggestions about candidates, and once they recommend candidates, we do 
not necessarily question their decisions and eventually prefer to nominate 
those candidates on our party lists. […] Since we have a pluralist structure, 
having different ideas or thoughts do not create serious problems in the party. 
[…] For example, we use zipper method for our candidate lists. […] As we 
have many constituents, there are various recommendations coming from 
those with regard to candidates in elections. For example, women generally 
select female candidates, young members decide the names of young 
nominees on the candidacy lists or Armenians pick their own candidates in 
the party.”96  
 
This practice seems to be different from exclusive selection method. Still, it is indicated 
that candidate lists are finalized by the party headquarters and specifically by party 
leadership in all parties.  
Chapter 6 examined the reasons of individuals’ deal/compromise with parties to be 
nominated in non-electable positions. Electable positions are generally defined as safe or 
secure seats or winnable positions (Ashiagbor, 2008) or eligible positions (Put and 
Maddens, 2013) which almost guarantee the election of the candidates nominated in 
those. For example, “…if a party won four seats in a constituency at the previous election, 
the first four positions on the list are normally considered as eligible or realistic.” (Put 
and Maddens, 2013: 55). The candidates who are nominated in those positions can be 
defined as “favourites” (Ecevit and Kocapınar, 2018). Those who are given other ranks, 
hence, will have less chance to be elected. Thus, progressive ambition is also shaped by 
the practices of parties’ recruitment strategies. 
Table 7.3. shows the number of candidates who had at least one candidacy experience in 
previous elections (regardless of their electability), and nominated in current elections as 
well. It is notable that number of such candidates are significantly high in November 2015 
General Elections. The reason for this is that November 2015 General Elections were 
                                                          
96 Interview with local party chairperson of the HDP in İstanbul, 11.11.2016. 
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snap elections, as it occurred within five months of the June 2015 General Election, and 
there was a very short time period to finalize the candidate lists. Not only that, but also 
especially opposition parties did not want to revise their candidate lists, as they did not 
feel necessity to do so. Thus, continuity of candidates was higher in the latest elections 
analyzed in this dissertation. 
 
Table 7.3: Number of candidates with pervious candidacy experience (2007-2015) 
Parties 
2007 2011 June 
2015 
November 
2015 
AKP 196 208 199 387 
CHP 111 127 156 365 
MHP 101 180 151 308 
HDP N.A. N.A. 55 302 
Total 408 515 561 1362 
 
Nevertheless, when we look at the other cases, we can see that the numbers are relatively 
low. Meaning that, winnable positions are occupied by the newcomers as well as the ones 
with previous candidacy experience, as they are not filled all by experienced politicians.   
Such candidates secure their electability to a great extent. Thus, one may argue that those 
safe seats are open to ones who would like to start their legislative career but did not have 
any candidacy before. It was explained in the Chapter 6 that candidates with low ranks 
expect to push their candidacy order to more electable places in future elections, hence 
they compromise with parties to be nominated in noneligible places in current elections. 
In addition to that, results in Table 7.3 signal for those individuals without any experience 
in legislative politics that their nomination in winnable positions is likely to some extent, 
as the numbers show that not all places are filled.  
Moreover, Table 7.4 shows the number of candidates who have been nominated at least 
once in the previous elections, and nominated as favorites (in winnable positions) in 
current elections by parties.  
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Table 7.4: Number of candidates with previous candidacy experience and ranked in 
winnable positions in current elections (2007-2015) 
Parties 
2007 2011 June 
2015 
November 
2015 
AKP 169 177 147 239 
CHP 59 44 66 129 
MHP N.A. 58 37 73 
HDP N.A. N.A. N.A. 78 
Total 228 279 250 519 
Note: This table does not include the candidates nominated by the 
HDP in June 2015, because calculation of favorite candidates is 
not available as the party did not compete in elections prior to 
2015. 
In comparison to that, Table 7.5 reveals the number of candidates who also had previous 
candidacy experience at least once, but not nominated as favorites in current elections. 
Table 7.5: Number of candidates with previous candidacy experience but not ranked in 
winnable positions in current elections (2007-2015) 
Parties 
2007 2011 June 
2015 
November 
2015 
AKP 27 31 52 148 
CHP 52 83 90 236 
MHP N.A. 122 114 230 
HDP N.A. N.A. N.A. 229 
Total 79 236 256 843 
Note: This table does not include the candidates nominated by the 
HDP in June 2015, because calculation of favorite candidates is 
not available as the party did not compete in elections prior to 
2015. 
 
The number of such candidates were 79 in 2007, 236 in 2011, 256 in June 2015 and 843 
in November 2015 General Elections. Among those, the MHP seems to have the largest 
group of candidates who previously run in elections but not nominated in safe positions 
in the current elections. 
Previous section showed that a considerable number of MPs pursue static ambition as 
they become candidates in multiple elections and seek for re-election. However, the tables 
above also show that there is a sizable group of individuals who have been candidates in 
multiple general elections. Some of those still appear on the lists even if they are not 
elected. Hence, they are still aiming for their legislative career goal which should be 
indicative of their progressive ambition. 
192 
 
As explained in the Chapter 6 of this dissertation, total served term in the TBMM has 
negative correlation with re-nomination, and its effect is statistically significant. In other 
words, as MPs serve longer terms in the TBMM their likelihood to be re-nominated in 
the next elections decreases. One reason for this may be the loss of interest of such long 
served MPs in running in elections who already spend long years in the TBMM. 
Moreover, one may interpret from this result that political parties tend to select 
newcomers or legislatively less experienced MPs to nominate in the upcoming elections. 
This may also explain the high turnover rate in the TBMM. Nevertheless, although total 
served terms negatively affect re-nomination chance, holding ministerial positions seem 
to have positive correlation with this variable. More specifically, if an MP occupy a 
ministerial position in current legislative term, his or her likelihood to be re-nominated in 
next elections increases.  
 
7.1.4. Discrete Ambition and Resignation of MPs in Turkey 
 
Political ambition is mostly identified with personal interest, and if that interest is no 
longer available, individuals may seek to retire from their office or exit politics. This is 
generally defined as the end of a political career. Under such circumstances, “…politician 
wants the particular office for its specified term and then choses to withdraw from public 
office.” (Schlesinger, 1966: 10). Many factors may influence this decision of politicians 
such as loss of political interest, loss of political efficacy feeling, age, family issues, 
economic interests and so on.  For example, one interviewee indicated that, 
“First, I became a member of the party, then served as executive committee 
member of a district branch of the CHP. Now, I am a member of executive 
committee of provincial branch. Due to my age, I am not planning to be a 
candidate for this position in the future.”97 
Such decisions are not peculiar to party elite only. MPs, mayors or other kind of political 
elite may choose not to run for office again. For example, municipal council membership 
seems to be a political career that it is more temporary compared to positions of local 
party chairs, mayors and MPs as several interviewees indicated. Similarly, some MPs or 
mayors may also prefer exiting politics by not running in future elections after their terms 
are over. Moreover, MPs may choose to resign from their offices while the legislative 
                                                          
97 Interview with local party executive committe member of the CHP in Kayseri, 21.10.216. 
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term is not over. Although above mentioned activities imply the static or progressive 
ambition of MPs, not all MPs pursue the goal of being re-nominated by their parties and 
re-elected. Although this may not necessarily mean that they are completely exiting 
politics, it is at least clear that they are ending their legislative careers with this decision. 
Yet, as Table 7.6 shows, the number of MPs who resign from their offices is notably low 
in the country, and zero for many legislative terms. However, resignation is not limited 
to leaving legislative office. 
Table 7.6: Number of MPs who resigned from their legislative office (2002-2015) 
 22nd Term 23rd Term 24th Term 25th Term 26th Term 
Number of MPs who 
Resigned from their 
office 
2 
(1 AKP, 1 CHP) 
0 0 0 1 
(CHP) 
Note: This table does not include those who resigned for preferring other elective offices such as mayoral positions. 
Please see the following pages for details of such cases.  
Besides resigning from the office, another important political career decision of the MPs 
is resignation from their parties but continuing as an independent MP in the TBMM. For 
instance, only two parties, namely the AKP and CHP won seats in the TBMM in 2002 
General Elections along with 9 independent MPs98. Nevertheless, a number of MPs both 
from the AKP and CHP resigned in 22nd Legislative Term while still continuing their MP 
positions in the TBMM. Some of them continued as independent MPs while some shifted 
between those two parties and others engaged with political parties other than the AKP 
and CHP. Resignation from a party does not necessarily annul the title of MPs in Turkey. 
In other words, if an MP does not resign from his or her legislative office while resigning 
from his or her party, this MP can still continue to serve in the TBMM. Under such a case, 
the MP in question can either continue as an independent deputy or start a new affiliation 
with another party. As a result of this, the number of parties represented in the TBMM 
may increase even though they do not have party groups.  
This was what happened throughout the 22nd Legislative Term in the TBMM. Although 
there were only two political parties represented in the TBMM as a result of the 2002 
General Elections, seven political parties had MPs at the end of the term.99 Increase in the 
represented number of parties in the TBMM was not only related to party shifts of MPs 
                                                          
98 Please see the following link for more details: 
http://www.ysk.gov.tr/doc/dosyalar/docs/2002MilletvekiliSecimi/turkiye/milletvekilisayisi.pdf. 
 
99 Please see the following link for more details: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/2-partiyle-basladi-7-partiyle-
bitti-6657172.  
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but also to initially independent MPs’ engagement with parties after their election. Table 
7.7 shows the number of status changes of MPs who switched between parties or became 
affiliated with parties while they were previously independent. 
Table 7.7: Number of MPs who switched their status and party affiliation in the 22nd 
Legislative Term 
 Number of MPs who switched their status 
 Once Twice Three times 
More than 
three times 
22nd Legislative Term 9 31 4 4 
Note: This table includes each step of status change after the election. E.g., if an MP was elected 
with a party ticket, then resigned from the party and became an independent, it was calculated 
as one. However, if this MP ten became affiliated with another party, then it was calculated as 
two. 
For example, one MP in 22nd Legislative Term was elected as an independent, then 
engaged with the ANAP in 2003, then resigned from the party, became an independent 
MP once again, and shifted to the AKP after a while (TBMM Albümü 1920-2010, 3. Cilt, 
2010: 1483); several MPs were elected with the CHP ticket, then resigned and became 
independents, and then affiliated with the AKP (TBMM Albümü 1920-2010, 3. Cilt, 
2010: 1457, 1458, 1460); several MPs were elected with the AKP ticket, then resigned 
and became independents, then joined to the DYP, resigned and served as independent 
MPs once again, and finally affiliated with the ANAP (TBMM Albümü 1920-2010, 3. 
Cilt, 2010: 1459, 1480);  some even changed their status up to seven times like an MP 
who started with the AKP affiliation, resigned and served as independent, then joined to 
the LDP, became independent once again, shifted to the ANAP, resigned from this party, 
became independent and finally joined to the GP (TBMM Albümü 1920-2010, 3. Cilt, 
2010: 1493). Moreover, some MPs founded new political parties through 22nd Legislative 
Term, and started to be affiliated with those (TBMM Albümü 1920-2010, 3. Cilt, 2010: 
1459, 1492).100  
Table 7.8 reveals the direction of party or status switching of MPs in the 22nd Legislative 
Term. It reveals that although there were no MPs who switched from the AKP to CHP, a 
number of MPs preferred to shift to the AKP even though they were elected with the CHP 
ticket.  
 
                                                          
100 Please also see the following link for more details: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/yasar-nuri-ozturk-parti-
kurdu-38696941. 
195 
 
Table 7.8: Direction of MPs’ party or status switching in the 22nd Legislative Term  
Direction of Switching Number of MPs 
From AKP to CHP 0 
From CHP to AKP 7 
From AKP to any party other than the CHP 12 
From CHP to any party other than the AKP 11 
From AKP to Independent 7 
From CHP to Independent 7 
From Independent to AKP 4 
From Independent to CHP 0 
From Independent to other parties, or independent again 2 
 
Moreover, it is observable that a number of MPs who were elected with the AKP or CHP 
tickets then preferred to switch to other political parties which did not have a party group 
in the TBMM such as ANAP and DYP. Additionally, 14 MPs seem to leave their parties 
by resigning and they became independent MPs through that legislative term. 
Such changes and shifts among parties were more common through the 22nd Legislative 
Term, yet the number of similar cases decreased over time. For example, although several 
shifts of MPs from the CHP to DSP, and from DTP to BDP (right after the foundation of 
the latter) were observed, and although a few MPs from the AKP became independents 
through 23rd Legislative Term, it seems that number of such party switches dramatically 
dropped, especially for the AKP MPs (TBMM Albümü 1920-2010, 3. Cilt, 2010: 1527-
1602). This decline may show that party groups in the TBMM became more disciplined 
throughout time. Even though several incidents made some MPs to resign from their 
parties in various points of time in other legislative sessions, it seems that not many MPs 
pursued to goal of affiliating with other parties after their election to the TBMM. Hence, 
their political ambition differs from others who change their affiliation. Such resignations 
did not show any loss in political ambition, on the contrary, showed the enthusiasm of 
those MPs to improve their status or ambition to find closer parties to their ideological 
stance by engaging with other parties. Nevertheless, as indicated above, several MPs 
decided to resign from their office completely due to loss of ambition for that position.   
Loss of interest or motivation is not the sole reason for ending a political career. 
Exogeneous factors may also shape political ambition and career patterns of individuals. 
For example, a number of MPs lost their right to continue their legislative careers due to 
legal regulations and laws in Turkey. More specifically, several MPs’ titles were annulled 
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in accordance with the Constitution. Table 7.9 shows the number of MPs whose 
legislative career ended due to exogenous factors such as termination of their title or 
death. 
Table 7.9: Number of MPs whose legislative career ended due to exogeneous factors 
 22nd Term 23rd Term 24th Term 25th Term 26th Term 
Number of MPs whose 
title was annulled on 
Constitutional grounds 
0 2  
(HDP) 
0 0 11  
(HDP) 
Number of MPs who 
lost their lives during 
legislative terms 
7  
(3 AKP, 3 CHP, 
1 ANAP) 
6 
(3 AKP,  
2 MHP, 1 BBP) 
4 
(1 AKP, 1 CHP,  
1 HDP, 1 KADEP) 
0 1 
(AKP) 
 
Cancellation of MP titles are observable for the MPs who have been affiliated by either 
the DTP, BDP or HDP. Although such annulment cases did not occur in the 22nd, 24th and 
25th terms, several MPs’ titles were cancelled in the 23rd and 26th legislative terms. Indeed, 
the number of such cases reached the peak point in the 26th Legislative Term resulting in 
the termination of the office of 11 HDP MPs. These cases indicate the end of legislative 
careers of those individuals even if they did not have discrete ambition. 
Moreover, terms limits may hinder individuals from continuing their legislative career, at 
least for certain amount of time as an exogenous factor. Such limits are not implemented 
by many parties in Turkey, but the AKP used that for one period for general elections. 
Additionally, by-laws of the AKP limit the election of the same chairman (in district and 
provincial areas) with 3 ordinary successive periods at most.101 All the branches of the 
party should act accordingly, and for example, even if a local branch thinks that a local 
party boss will be successful if he/she is elected one again (after 3 periods), the party by-
laws restrict it. Since the local branches are bounded by these regulations, political 
ambition of party elite may be influenced. Recently, in 2018, implementation of a similar 
practice is indicated for the mayors of the AKP which will limit mayors to serve three 
consecutive terms at most in the same district. This will be implemented in the upcoming 
Local Elections in March 2019, and 92 mayors in total cannot not be candidates in the 
districts where they have been serving as mayors for three consecutive terms.102 Under 
                                                          
101 AKP by-law, Article 31 and Article 36, retrieved from: http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-tuzugu. 
 
102 Please see the following link for more details about the three term rule for mayors of the AKP and mayors who 
cannot be nominated in the same districts in the 2019 Local Elections: https://www.ntv.com.tr/video/turkiye/ak-
partide-3-donem-kuralina-takilan-belediye-baskanlari-kimler,rjCQ2JUZAkC6NuAQAUwutA. 
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those circumstances, those mayors need to leave their office even if they still have static 
ambition and desire to re-election to their position. 
Another exogenous factor is the renewal of the elections in certain districts. Although this 
is not a common issue, it seems to affect the legislative careers of individuals. For 
example, 2002 General Elections were annulled and repeated in Siirt which had 3 seats, 
and all three MPs who were elected in the regular elections lost their MP title as a 
consequence of this decision of renewing elections in the district. Such cases may also 
put an end to legislative careers of individuals.  
Thus, both exogenous and endogenous factors may make politicians to leave their office 
either during their term or after the term is over. Even though discrete ambition is seen to 
be related to endogenous factors, some of the above-mentioned exogenous factors may 
also make politicians to re-evaluate their political career choices.  
 
7.1.5. Intrainstitutional Ambition in Turkey 
 
Intrainstitutional ambition is defined as “members’ desire for leadership positions within 
their present institution” (Herrick and Moore, 1993: 765). Hence, for political parties, one 
may identify the individuals who try to occupy the party leaders’ office as pursuing 
intrainstitutional ambition. 
Challenging party leaders to replace them has not been an unexpected act in political 
parties in Turkey, yet it is not very frequent. Moreover, there have been differing cases 
of leadership alternation in different parties in the country; however, one common 
observation has been that challengers to existing party leaders encounter various 
difficulties with regard to leadership change in many parties.   
One important reason of difficulties to replace party leaders while they do not want to 
leave their office is the centralist and leader-oriented structures of parties, which is closely 
related to high levels of party discipline in Turkey. More specifically, parties in Turkey 
have been defined as having “…no significant internal democracy […] Ideas are not 
generated within parties where debate is discouraged. Obedience rather than competition 
governs the parties' political culture.” (Rubin, 2002: 3). Thus, “oligarchic and top-heavy 
nature of internal party structures” of Turkish political parties have been underlined by 
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many scholars (Hale, 2002: 166). In order to increase internal democracy levels in the 
parties, several regulations of the SPK intended to develop a democratic nature in the 
parties with regard to elections within the parties and leadership change. For instance, the 
SPK indicates that the parties shall hold a National Convention (Büyük Kongre) at least 
once in three years, and the party leader (Genel Başkan) must nominate himself/herself 
for re-election. The intention is that, there may be other candidates running for this office 
in the party, and alternation may occur depending on the discretion of the party delegates. 
Nevertheless, it is very unlikely to change the party leader in these conventions (Hale, 
2002: 185). Meaning that, in many political parties, changing the leader of the party via 
elections in national conventions is not a common practice of political parties in Turkey. 
On the contrary, there is either the current leader as the only candidate in those 
conventions or the party leaders sometimes point out their successors as the candidates. 
Thus, there is a tendency that the leaders decide and nominate through the conventions, 
and the other members of the party usually accepts this practice. Under such 
circumstances, the current leader of a party may be consolidating his or her power by 
getting re-approval of the members and delegates of the party. Consequently, such a 
practice can enable the center to further concentrate the control power in its hands.  
Challenges against party leaders may have varying consequences. For example, if parties 
do not have internal democracy, attempts coming from any group or faction which try to 
replace top ranks of the parties would face either a party split or leadership change, 
however, this also depends on the “the level of power concentration within the dominant 
faction” because “If the power is concentrated in the hands of a small elite, the divisions 
within the elite can help the oppositional faction remove the party leader. If the power 
resides only with a single leader, the oppositional faction is likely to lose the struggle 
against the dominant faction and decide to exit” (Ayan Musil and Dikici Bilgin, 2014: 1). 
The following quote further explains the consequences of opposition to leadership in 
many parties in the country in details: 
 “Another instrument frequently used to control party membership is that of 
activating the dismissal mechanism for members perceived as opposing the 
existing party administration with the claim that they are not acting in 
accordance with party discipline. This has been applied frequently since the 
beginning of the multiparty regime. Three members of the CHP, namely 
Adnan Menderes (future prime minister), Refik Koraltan and Fuat Köprülü, 
were dismissed from their parties in 1945. They then established the DP, 
together with Celal Bayar. Later, the leadership of the DP dismissed some 
Parliamentarians of the party in 1948. In 1962, Kasım Gülek (former general 
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secretary of the CHP), Nihat Erim (future prime minister) and Avni Doğan 
were debarred from the CHP for a year. The dismissal mechanism has been 
used as a tool routinely in Turkish political life. Even former Secretary 
General of the CHP (Ertuğrul Günay) was dismissed from his party in 1990s. 
During the past decade, some parliamentarians […] and party members […] 
who had active roles in their parties were dismissed from their parties. A 
recent search of the Turkish popular media over the one-year period January 
2011 to January 2012 shows that all three parties (AKP, CHP and MHP) 
represented in the Parliament have dismissed several party members during 
this period.” (Kabasakal, 2014: 708). 
Hence, not only those who seek leadership positions in the parties but also those who 
reveal their opposing ideas to the existing leaders or to ranks of the parties may face 
punishment within political parties. Such practices eventually may discourage any 
individual with intrainstitutional ambition, and that person may need to revise or re-
evaluate the political career decisions. 
Although some parties constituted more or less institutionalized recruitment patterns 
throughout time, especially the post-1983 parties have shown certain characteristics that 
the selection of the candidates, resolution of the problems among various party organs 
and the management of the party group in the Parliament have been controlled by the 
central branch and sometimes specifically by the leader of the parties; and by having the 
ability to control the candidate nomination, and access to the various sources of patronage, 
these leaders personalized the leadership (Kalaycıoğlu, 1990: 196-197; Sayarı, 2002: 25). 
Hence, the party leaders enjoy a broad range of powers and it is not easy to challenge 
party leaders to replace them. 
Through 2002 to November 2015, there have been a number of leadership changes in the 
AKP and the CHP, but not in the MHP. Moreover, there have been some challenges to 
the leaders of the CHP103 and MHP which did not lead to any leadership change. For 
example, a severe dispute emerged between Deniz Baykal and Mustafa Sarıgül in 2007 
as there emerged dissatisfaction with Baykal’s policies in various levels of the party: 
“The delegate selection process for the national party convention had to take 
place following the CHP’s defeat in the parliamentary elections on July 22, 
2007, when several leaders of the provincial and district party organizations 
revealed their dissatisfaction with the central party policies and the Baykal 
administration. One of the most representative public opinion surveys on the 
parliamentary elections demonstrated that among the CHP voters the 
percentage of the people who recognized the need for a new party and the 
need for a new leader in solving Turkey’s problems was 34.8 percent and 59.6 
                                                          
103 Please see the following link for more details: https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2014/09/140905_chp. 
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percent respectively.37 The distrust for the Baykal administration was 
therefore evident among voters. Following the outbreak of this distrust, a new 
faction within the party emerged under the leadership of the Şişli mayor, 
Mustafa Sarıgül, who, after the parliamentary elections, began making 
statements in the media about his intentions to be the next CHP party leader 
and sharply condemned the Baykal administration for the CHP’s failure in 
elections.38 He attempted to gather all the CHP opposition members under his 
leadership and organized backdoor meetings with the provincial and district 
party chairs whose roles had been marginalized in the party.39 However, 
Sarıgül soon was expelled from the party by decision of the party disciplinary 
committee.” (Ayan, 2010: 204). 
Hence, quite a similar case occurred to what explained by dismissal mechanism by 
Kabasakal (2014) during the competition and dispute period between Baykal and Sarıgül 
in the CHP. 
Still, from time to time, several political party leaders encountered with severe disputes 
or competitive rivals in party leader elections which at the end led to leadership change. 
For example, İsmet İnönü was replaced by Bülent Ecevit as the leader of the CHP in May 
1972 as Ecevit won the votes of 826 delegates out of 913 after severe disputes in the party 
and resignation of İnönü from the leadership position.104 Nevertheless, a number of cases 
ended up without any change in leadership positions, but with a clear end of challengers’ 
career in respective parties. For example, four candidates who indicated their will to run 
for the leadership position of the MHP to compete against Bahçeli were criticized by him, 
and all those four people left the party at the end of this process.105 In some other cases, 
leadership alternation occurred but decision for that change was given by the existing 
leaders. For example, Erdoğan was elected as President of the country in August 2014, 
and he needed to leave the leadership position in the AKP. During that process only one 
candidate, Ahmet Davutoğlu, was nominated for this position with the support of 
Erdoğan, and he was elected as the party leader by the party delegates.106 Since there were 
no other candidates who declared that they would compete against Davutoğlu, that 
alternation in leadership position did not create any disputes within the party. 
                                                          
104 Please see the following links for the details of this election and others in the CHP: 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/yorum/chpnin-bol-cekismeli-kurultaylari-998280/, 
and http://www.ismetinonu.org.tr/partiden-kopus/. 
 
105 Please see the following link for more details: 
https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2016/05/160512_mhp_muhalifler_karar. 
 
106 Please see the following link for more details: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/ahmet-davutoglu-genel-baskan-
secildi-27088866. 
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All in all, centralist structures of political parties in Turkey seem to hinder leadership 
change to a large extent, even if there emerge some groups or individuals who wish to 
realize this goal. Nevertheless, even under such circumstances, individuals show their 
intrainstitutional ambition by competing against the leaders in national conventions, or 
by indicating that they would be candidates (even if they cannot). Still, compared to other 
types of political ambition, this type is pursued by a considerably small number of 
politicians in the country. 
  
7.1.6. Regressive Ambition and Preferring Lower Level Offices in Turkey 
 
Not all politicians pursue a goal of staying in their current offices for long periods or 
occupying higher offices through their political career. From time to time, individuals 
may feel that running for a higher office is not possible, or continuing with the current 
office is unlikely. Those individuals may exit politics if they do not believe that they can 
go further in their political career paths. Nevertheless, such individuals may still have 
political ambition which make them to stay in politics. Under those circumstances, 
another option stands: he or she may prefer to run for a lower office. Of course, there may 
be other options such as preferring a non-elected office, yet when we focus on elected 
offices, selecting lower level ones may be the only option to select. This decision is 
defined as regressive ambition which is called as “…an oxymoronic expression” (Leoni 
et al., 2004: 123). However, this oxymoronic type of political ambition is not always for 
the ones who feel themselves electorally vulnerable or who do not believe that they can 
achieve a better office goal: 
“For ambitious politicians, climbing down the career ladder with regards to 
elected office may be more attractive based on one’s particular circumstances 
given the higher rate of success. Moreover, many ambitious politicians seek 
non-elected office, and … most are successful at gaining positions in the 
bureaucracy or doing party work.” (Kerevel, 2013: 27). 
Hence, one may argue that aiming for lower level offices does not necessarily indicate a 
loss in political ambition. It is more expectable from politicians to seek election for lower 
level offices if they believe that they will lose any election to higher positions. What is 
interesting to see is politicians’ decisions to leave their higher level offices for lower level 
ones even if they are already elected as in some cases in Turkey. We may argue that this 
is a more specific type of regressive ambition.  
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As explained in the Chapter 6 of this dissertation, a number of MPs in the TBMM 
formerly served as mayors or municipal council members for one term or longer. More 
specifically, data show that 5 percent of the MPs were previously mayors and 9.7 percent 
of the MPs had municipal council membership prior to their legislative career. Although 
the numbers are not high, it is still important to see the presence of this group to 
understand their progressive political ambition. In other words, such an experience 
provides good opportunities for a person to be recognized by the electorate which may 
increase his or her chance to be selected by a party as a candidate in general elections. 
Occupying a legislative office after municipal office is an upward political mobility from 
local level to national level politics. Hence, those who select a path like this are identified 
as pursuing progressive ambition.  
Nevertheless, a number of individuals prefer a path which is the opposite case of above-
mentioned pattern. In other words, some MPs prefer mayoral positions over MP positions 
after their legislative career or even while they are serving in the TBMM.  
Three local elections were held in Turkey between 2002 and November 2015, one in 
2004, other one in 2009, and another one in 2014. Hence, MPs with such paths (from 
legislative office to municipal office) may be observable in the 22nd Legislative Term 
(2002-2007), 23rd Legislative Term (2007-2011) and 24th Legislative Term (2011-2015). 
Table 7.10 shows the number of MPs who preferred to become mayors while they were 
MPs in the TBMM. 
Table 7.10: Number of MPs preferring mayoral positions over MP positions (2002-
2015) 
 22nd Term 23rd Term 24th Term 
Number of MPs Preferring Mayoral 
Positions over MP Positions 
0 1 (CHP) 10 (4 AKP, 3 CHP, 3 BDP) 
 
Although the numbers are quite low, and even though there were no MPs chose this 
downward mobility path in 22nd Legislative Term, it is still noteworthy that the number 
of such MPs dramatically increased from 23rd to 24th Legislative Term. It seems that more 
MPs were attracted by local politics even though they were elected to the national 
legislature. With regard to political ambition theories, this may be explained as regressive 
ambition as the preferred office is lower than the existing one. Nevertheless, it does not 
necessarily mean that municipal offices have lower salience for all politicians. Indeed, 
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such cases show that those mayoral positions provide better opportunities for the political 
careers of those who select them over their national politics career.  
Regressive ambition can be defined as a survival strategy in politics. For Turkish case, 
staying in politics seem to be a harder task than entering to politics as several interviewees 
underlined which are explained in the previous pages. Many parties in Turkey have 
detailed party by-laws; the election process of the district or provincial party chairpersons, 
their responsibilities, relations with different organizations within and without the party 
are regulated by those. As another example, certain kinds of incentives can be used for 
consolidating the power of the center and increasing its control capacity (Ayan, 2010). 
For example, the Article 43/F of the CHP by-laws allows the party headquarters/party’s 
central actors to dismiss a local branch’s members, if there emerge a vote loss compared 
to the previous elections in the specific location under its jurisdiction (province, district 
or smaller areas) (CHP, 2012: 60). Even if the party headquarters do not use this right so 
much, such kind of an article can make the local branches to feel the pressure of the 
center. Hence, when such regulations are executed, some politicians, especially party 
actors, may need to pursue a regressive ambition even if they did not intend to do so. 
Regarding this, one interviewee indicated that, 
“There may be unexpected things to occur such as dismissal. For example, 
electoral defeat in a district may be regarded as your own fault. […] Being in 
politics requires motivation and will to struggle with problems and difficulties 
that you encounter. From time to time party members who served for long 
years in the party may not be selected as candidates even if they want to. So, 
there may emerge some problems with regard to political career. But one 
needs to continue to work hard to stay in politics.”107  
Under such circumstances, politicians may think that aiming for a higher office will not 
be the best option. Rather, they would compromise to stay in their current offices or to 
occupy even lower offices. Because, this may be their only chance to stay in politics. 
Above mentioned case (preferring mayoral positions over MP position) is more of an 
individual decision, and can be regarded as a progressive ambition as it bring better 
political career opportunities to those politicians. However, having a necessity to prefer 
lower level offices due to party decision is more related to recruitment and dismissal 
processes rather than sole individual discretion. Moreover, preferring a lower level office 
due to expected electoral vulnerability in other offices is a also a sign of regressive 
                                                          
107 Interview with local party chairperson of the CHP in Pamukkale, Denizli, 26.08.2016. 
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ambition. Thus, differentiating between those decisions may provide better insights about 
political career decisions of individuals. One may argue that not everyone who seek for 
lower level offices pursue regressive ambition. The saliency of the office and expected 
utilities may drive some politicians to select lower level offices over higher level ones.  
 
7.2. Political Careers and Clientelism in Turkey 
 
All types of political ambition that are mentioned in the previous sections can be 
observable in Turkish politics. Regarding these, individuals may develop different 
strategies and career path decisions. These decisions are shaped by parties’ discretion and 
individual attributes of those politicians. With regard to individual attributes, pre-
parliamentary political experience such as local party experience plays important roles. 
Nonetheless, other features seem to be also necessary to stay in politics. Chapter 4 of this 
Dissertation explained the history and broad practice of clientelism in Turkish politics. It 
seems that along with political ambition, proximity to the electorate and chance and will 
to provide certain services and goods for the constituency have positive effects on 
political careers in the country. It was argued that “…Where party competition focuses 
on the national parliament, long-standing national legislators will simultaneously stand 
near the pinnacle of the party hierarchy, visible to voters, and wield the knowledge and 
institutional connections to get things done in office…” (Pemstein et al., 2015: 1422). As 
explained in the beginning of this chapter, politicians’ visibility to the party leaders play 
important roles in political career paths. In addition to that, being visible to the voters is 
also decisive in career success of those politicians. 
First of all, being recognized by the constituents and having proximity to electorate is 
seen as a quite important attribute especially for local party chairpersons. 
“Your roots are very important in politics. When people wonder about a 
person, they first look at his or her past. […] If I go to another district (to run 
for a local party chairperson position), regardless of my hard work, I may not 
be a local party chairperson. The people would ask who I am, where I come 
from, who my father/mother is... The reason is that, it is not an easy task to 
build trust.”108 
                                                          
108 Interview with local party chairperson of the CHP in Ümraniye, İstanbul, 17.07.2014. 
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It was also indicated that localism increases the chance of being familiar with the 
constituency and being more trusted by the electorate in particular districts. 
“Living here for long years is an advantageous factor for this position for sure. 
For example, in this district, almost 80 percent of the residents come from 
various parts of Turkey. You should be familiar with their culture. In the 
weddings, funerals, and other occasions, you should share feelings with these 
people. […] when we meet the people in public, they all can hug me.”109 
These issues are also closely related to party-voter relations. As a reminder, since the 
beginning of the multiparty period in Turkey, political parties had strong clientelistic 
relations with the electorate (Kabasakal, 2014: 707). Hence, clientelism and party 
patronage is observable in many aspects of Turkish politics: a significant number of 
citizens stop by the offices of the deputies for seeking personal assistance from these 
parliamentary elite which is a sign of the importance attached to the clientelistic relations 
(Sayarı, 2011: 88).110 As a result of such practices, a significant number of the deputies 
(more than a half) have been spending their time –as a regular activity- on “finding jobs 
and providing other services or benefits for constituents” (Kalaycıoğlu, 1995: 47, 49). 
More specifically, the demanded services and goods have been “jobs and employment, 
favorable treatment from the bureaucrats and state officials, assistance in finding medical 
care in Ankara, and influence peddling in a variety of different issues.” (Sayarı, 2011: 
89). Thus, it is significant to find enough time and money to spend for such party works, 
and also will to deal with individuals’ demands in order to continue political careers. Even 
though political parties have a certain amount of funds distributed to the local offices, 
almost all interviewees mentioned that those funds are not enough to cover all the 
expenses of the party. For example, they need to find additional sources to spend for 
electoral campaigns or other occasions, or promotions to distribute to the electorate.  
With regard to distributed materials and goods, several interviewees indicated that they 
give some promotional products such as pens, perfumes and coffee. Nevertheless, it is 
also mentioned that the people will probably not vote for them by just considering the 
quality of those products.  
                                                          
109 Interview with local party chairperson of the CHP in Tuzla, İstanbul, 06.07.2014. 
 
110 Sayarı (2011: 88-89) also refers to a survey which was conducted on this issue and which reveals that more than 
half of the parliamentarians receive between 50 and 300 visitors every week. For more information please see: Turan, 
İ. 2000. Parlamentoların Etkinliği ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi. In Devlet Reformu: TBMM’nin Etkinliği. 
İstanbul: TESEV. 
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It was mentioned that some people stop by the local party offices with the demands of 
health payments or flat rents.111  However, it was also indicated that local branch does not 
give cash money to the needy people, but rather help them in the form of food or free 
educational assistance. Similarly, others stop by the local party offices to raise their 
problems which require municipal solutions, especially if the mayor was elected from 
that party.112 
The interviews reveal that many voters regard meeting with local party actors as a direct 
source of finding solutions to their problems, concerns and demands. These demands are 
generally located around finding jobs (especially in public sector and municipalities), 
reaching health service and educational assistance similar to the ones explained in 
previous studies with regard to voter and MP relations (Kalaycıoğlu, 1995; Sayarı, 2011). 
Nevertheless, the demands of the constituents vary in a wide range from lawyer assistance 
to finding accommodation. Moreover, problems and demands of the electorate also vary 
depending on the living area. To illustrate, issues about land title (tapu) and town planning 
(imar) are mentioned as one of the major problems during an interview while it was not 
necessarily mentioned to a large extent in other districts.”113 Additionally, there can be 
other complaints which are not related to material issues, but rather ideological. One 
interviewee underlined the complaints of the people saying that their thoughts cannot find 
a place in the municipality of the district. Meaning that, the events or activities organized 
by the municipality (which is run by another party) do not cover their needs, but rather 
the municipality party’s ideas take place in organizing social events.114  
Regardless of the content of the demand, it is usually hinted that local party offices are 
like intermediaries between the citizens and the state or party headquarters. Hence, it 
seems that patterns previously explained by other scholars (e.g. Güneş-Ayata, 1994) still 
continues in Turkish politics, and such practices have important implications on elite 
recruitment and political career paths of the individuals.  
 
                                                          
111 Interview with local party executive committee member of the CHP in Alanya, Antalya, 25.07.2014. 
112 Interview local party chairperson of the MHP in Alanya, Antalya, 25.07.2014. 
113 Interview with local party chairperson of the CHP in Sultanbeyli, İstanbul, 17.07.2014. 
114 Interview with local party chairperson of the CHP in Ümraniye, İstanbul, 17.07.2014. 
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7.3. Concluding Remarks 
 
Political ambition was defined as a personal thing. However, individuals shape their 
political ambition by evaluating their circumstances with regard to their chance of being 
recruited by parties, analyzing the availability of possible positions to occupy or offices 
to run, considering their competitiveness in nomination races and deciding the relative 
salience of various offices for themselves. Hence, individuals pursing political career 
goals need to take various exogenous and endogenous factors into consideration while 
determining their goals. 
Data on MPs and legislative candidates in Turkey reveal that it is possible to detect at 
least a certain number of politicians pursuing each one of the political ambition types 
mentioned above. Nevertheless, not each ambition category contains same numbers of 
politicians. One may argue that the largest group of the MPs show static ambition as they 
prefer to run for legislative office in future elections. Moreover, as various interviewees 
mentioned, static ambition seems to be the most common type especially for the elderly 
in local party offices.  
Regarding the previous research, it seems that seeking party leadership positions is 
discouraged to a large extent due to centralist tendencies of political parties in the country, 
hence, the number of politicians with Intrainstitutional ambition seem to be small 
compared to above mentioned categories.  
Additionally, especially elderly politicians serving in local party offices seem to have 
discrete ambition, but the interview results also indicate that politicians with no discrete 
ambition may also need to leave their offices if the parties use their discretion in that 
direction.  
Lastly, regressive ambition seems to be observable with the legislative politicians who 
would like to embark on local politics careers, or who already had mayoral experience 
prior to their legislative career. Although regressive ambition has been identified as a 
survival strategy by some scholars as indicated above, those politicians in Turkey seem 
to select local offices not as a survival strategy in politics, but as a more salient choice for 
their political careers. 
Moreover, political context and political practices have important influence on political 
ambition and careers of individuals. Especially with regard to clientelism practices in the 
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country, localism, occupation and wealth seem to play important roles in the recruitment 
processes of political elites in general.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This dissertation aimed to explain the determinants of political career patterns of political 
elites in Turkey by detailed analyses of elite recruitment by parties and political ambitions 
of individual politicians. Literature provided two important explanations with regard to 
elite recruitment and candidate selection: supply-side and demand-side explanations. As 
indicated on the previous pages, various studies unearth the centralist and authoritarian 
structures of political parties in Turkey. This characteristic seems to one of the most 
influential factors on elite recruitment by political parties and political career mobility.  
More specifically, exclusive candidate selection methods seem to be employed in general 
by political parties in Turkey, and one may argue that this characteristic is emphasizing 
the importance of demand-side explanation of elite recruitment and candidate selection. 
Nevertheless, it seems that other factors may also influence these decisions, and career 
mobility of party elites. Thus, examining the effects of socioeconomic backgrounds, 
political experience and motivations of the party elites seemed to be useful. In order to 
explain political career patterns in terms of previously mentioned research questions of 
the dissertation, socioeconomic backgrounds of political elites including age, gender, 
education, foreign language, localism and occupation; political experience backgrounds 
including served terms in the TBMM and bill initiation; party experience including local 
branch membership, chairmanship and women/youth branch memberships; local politics 
experience such as mayoral positions and municipal council membership; civil society 
organizations membership, public office experience, party ideology, district size and 
electoral results in districts were examined. 
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More specifically, Chapter 2 explained elite recruitment by political parties and its 
influence on political careers. Details of different patterns of elite recruitment and 
candidate selection strategies of political parties were explained by reviewing respective 
literature. Additionally, various types of party recruitment and candidate selection, such 
as inclusive and exclusive methods, and candidate selection strategies under different 
settings were mentioned. Following that, Chapter 3 explained political ambition and its 
impact on political careers decisions. Different categories of political ambition theories 
were explained with relevant literature review, and their reflections on political career 
patterns were underlined. Additionally, factors influencing political ambition and 
eventually the politicians’ decisions to remain in or exit politics were discussed in this 
chapter to reveal various theories on political ambition and strategical behavior of 
politicians.   
With specific reference to the Turkish case, Chapter 4 provided information about party 
politics in Turkey regarding the political culture, electoral system(s), party organization, 
legal regulations on political parties, party system(s) and party competition in the country. 
This chapter also included the explanation of two noteworthy characteristics of Turkish 
political parties and their relations with the electorate which are centralist structures of 
political parties and clientelism. Following this, Chapter 5 explained previously examined 
elite recruitment patterns and political ambition of individuals in Turkey. This chapter 
provided main features of party strategies in recruitment and candidate selection by 
reviewing the respective literature to explain previous practices and their possible 
reflections to today. Additionally, it included previous research on party elite and 
parliamentary elite, and their possible career choices with regard to political ambition in 
the country. 
 
After the examination of various categories of elite recruitment and political ambition 
provided by previously conducted research, and explanation of particular characteristics 
and past practices in Turkey, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 provided data analysis and 
evaluation of the findings.  
 
More specifically, Chapter 6 presented a detailed explanation of proposed hypotheses, 
data analysis and findings with regard to determinants of career patters of political elite, 
first-time first-ranked candidates, and candidates with low chance of electability in 
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Turkey. This chapter also included a comparison of political parties regarding the 
composition of their MPs, alternation in that composition over time and strategies about 
candidate selection in Turkey. Results showed that the composition of the MPs in the 
TBMM has changed through time. For example, educational backgrounds, occupations, 
gender distribution and foreign language knowledge of the MPs seem to have alternation 
compared to previous legislative terms which were examined in previous studies. It was 
revealed in the Chapter 6 that, compared to previous studies, although the educational 
levels of the MPs do not show dramatic differences from past, attended educational 
institutions by those MPs show more variety today as more MPs with religious 
educational attainment occupy seats in the TBMM over time. Moreover, although large 
groups of MPs had military backgrounds regarding their professions especially in the 
initial period of the Republican Era, as indicated by previous studies, MPs with 
engineering backgrounds started to occupy more seats both as MPs, PMs and Presidents 
of the country. According to the results, lawyers, engineers, academicians, doctors and 
businessmen construct the most crowded profession groups in the TBMM between 2002 
and 2015. As another change, percentage of female MPs increased over time which reveal 
a difference from the past composition of the TBMM which contained lower percentages 
of female MPs. Although the number of female MPs is still not sufficient to close the 
gender gap in politics in the country, at least the percentages seem to increase through 
time. Additionally, the data showed that the number of MPs who speak Arabic and 
Kurdish has increased between 2002 and 2015. Hence, more diverse groups of MPs 
emerged which are clearly different from the past composition of the TBMM explained 
in other research conducted on previous legislative terms as mentioned in the previous 
pages. Those changes provide important clues about the change in elite recruitment and 
political ambition of individuals in the country. Expansion of opportunities to run for 
office made more individuals to try their chances in political career. In the light of above-
mentioned results, Hypothesis 1a (Ideological differences of parties have impact on the 
socioeconomic composition of their MPs.) seemed to be supported, yet, partially as 
political parties show both similarities (e.g. with regard to educational levels and 
occupations) and differences (e.g. with regard to gender distribution, educational 
backgrounds and foreign language knowledge). 
 
It was also argued that, along with the socioeconomic backgrounds of the MPs, their 
political experience delivers insights about determinants of career patterns of political 
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elite in Turkey. The results showed that the party experience does have a positive effect 
on re-nomination of the MPs in the next elections. More specifically, results suggested 
that if an MP had local or national party office experience, his or her likelihood of being 
re-nominated in next elections increases. Hence, the Hypothesis 1b (Acquiring party 
experience has a positive effect on re-nomination of the MPs in the next general 
elections.) can be supported by the findings under these circumstances. Additionally, 
legislative experience (e.g. total served terms in the TBMM and ministerial positions) 
seems to play a major role in re-nomination chances, but they show opposing effects. 
While ministerial experience increases the likelihood of re-nomination, total served terms 
in the TBMM seem to decrease one’s chance to be selected as candidate in the next set of 
elections. These results suggest that pre-parliamentary experience, especially in the form 
of party experience increases the likelihood of re-nomination in the future elections. 
Political party selectorates may also choose those who had no experience in general 
elections as their candidates. Even so, they nominate some of them as their first-ranked 
candidates on their party lists in general elections. Data revealed that such candidates are 
strategically selected by political parties especially in districts where they do not have 
large swaths of supporters. That is to say, it seems that political parties tend to prefer 
revising their candidates lists, especially the first ranks if they could not win any seat in 
a particular district. In fact, by such strategies, some political parties won seats in districts 
where they previously received no significant success. Hence, one may infer from those 
findings that, revisions on party lists may provide better electoral opportunities for 
political parties.  Data showed that between 2007 and November 2015 general elections, 
almost 39% of the first-time candidates are first-time first-ranked candidates. Moreover, 
it was revealed in the Chapter 6 that party votes in the previous elections (t-1) negatively 
affect the emergence of first time first rank candidates. In other words, as the number of 
votes for the party in question decreases in a district, likelihood of nomination of first 
time first ranked candidates increases. Hence, Hypothesis 2 (Inadequate electoral support 
(i.e. insufficient vote share to win seats in a particular district) for political parties 
increases the number of first-time first-ranked candidates on party lists in general 
elections.) seemed to be supported under these circumstances. 
Additionally, with regard to continuity of the candidates and MPs, Hypothesis 3a (Party 
leadership change decreases the continuity of candidates in the elections following this 
change.) can be falsified under certain conditions only. It means that, the process and 
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characteristics of leadership change plays an important role in continuity of the 
candidates. If the newly elected leader of a party is personally close to the former leader, 
and/or if the heritage of the former leader is still influencing the party, no considerable or 
dramatic changes occur in the continuity of the candidates and eventually the MPs. 
Related to the above-mentioned explanations, data also showed that continuity on 
candidate lists are not very high in the country. This practice seems to be an opportunity 
for those who were nominated in unwinnable places or ranks. In other words, revisions 
and reshuffles on candidate lists may enable individuals who were previously nominated 
as lower ranked candidates to occupy higher and electable ranks in future elections. 
Hence, one may argue that Hypothesis 3b (Candidates who accept to be ranked in non-
electable positions expect to push their ranks to electable positions over time or rewarded 
by other positions in the party) was also supported by the findings. Some interviewees 
also indicated similar explanations with regard to low rank candidacy which also provide 
support to such an argument. 
Following Chapter 6, Chapter 7 revealed personal insights gathered through in-depth 
interviews conducted with local party elite in the country regarding political ambition and 
political career choices. More specifically, it provided information on individual 
politicians’ nascent interests, motivations and entrance to politics; their future goals and 
their evaluation about the political careers. Additionally, this chapter represented 
discussions on different categories of political ambition in Turkey.  
 
Political ambition seems to be personal issue. However, individuals shape their political 
ambition by evaluating their circumstances with regard to their chance of being recruited 
by parties, analyzing the availability of possible positions to occupy or offices to run, 
considering their competitiveness in nomination races and deciding the relative salience 
of various offices for themselves. Hence, individuals pursing political career goals need 
to take various exogenous and endogenous factors into consideration while determining 
their goals. Data on MPs and candidates in Turkey reveal that it is possible to detect at 
least a certain number of politicians pursuing each one of the political ambition types 
mentioned in the previous chapter. Nevertheless, not each ambition category has the same 
number of politicians. It seems that the largest group of the MPs show static ambition as 
they prefer to run for legislative office in next elections. Moreover, as many interviewees 
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mentioned, static ambition seems to be the most common type especially for the elderly 
in local party offices. 
In addition, although a number of career decisions are observable which are driven by 
intrainstitutional ambition, this type of ambition is not as common as others. Moreover, 
it seems that challenging to the party leaders to occupy the leadership position is not easy 
or common in Turkish political parties. Hence, several factors mentioned above seem to 
be discouraging some individuals either from entering politics or from seeking leadership 
position in political parties. It is observable that centralist and authoritarian structure of 
the parties in Turkey are also accepted and/or internalized by many members in various 
levels of the parties. For example, several interviewees from different political parties 
mentioned during the interviews that they were eager to occupy certain positions in their 
respective parties, yet, this is not enough to do that. Only if the party leaders (these can 
be local branch leaders as well as the national level ones) are approving their position, 
then they can have that position.  
Additionally, regressive ambition seems to be observable with the legislative politicians 
who would like to embark on local politics careers, or who already had mayoral 
experience prior to their legislative career. In the political ambition literature, regressive 
ambition has been identified as a survival strategy in general by some scholars as 
indicated in the previous chapter. However, in the case of MPs in Turkey, this kind of a 
decision seem to select local offices not as a survival strategy in politics, but as a more 
salient choice for their political careers. 
Moreover, political context and political practices have important influence on political 
ambition and careers of individuals. Especially with regard to clientelism practices in the 
country; localism, occupation and wealth of politicians seem to play important roles in 
the recruitment processes. These issues were also explained with the insights received 
from the interviews. 
To conclude, this dissertation provided answers to the questions of “What are the 
determinants of career patterns of political elite in Turkey?”, “Why and how do some 
individuals become first-ranked candidates even though they have never run in general 
elections prior to their candidacy?”, “Why do some individuals become candidates in 
general elections even though their electability chances are low?” by the help of two 
unique datasets compiled for this dissertation, and in-depth interviews conducted by local 
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party elites of four political parties, the AKP, CHP, MHP and HDP, in Turkey. Results 
show that the composition of the MPs in the TBMM has changed through time; 
ideological stances of political parties affect the composition of their MPs; political 
parties strategically revise their party lists and specifically change first-ranked candidates 
in districts where they are electorally vulnerable; and ambitious politicians accept 
unwinnable candidacy ranks with the expectation of pushing their ranks to electable 
positions in future elections. 
For future studies, expansion of those datasets and conducting interviews and surveys 
with MPs in the TBMM may be noteworthy on elite recruitment, political ambition and 
political career patters in the country. In addition, future studies on elite recruitment and 
political career patterns may also focus more detailed examination of ministerial elite or 
municipal elite. Such studies may further present important explanation about political 
career patterns in Turkey. Similarly, comparative analysis of various countries with 
regard to political career patterns may provide helpful information to understand the 
similarities and differences in varying systems and contexts. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
A.1. Electoral Districts and District Magnitude in Turkey 
 
Turkey has 81 provinces, and the borders of electoral districts are defined in accordance 
with those provinces. Nevertheless, between 2002 and 2015, three provinces namely 
İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir contain more than one electoral district as these cities are the 
top three most populated ones. İstanbul is divided into three electoral districts whereas 
Ankara and İzmir has two electoral districts per each. Hence, there are 85 electoral 
districts in total within the time period which is analyzed in this dissertation. District 
magnitudes are calculated in accordance with the population sizes of the electoral 
districts, and Table A1 shows number of seats of specific districts.   
  
Table A1: Electoral districts and district magnitude in Turkey (2002-2015) 
Electoral District 
District 
Magnitude Electoral District 
District 
Magnitude 
Electoral 
District 
District 
Magnitude 
ADANA 14 ELAZIĞ 4 MALATYA 6 
ADIYAMAN 5 ERZİNCAN 2 MANİSA 9 
AFYONKARAHİSAR 5 ERZURUM 6 MARDİN 6 
AĞRI 4 ESKİŞEHIR 6 MERSİN 11 
AKSARAY 3 GAZİANTEP 12 MUĞLA 6 
AMASYA 3 GİRESUN 4 MUŞ 3 
ANKARA 1 18 GÜMÜŞHANE 2 NEVŞEHIR 3 
ANKARA 2 14 HAKKARİ 3 NİĞDE 3 
ANTALYA 14 HATAY 10 ORDU 5 
ARDAHAN 2 IĞDIR 2 OSMANİYE 4 
ARTVİN 2 ISPARTA 4 RİZE 3 
AYDIN 7 İSTANBUL 1 31 SAKARYA 7 
BALIKESİR 8 İSTANBUL 2 26 SAMSUN 9 
BARTIN 2 İSTANBUL 3 31 ŞANLIURFA 12 
BATMAN 4 İZMİR 1 13 SİİRT 3 
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BAYBURT 2 İZMİR 2 13 SİNOP 2 
BİLECİK 2 KAHRAMANMARAŞ 8 ŞIRNAK 4 
BİNGÖL 3 KARABÜK 2 SİVAS 5 
BİTLİS 3 KARAMAN 2 TEKİRDAĞ 6 
BOLU 3 KARS 3 TOKAT 5 
BURDUR 3 KASTAMONU 3 TRABZON 6 
BURSA 18 KAYSERİ 9 TUNCELİ 2 
ÇANAKKALE 4 KİLİS 2 UŞAK 3 
ÇANKIRI 2 KIRIKKALE 3 VAN 8 
ÇORUM 4 KIRKLARELİ 3 YALOVA 2 
DENİZLİ 7 KIRŞEHIR 2 YOZGAT 4 
DİYARBAKIR 11 KOCAELİ 11 ZONGULDAK 5 
DÜZCE 3 KONYA 14 TOTAL 550 
EDİRNE 3 KÜTAHYA 4     
 
 
A.2. Factor Analysis of Independent Variables in MP Dataset 
 
MPs Dataset contains various independent variables on the personal attributes and 
political experience of MPs. Political experience variables include women or youth 
branch membership, district office membership, district chairmanship, provincial office 
membership, provincial chairmanship, party headquarters membership, proximity to the 
party leaders, mayoral positions, municipal council membership and civil society 
organizations membership. Factor analysis was used in order to group these variables and 
create new independent variables. Table A2 shows the results of factors analysis without 
any limitation on the number of factors.  
Table A2: Factor analysis of political experience variables 
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs       =     2750 
Method: principal factors                          Retained factors     =          5 
Rotation: (unrotated)                                 Number of params =        40 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Factor     Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Factor1        1.52230      0.41001            0.5902       0.5902 
Factor2        1.11228      0.63060            0.4312       1.0214 
Factor3        0.48169      0.17083            0.1867       1.2081 
Factor4        0.31086      0.25949            0.1205       1.3286 
Factor5        0.05137      0.05643            0.0199       1.3486 
Factor6       -0.00506      0.16043           -0.0020       1.3466 
Factor7       -0.16549      0.04581           -0.0642       1.2824 
Factor8       -0.21131      0.02314           -0.0819       1.2005 
Factor9       -0.23445      0.04830           -0.0909       1.1096 
Factor10     -0.28275            .                 -0.1096       1.0000 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(45) = 4596.13 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
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Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
Variable Factorl Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 Uniqueness 
Women and Youth Branch Membership 0.3828 -0.0027  0.0009 -0.1414  0.1637 0.8067 
District Party Membership 0.3945 -0.3363 -0.3739  0.0597  0.0272 0.5871 
Provincial Party Membership 0.6118 -0.2215  0.2901 -0.1061  0.0228 0.4807 
District Chairperson 0.4357 -0.2856 -0.3533  0.0947 -0.0576 0.5916 
Provincial Chairperson 0.5561 -0.1984  0.2772 -0.0526 -0.1134 0.5590 
Party HQ Member 0.3885  0.6371 -0.1060 -0.0117 -0.0075 0.4317 
Proximity to Leaders 0.3868  0.6423 -0.0645  0.0157 -0.0304 0.4326 
Mayor 0.0785  0.0688  0.1110  0.3674  0.0004 0.8418 
Municipal Council Member 0.0988 -0.0602  0.1548  0.3416  0.0497 0.8435 
Civil Society Organization Member 0.1742  0.0489  0.0665  0.1106  0.0606 0.9469 
 
 
In order to determine the number of factors, scree plot analysis was done, and relying on 
the elbow rule as the rule of thumb in this analysis, the number of factors is determined 
as four.  
Graph A1: Scree plot of eigenvalues after factor 
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Graph A2: Factor loadings of political experience variables 
 
 
Depending on the factor analysis, there emerge groups of various variables. Women and 
youth branch membership variable seems to be one variable, while district party 
membership and district chairperson variables can be grouped into one variable named 
district party experience; provincial party membership and provincial chairperson in to 
provincial party experience; party headquarters membership and proximity to leaders into 
party headquarters experience; mayor, municipal council membership and civil society 
organization membership into local politics experience. Although the other groupings 
make more sense, the last one seems to be odd by including the civil society organizations 
membership. Thus, different types of analyses were done in Chapter 7 by treating these 
variables in different ways.  
 
A.3. Interview Questions 
 
As mentioned in the previous pages, in-dept interviews were conducted with local party 
(district and provincial) members and chairs of political parties. The interview questions 
are shown in Table A3. Some of the questions are gathered from previous research as 
indicated in the table. The reason for doing this is to catch whether there are any 
similarities or differences from previous studies.  
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Table A3: Interview questions asked to local party elite115 
Question 
A. Questions about Political Career 
1. How many hours do you spend in party work in one week? 
2. Do you think that certain jobs enable people to work more efficiently in the party with 
regard to their time to spend for the party? 
3. Are you a member of another organization such as civil society organizations, business 
associations, trade unions and so on? 
4. Have you ever been a member to another political party? If yes, why did you decide to 
change the parties? 
5. Is there any other person who was/is a party member in your family? If yes, which party, 
and what was/is their roles?  
6. When did you become a member of this party? 
7. What are the three most important reasons that motivated you to be a party member?*  
8. Why did you specifically prefer this party to become a member?* 
9. What was your first work/job in the party when you become a member?  
10. What is your current position in the party? 
11. What kind of offices did you occupy until now? 
12. How did you come up to this position (chair, activity coordinator, etc.) in the party? Can 
you please share your story with me?* 
13. What are your most important roles in the party during ordinary times?  
14. What are your most important roles in the party during election times? 
15. What is your major source of funding for your party activities?*  
16. Do you collect membership fees?* 
17. Who do you think is the most powerful decision maker in the party about recruitment of 
new party actors? 
18. Who do you think is the most powerful decision maker in the party about candidate 
selection in elections? 
19. Do you want to stay in your current position or run for other offices? 
20. Suppose that you are considering having a higher position in the party, or to be candidate in 
national or local elections, whose support would increase your chance to achieve that goal? 
21. Do you think that a member should start from the bottom to get higher positions in the 
party? What are the common practices? 
B. Questions about Personal Information 
22. Date of Birth 
23. Place of Birth 
24. Father’s Date of Birth 
25. Father’s Place of Birth 
26. Gender 
27. What is your educational attainment? 
28. How many languages do you speak? 
29. What is your occupational status? 
30. How many hours do you spend for your professional occupation/job? 
 
                                                          
115 The questions marked with (*) are retrieved from Ayan (2009: 300-302)’s study titled Theorizing Authoritarian 
Party Structures: The Case of Turkey. 
